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INTRODUCTION

Is it possible to look out over the Ural Mountains and see Appalachia? To find the
character of the American West in the vast open space of Siberia? To smell the citrus
and feel the warm sun of the Black Sea coast and be struck with a sense of Florida?
This book is based on just such an idea: that we can look beyond our borders and
discover fundamental realities about places that transcend differences of culture,
language, and politics. Five American and four Russian geographers wrote this book to
provide glimpses of understanding about the United States and Russia. Despite the size
and power of our two nations and more than seventy years of cold war, we seem to have
a meager comprehension of each other, perhaps because each country is so often viewed
as a monolith and we emphasize our differences, rather than similarities.
The authors of this book worked together in the hopes of overcoming some
misimpressions of the past. Beyond Borders became an experiment - an attempt to
compare the United States and Russia by pairing up and analyzing eleven regions.
We have therefore taken the rather risky step of suggesting similarities between New
England and Novgorod, between Odessa and New Orleans, between Moscow and New
York. But perhaps the time has never been more appropriate for such a new approach
to geography because so many people seem adrift on the changing world
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map. In an era when established states are breaking up, new alliances are forming,
and the very idea of state sovereignty is being transformed, we may begin to question
whether all these lines on the map actually mean anything to people. Is there an
underlying “real” geography which can provide an anchor?
We believe that our regional scheme is somewhat like the well-trodden paths on our
campuses. People have an innate sense of the best routes, even when architects lay out
concrete sidewalks to the contrary. In writing our book, we have tried to reveal the long
trampled footpaths of real borders and regions, not the paved political boundaries that
often have little meaning for the lives and fates of human beings.
Letter written to a friend April 26, 1935:
You say, "Russia is not just a state...she is a superstate, an ocean, elements as yet unformed, not yet
pulled to its destined shore. [She has] not yet
begun to sparkle in a sharp and limited understanding of her own uniqueness, as the gemstone begins
to glitter within the rough diamond. She is still
in anticipation, restlessness, endless desire, and
endless organic possibilities. Russia is an ocean
of land which has swept up a whole one-sixth of the
earth, holding both East and West together by
the touch of her open wings. ~ N.K. Rerikh, The
Elected, Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya publ.,
1979, p. 303; transl. by K. Braden

While we do not try to minimize the differences between Russia and America, we
observed that people in the two countries have many similarities in the way they
spread across the continents, adapted to various environments, conquered or absorbed
indigenous people, and molded their respective geographies into a set of regions. But
how should that set be defined since the delineation of regions is in part dependent on
the criteria selected?
We decided to take a particular historic and cultural viewpoint in selecting the eleven
region-pairs of Beyond Borders. We began with the realization that the majority groups
in both Russian and American society were offspring of European parents whose seed
was transplanted into a North and South hearth in each country. But between these
two seedbed regions, something new was born: a Core area which was to become all
that one could define as uniquely American or Russian. American democracy was as
alien to Europe as Russian autocracy, yet for all their differences, these two Core regions
were similar in the creation of two novel cultures on the map.
As the new Russian and American societies burst out into the interiors of their
respective continents, a series of regions was formed, remarkably similar in their

2

function and characteristics: the Heartlands of industrial muscle, the food-supplying
Breadbaskets, the orphaned no-man’s-land Crossroads, the eerie Old Mountains, the
Tropical South playgrounds, the arid “Mexistans”, and the vast expanses of Land Ocean
that were the American West and Siberia. The waves of conquest and settlement moved
east and west respectively and finally met up at the Pacific Edge along a touchstone
called Alaska.
The idea of American "exceptionalism" is
valid if you take it in the sense that America
has its own civilization pattern...it does stress
the ways in which America has been favored
by geography and historical circumstance.
One view of the geographical theory underscores the expanse of continent, another
the expanse of oceans. The continental
version points out that America has been
blessed with a richness of resources...as few
other nations. The oceanic version points
to the stretch of the Atlantic and the Pacific
which enabled America to develop...far from
the wars and dynastic struggles of other
nations.~ Max Lerner, America As A Civilization, New York, Simon and Schuster,
1957, pp. 28-29

Could such an exercise be carried out for any two states on earth? Probably not, because
we believe that the United States and Russia are are unique in their historic and spatial
parallels. Even the geographic changes in what was the USSR have confirmed some
of the principles the authors foresaw at the beginning of this project. Many of the
republics which made up the USSR never really belonged in Russia as a wider cultural
realm, but were more like colonies. At the same time, beneath the arbitrarily drawn
boundaries of the republics, there was an underlying but hidden “real” geography
which may yet emerge politically into something more than Russia, perhaps a
recognition of the term “Rossiya”, loosely translated as “All Russia”. Rossiya includes
areas (such as North Kazakhstan) which have large Russia populations and where the
cultures and histories of local people were well intertwined with that of Russia. Our
scheme in this book, therefore, goes beyond the current political borders to focus on a
larger geography - on Rossiya.
At the same time, NAFTA, or the North American Free Trade Agreement, as well as
separatist movements in Canada, hint that the North American map itself may not be
beyond a redefining of political boundaries in the future. The experiment of Beyond
Borders suggests that the printed lines on paper maps shift and reform constantly to
reflect realities of human society.
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In designing our scheme, the authors found that some geographic entities have no
regional analogs. Thus, California is largely excluded from our book. By way of

apology, the authors can only state with reverence that there is probably no counterpart
to California anywhere on the entire globe. While our book emphasizes similarities
between the two countries, we should note that the differences between Russian and
American outlooks that surfaced during the book writing were much more serious than
mere matters of politics or geographic style. If you asked one of our American authors
to discuss a region (“what is the Heartland all about”?), he began by describing now. If
you asked one of the Russian team, “what is the South all about?”, he usually started in
the 9th century and eventually worked his way up to modern times. For the Russian
authors, the joint work of the two geography teams quite validated Henry Ford’s
argument that to Americans, the only history worth a damn is that which we make
today. In their view it is the relatively young nature of American society that makes the
present the only relevant tense. In turn, the American authors began to appreciate how
deeply Russian identity is grounded in time, almost as if Russia lives in the past and the
future and cares little about the present. This contrast in the perception of history is
only one example of how in attempting to create understanding of counterpart regions
in America and Russia, we learned much more about ourselves in each country than we
had expected.
But perhaps we should not have been surprised. After all, our idea in writing Beyond
Borders was to open up windows to each other’s countries, but the glass that lets us look
through to another place often reflects back as well. One of our Russian authors said it
best, “you can’t see yourself, without holding up a mirror.”
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THE CORE
Sergei Rogachev

THE CORE
Wilbur Zelinsky

The New Year enters every Russian house with the chime of the Moscow
Kremlin’s bells. In all time zones of the huge country, watches are set by
the clocks of Moscow; the schedules of trains and airplanes are put on
Moscow time. From the Spasskiy Tower, the rotating hands of the Kremlin’s
clock make a circular sweep of benediction all around Russia. The packed
cobbles of Red Square resonate with the historic memory that this place
represents, and the bustle of a huge city that surrounds it invades only one
corner where the country’s largest department store is located. But in just
a few paces the noises die down, as if calmed down by imperious gesture
of the bronze statue of Kuzma Minin (a 17th century organizer of resistance
to Polish rule), outstretched over the solemn square. The orgy of colors
of the famous St. Basil’s dominates the southern side, but fails to create
an ambiance for the whole place. Instead, another rhythm prevails: one
measured by the regular striking of the chimes and by the ceremonial steps
of the honor guard, still replaced hourly at Lenin’s tomb.

The final approach to LaGuardia or JFK airports in New York sometimes takes you
right over the island of Manhattan. There, just below, are the great skyscrapers,
a tight mass of them huddled around Wall Street toward the southern tip. Now
all of the vast, intricate harbor is visible with its scores of ships from all over the
world. Five monumental bridges crammed with cars, buses, trains, and trucks
reach out from the city, and even in broad daylight there may be no problem
picking out the bright glare and promise of Times Square. A long rectangle of
green appears - Central Park - on two sides girdled by the poshest of hotels and
apartment buildings. Off to the east, north, and west, as far as you can look, an
endless maze of homes, shops, factories, warehouses, all overlain by loops of
broad parkways pulsating with their traffic loads.

This is probably the only spot in all of Russia where everything functions in
perfect clockwork order, constant and unshakable. For a person from the
provinces who arrives in Moscow by trains or airplanes that are chronically
behind schedule, who is used to chaos in his workplace and who distrusts
the authorities, this is the only place where he may sense the regular
heartbeat of Russia. It is only here that he may regain his faith in the state.
1

If you could look far enough out your plane window, you would see a
skyline that stretches far up and down the Atlantic coast from Boston to
Washington D.C. You are gazing at the very center of the North American
Core. And, insofar as any place is entitled to the claim, this is still the spine,
the command post for much of the western world.
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MOSCOW

MEGALOPOLIS

The Core of Russia is a single great urban area, Moscow, and that city dominates
a hierarchical structure which permeates both the spatial and societal layout of the
country. The outline of Moscow on the distant horizon does not gather up into the
pyramid of skyscrapers driven by the land values of a western city, but rather shows
a few large buildings that symbolize the singularity of power in the state: the onion
domes of cathedrals directing the eye up to heaven, the towers rising out of the Kremlin
walls, and the Stalin-era “wedding cake” skyscrapers - all reminders of political and
spiritual power on the urban landscape. The highest points of Moscow were pushed
up by decree, and the relationship between this urban brain center and the country
resonates down the hierarchy.

New York may indeed be a formidable city, but it alone does not define the American
Core; instead, the region is made up of a line of cities often called Megalopolis, running
down the northeastern seabord - a geographic expression of concentrated economic
and social power. The reasons for the evolution of a linear nerve center, rather than a
single dominating city, may be explained at least in part by the nature of power in this
country. The skyscrapers commanding the downtowns erupted from the same market
forces that drove the competition among the cities of Megalopolis. Eventually an
oligarchy of urban areas emerged; but then, would a singular Core have fit a pluralistic
society?

How the Core Prevailed
For all the Core’s apparent centrality today, in the days of Kievan Rus it was strictly
peripheral. The Core was not one of the original cradles of the Russian state, but its
colonized periphery. Most of the ancient cities of the region were founded by settlers
from either northern Novgorodian or southern Kievan mother sources.
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The two waves of colonists’ movement from the southern and northern cradles of
Russia were strongly influenced by an increasingly continental climate to the east.
Thus, the arid environment and threats from steppe nomads made the flow of settlers
from the Dnieper veer off to the north, along the Oka River. Meanwhile, the eastward
movement of people from Novgorod was likewise deflected to the south along the
Volga by harsh winters and bare soils. But the wedge of land bounded by the Volga and
Oka Rivers seems to be a compromise landscape between northern forest and southern
steppe zones. The North creeps into the Core with moraines, swampy lowlands, and
lakes that seem to be tiny splatters of the huge lakes of the northwest. Novgorodians

The Line Crystallizes
There was little in its physical geography that could have made the dramatic success
of the Core inevitable. The fortuitous character of the Core’s ascendancy becomes
clear enough when we realize that 500 years ago, prior to the European invasion, this
was decidedly one of North America’s backwater areas. A moderately dense array of
Native Americans did dwell within the region, but at a level of technology and social
organization less advanced than in communities to the southwest and southeast.
Initially, the region emerged as a succession of urban and agrarian communities along
the North Atlantic littoral between New York Harbor and upper Chesapeake Bay. The
early Core was claimed and settled by a variety of European powers and their subjects:
several distinct groups from the British Isles, the Dutch, Flemish, Swedes, and Finns.
The urban points that originated here at first faced Europe: Philadelphia was the largest
city in the original colonies, and served as an export point for food from its hinterland;
Baltimore began as a harbor city to ship out tobacco; and when New York was founded
by the Dutch in the 1600’s, its natural port sites seemed ready made for trade with the
6

entered the region follo wing this familiar environment. Southern Russia penetrated
the Core in the form of large fertile clearings, extremely rewarding for agricultural
colonization. The northern and southern flows of colonization, both deflected
by unfriendly environments, thus met and coalesced in the Core. Ultimately, the
two major cultural strands of Russia (transplanted Byzantine and Baltic European
influences) blended here into a uniquely “native” Russian style that came to define the
face of the country. It was in the Core that northern and southern Slavs blended into
Greater Russians.
In the homogeneous environment of the huge Russian plain the ascendancy of a single
center may have been inevitable, but Moscow had no special advantage that would
determine its rise to power. The history of Moscow as a self-made domineering focus
of Russia is reflected in the very asymmetrical shape of the Core. The region extends far
to the East while being severely circumscribed in the South, North, and especially the
West, the front where it had to fight for its very survival. The asymmetry is especially
striking in the west, which took the brunt of frequent invasions from Europe, and
where the Core’s expansion was long arrested. As a result, the western boundary of the
Core is a mere 40 miles from Moscow, perhaps contributing to Russian xenophobia
about the West. While Moscow frequently proclaimed itself to be the heir to the best
achievement of humanity with titles such as the Third Rome or First Socialist State, it
was still frustrated to discover equal or surpassing achievement on its western frontiers.
The feeling of Russian superiority to the West (especially in terms of “spirituality”) is
but the reverse side of an inferiority complex about western material achievement.
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The region’s southern boundary is marked by a line of cities along the Oka that once
formed a protective belt from the nomads. When the early Russian state of Muscovy
made its first tentative moves beyond the Oka and into the steppe, the city of Tula
became its first outpost, and famous Tula armories (still a major industry) supplied
Russia’s southward expansion. Clashes with Islam along the southern interface of the

Old World. Washington D.C., with its function of service the now independent
country, was a relative newcomer to the line of cities crystallizing along the east coast.
But why did this particular region of the country emerge to become so dominant?
Although there was a considerable range of geographic conditions and physical
resources, none of the latter were so exceptional as to foster regional supremacy. We can
invoke climate as one of the factors in the inability of the Core to push south past the
Potomac River. In lower latitudes, weather and soil combine to create problems for the
traditional Northwest European modes of farming and animal husbandry. Similarly,
any substantial northward extension in New York has been pretty well precluded by
the shortness of the growing season and particularly by the stoniness of the soil where
glaciers once lay.
In terms of prospects for expansion, the American Core has suffered from one major
drawback: the formidable Appalachian barrier. On the other hand, the accidents of
geological history have furnished the Core with three crucial and easy entry ways from
ocean to interior: the Hudson River, open to oceangoing vessels as far north as Albany,
and providing fine natural harbors near its mouth in the New York City area and
northern New Jersey; the Delaware River and its estuary; and Chesapeake Bay, with its
extension into Pennsylvania via the Susquehanna. New York’s Mohawk Valley and the
various glacial spillways in Ohio and Indiana made canal building a relatively simple
proposition. But the development of harbors, canals, and even the watery highway of
the Great Lakes awaited the political and technological events that came to pass later in
the Core. Finally, the region emjoyed a physical advantage shared with New England
of relative proximity to Europe in terms of both shipping time and costs. In any
competition with the Core, the coastal zone to the south was at a distinct disadvantage
because of the near absence of decent natural harbors and the greater distances to
European ports.
8

Moscow is a gigantic chronicle occupied by the entire history of the
Russian people. ~ Leonid Leonov,
Our Moscow, 1972, p. 72

region sustained Russia’s messianic feeling; Muscovites saw the simultaneous decline
of Constantinople and the ascent of Moscow as a sign of its predestination to become
the Third Rome. Here in the south were forged such elements of national character
as the belief that Russia can be a savior and a teacher to other peoples and perform
some global mission. This youthful arrogance of a child that outstripped its parents has
frequently led Moscow to reject the valuable heritage of its two older “mother cradles”:
the Novgorodian tradition of popular self rule or the scholarly conventions of Kiev, and
St. Petersburg’s westernism has likewise been irritating.
Threatened from the west and from the south, Moscow sought escape, guidance, and
new identity in the only natural direction left: the east, where Moscow always retreated
at crucial moments of its history. In the turmoil of the Time of Troubles (1609-1613),
when Moscow was overrun by the Poles, the northeastern forests near Kostroma
served as a hiding place for the Romanov family who became the new Russian dynasty.
The most venerated saint of Russia, Sergei of Radonezh, was born in a small town
northeast of Moscow and established there the famous Trinity monastery, a holy place
of pilgrimage which remains the buttress of Russian Orthodoxy. From this monastery
came the blessings and encouragement for two decisive battles against the Mongols.
Finally, it was Moscow’s eastward expansion into the Volga Basin that turned the Core
into the master of a huge country. In the east, Muscovite culture became “the” Russian
culture.
Russian to the Core
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As if in conscious symbolism, Moscow is located in the center of the triangle formed by
the three Novgorods: Novgorod the Great, Russia’s ancient foothold in the North and
its old window on western Europe; Novgorod Severskiy, the outpost of ancient Kievan
Rus closest to Moscow and the starting point of ancient colonization movement from
the Kievan core; and Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia’s easternmost outpost from the 13th to

But it was the opening up of America that finally pushed the region into the forefront.
As the American Midwest began to realize its agricultural productivity, the need for a
good passage route into the interior emerged as paramount. Rapid land development
along the coast and rising populations generated pressure for settlement of new lands to
the west, but first the north-south ranging Appalachian Mountains had to be breached.
The east coast cities of the Core naturally entered into competition for the control
of trade routes into the interior. New York already had the advantage of controlling
access to the easiest passage in the northern half of the nation, the route along the flat
expanse of land due south of Lake Ontario. But it did not emerge as the clear winner
until the Erie Canal opened in 1825, creating a waterway from the Great Lakes all the
way to New York City. Two decades later, rail connections followed to the burgeoning
Chicago, and New York became the largest city in the United States as early as the mid
19th century.

[New York City] is a great organism of
specialized skill and leadership in finance,
industry and commerce which reaches
every spot in our country...Every activity
of this city is sensitive to every evil and
every favorable tide that sweeps this
great nation of ours.
~ Herbert Hoover speech to New
York City October 22, 1928, Madison
Square Garden

American to the Core
What makes the American Core unique is the fact that from the initial years of
European settlement up to the present moment, it has been the arena for meeting,
mingling, and fertile hybridization of contrasting peoples and cultures, and at the same
time has formed a political setting that encouraged creative use of wealth and power.
While both the Northern and Southern hearths of settlement were easily recognizable
as transplants of European society, in the Core something quite new and distinctively
American emerged. It was in this region, particularly Pennsylvania, that smaller family
farms prevailed over larger landholdings.
In terms of its social life, the region brought together peoples from such a large sweep
that a spirit of tolerance and liberalism developed, helped in part by the Quaker
heritage of the midlands. One of the oldest free Black communities in the United States
was founded in Philadelphia, and so many people from abroad were pouring in
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16th centuries, which served as a gateway to the Volga cradle of Islamic world and later
became the hinge connecting the fate of central Russia to that of Asia.
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Moscow’s original rise to power was due to the external support of Mongol rulers on
the Volga who used Muscovite princes as their henchmen in the control of Russian
principalities. Moscow learned well the Mongol lesson in politics and built its strength
through an Oriental mode of totalitarian rule. Many historians argue that the early
roots of Russian autocracy, so different from European feudalism, are to be found in the
Core’s early history as a frontier periphery, where the princes directed the colonization
process and enjoyed powers that they did not have in the North or South. Later, the
needs of eastward expansion into the Volga basin furthered the militarization of the
state and the introduction of universal serfdom. Leaning on the East, the great prince
of Moscow became the Tsar (“Caesar”), with absolute unbounded autocratic power
that eventually mutated into the powers of the General Secretary of the Communist
Party. Many key developments of Russian history occurred along the eastern vector
of the Core. In the 19th century, the zone east of Moscow nurtured indigenous
Russian capitalism (as opposed to the state-created capitalism of St. Petersburg). The
northeastern flank of the Core became the land of textiles and the most industrialized
part of Russia, due to the energy and quiet solidity of the Old Believers (who once hid
in the forests of the northeast) which made them the famous early industrialists of
Moscow. To our day, the Core remains Russia’s largest industrial region, accounting
for a fifth of industrial output. It is also the most urbanized one, as many industrial
villages of the past, such as Ivanovo, have developed into large cities. It was in such
industrial cities that not only Russian capitalism but also a very Russian egalitarian
response to it were born. In 1905, Ivanovo became the birthplace of the first “soviet”
(literally “council”) of workers, a uniquely proletarian concept that gave its name to the
Soviet Union. Thus the Core has effectively shaped Russian political forms from the
12th century to the present.

through the Core by 1789 that a new word appeared to describe arrivals more precisely:
the two-way English word “emigrant” became the Americanized term, “immigrant.”
As historian Henry Adams noted about Pennsylvania’s role in American cultural
history: “When one summed up the results of Pennsylvania influences, one inclined to
think that Pennsylvania set up the government in 1789, saved it in 1861; created the
American system; developed its iron and coal power; and invented its great railways.
The Pennsylvania mind was not complex; it reasoned little and never talked; but in
practical matters, it was the steadiest of all American types; perhaps the most efficient;
certainly the safest.”
In its economic life, the Core represented the competition that was to become so
characteristic of a capitalist system. In the cities of the region, the the profit motive has
always been a prime consideration, whether by way of commerce, shipment of goods,
manufacturing, services, banking, information management, or even speculation.
Other rationales for existence were secondary: only occasionally were the early towns
fortified for some military mission, and the development of social and cultural
traditions was even something of an afterthought. Furthermore, in keeping with the
competitive ethos of capitalism, the leading port cities of the Core have engaged in the
fiercest sort of rivalry among themselves (and with such external competitors as New
Orleans, Norfolk, Boston, and Montreal) in the struggle to capture the traffic of the
rich continental heartland.
By the nineteenth century, the Core was even dominating the speech and literary
patterns of what was to be identified as American. A North Midland speech dialect
(which is considered “standard American English”) developed along the coast and
moved inland throught the Heartland and on to the American West. One of the first
writers to emerge and become identified with a uniquely American literature was a
child of the Core: Walt Whitman was born on Long Island, raised in Brooklyn, and
12

From the 13th century to 1941, Russia answered the vital question “to be or not to
be?” in historic battles fought along the perimeter of the Core. While pushing out
the boundaries of early Muscovy centrifugally to the limits of the world’s largest state,
the region in turn developed a powerful centripetal tendency, gathering power inward
to Moscow. Throughout most of Russian history, the awesome machinery of state
managed to control even the most remote corners of the country and to extract from
them a sort of “tribute”, both in the form of centrally redistributed fiscal and material
resources, and by requisitioning the nation’s best brains and strong personalities. The
region that “made” the country developed a kind of sacral aura as the epitome of the
true and Holy Russia. Even after the imperial capital was moved to St. Petersburg in
1712, the Core preserved its key role, as exemplified by Napoleon’s invasion in 1812
that aimed at the heart of Russia, Moscow. During the Middle Ages, visitors from
Europe who clearly saw the unique role of the city called the state itself not after its
people (“Russia”) but after its node (“Muscovy”). The notorious centralism of the
USSR was not the rule of Russia, but the rule of Moscow’s bureaucracy and its satraps
over both Russian and non-Russian provinces. In the Soviet Union, a traditional
differentiation was made between people of Moscow (Muscovites) and people outside
of Moscow (provincials). Even in post-Soviet Russia, Moscow has retained and even
strengthened its sense of separateness and superiority from the rest of the country.
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died in 1892 in Camden, New Jersey. His Leaves of Grass, published in the 1850s,
marks the beginning of America’s departure from a European literary tradition and
represents the brash pride that was beginning to define the nation:
We must march my darling, we must bear the brunt of danger,
We the youthful sinewy races, all the rest on us depend,
Pioneers! O Pioneers!
One would expect to find the capital of a nation located within the historically
dominant region of any sensible country, but the path to that choice of site was
not smooth for the United States. When the Constitutional Convention met in
Philadelphia in 1787, the logical selection for the young republic’s capital city would
have been Philadelphia itself or New York City, either of which could then have
claimed supremacy in population or wealth. But, as it happened, severe sectional rivalry
between North and South scuttled any such possibility. Though commercial power
favored the North, Virginia was still the country’s most populous state, and perhaps
its most powerful in terms of social and intellectual impact. The District of Columbia,
that unprepossessing swampy rural site along the Potomac, became the compromise
solution. The precarious borderland position of Washington became all too obvious
during the Civil War when it barely escaped serious military assault, and only slowly
did the city become the large, imposing place it is today. After the outcome of the Civil
War determined that the Core plus New England, not the South, would administer
the economic and political business of the nation, it was then too late shift the capital;
however, the decision to situate the United Nations’ headquarters in Manhattan is a
recognition of the hard geographic realities of our contemporary world. As a result,
New York today represents the power elite of the United States, the embodiment of
“big government” and a place which is at once exciting and dangerous.
14

THEME 1: LIFE IN THE URBAN ISLAND
Being the almost monopolistic dispenser of power, the capital city was in many ways a
privileged one, enjoying a disproportionate share of budgetary outlays. The State took
good care of Moscow’s armies of office workers and intellectuals who legitimized and
strengthened the regime. Moscow’s privileged population enjoyed better housing, an
excellent subway system and access to comparatively well stocked shelves in groceries
or imported consumer goods in department stores. In Moscow, buses ran on schedule,
business could be done without bribes, and families were fed without resort to the
black market. After all, Moscow was also a showpiece for the outside world and the
country’s own residents, and the city was officially designated as a “model communist
city.” Sharp witted Russians said the same in different words, quipping that “Socialism
ends at the line of Moscow’s Beltway.”
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The many advantages of life in Moscow made it an obvious magnet for migrants. Early
on, Moscow based planners realized that to remain a privileged island, the city needed
to close its doors to diluting hosts of newcomers. The task was performed by the unique
Soviet system of propiska, or residence permit system. Without a local propiska, one
cannot get a job or an apartment. Moscow initiated the practice of “closing” the city by
denying propiskas to newcomers. Since under the Soviet system the quality-of-life index
for any city was directly related to its administrative status, the practice of “closing”
cities quickly spread to the 14 mini Moscows of the former Union republic capitals,
and then to even smaller administrative centers. The sense of a perfect pyramidal
hierarchy permeated the Soviet settlement structure, and upward social mobility
became synonymous with moving to ever larger cities, until the final coveted apex,
Moscow. A passage through the propiska barriers was possible through elaborate chains
of apartment exchanges or by marriage. Marrying a registered resident of Moscow made
an out of towner a resident too, and cases of marriages of convenience abound. But a
shortcut into the socialist haven lay through blue collar industrial

THEME 1: LIFE IN THE URBAN ARCHIPELAGO
During the past few decades, the Core has spilled its urban character even further
outward as modern transport and greater affluence have enabled millions of persons to
escape not just into suburbs but also even further into what is termed Exurbia. There,
in scattered clustered developments, highway strips, or isolated dwellings, a population
which is rural but not farmers by profession lives amidst bucolic surroundings, yet still
enjoys many of the amenities of urban existence.
The majority of people in the Core, however, are urban and suburban dwellers, living
in an amazing mixture of races, ethnicities, and incomes. Few places can think of
challenging New York City when it comes to sheer number and diversity of ethnic
groups. Here is a dazzling mosaic of peoples, languages, and cultural traditions, to
rival the Tower of Babel. Even in its earliest years under Dutch rule, the city welcomed
a mixture of newcomers quite unusual for the period. As time went on, New York
became by far the nation’s leading port of entry, and a large fraction of those arriving
traveled no farther than America’s largest city with its exceptional range of economic
possibilities. The result has been a place the majority of whose residents are first- or
second-generation foreign stock. At the present time, the leading “minorities.” if that is
an accurate term, are African-Americans and Hispanics, but neither category is uniform
in composition. Although the former consists mostly of migrants from the American
South and their progeny, Africans, Jamaicans, Haitians, and other West Indians are also
well represented, while Cubans, Salvadorans, Dominicans, Brazilians, and other Latin
Americans, as well as the numerically dominant Puerto Ricans, are easy enough to find
within the Hispanic fold.
Like some other American cities, New York has witnessed ethnic succession over space
and time as great numbers of Irish and Germans were followed by Chinese, Italians,
Jews, and various East European groups, then more recently by not only Latin
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employment: the chronically understaffed industrial enterprises had the right to recruit
labor elsewhere. After a passage of several years these recruits above the limit, limitchiki,
became registered Muscovites. Paradoxically, propiska limitations only accelerated the
growth of Moscow. The difficulties of getting into the city gave Muscovites a caste like
superiority complex and aristocratic disdain of blue collar work, forcing the enterprises
to annually import thousands of limitchiki to man the jobs that Muscovites avoided.
If the higher material standard of living was the major attraction for limitchik types,
the city was also a magnet for intellectual aspirants. Over the years Moscow sucked in
informational wealth by concentrating libraries, archives, and museum collections from
all over the country and creating an environment where research and culture thrive.
In the late 1980’s, Moscow concentrated more than one quarter of the Ph.D.s in the
USSR and was by far the country’s largest center of higher learning. More importantly,
against the low standards in most provincial schools, a Moscow diploma or degree is
taken as a sign of quality. The city further enriched its cultural compost by practically
monopolizing contacts with the outside world. Until recently, Moscow’s Sheremetyevo
Airport was the only entrypoint for international flights, and no other place in the
country saw so many foreign visitors. No other city in the USSR was so exposed to
“contaminating” influences of the West and so ready to imbibe them. Moscow’s elite
culture is strikingly cosmopolitan and liberal.
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However, the cosmopolitanism hardly shows in the ethnic structure of Moscow’s
population. In 1989, ninty percent of the population called themselves Russian, and
ninty-nine percent gave Russian as their mother tongue. Even the largest minorities,
Jews, Ukrainians and Tatars, are almost completely Russified in cultural terms.
Yet one should not hurry to conclude that Moscow is a purely Russian city. As an
“island of socialism” Moscow long functioned as safe haven for those who aspired to
good education and careers but were barred from them in the USSR’s non Russian
peripheries where too much depends on traditionalistic clan networks, bribes, or

Americans, but also Middle Easterners, East Indians, Thai, Filipinos, Vietnamese,
Chinese from a variety of countries, Ethiopians, and still another influx of Russian
Jews. Frequently, as the group that had dominated a relatively homogeneous
neighborhood moved up the socioeconomic ladder and outward to suburbia, a different
set of immigrants would replace them, and later repeat the process - but not always. If
neighborhoods that were once heavily Jewish, German, Italian, Hungarian, Czech, or
whatever have turned into something else, the large, ever-expanding African-American
districts show no signs of yielding to invaders; and Chinatown is becoming more
Chinese than ever and bulging outward ever since the liberalization of immigration
laws in 1965.
This wild ethnicity is visible - and audible, smellable, and tastable - in restaurants,
groceries, and other sidewalk food vendors catering to their own kin or offering exotic
specialties to the adventurous gentile. The diversity shows up as well in the churches,
synagogues, temples, and mosques with their ethnically exclusive flocks, and in the
social clubs, fraternal groups, and special schools, the multifarious foreign-language
press and radio and television programs, the festivals, parades, and music pouring out
of windows into the streets.
The urban archipelago of the Core does suffer chronically from dilemmas peculiar
to the area or relatively extreme versions of general American conditions. The most
intense and pervasive problem may be the striking social and economic disparities seen
within small areas, sometimes even a single city block. Such jarring discontinuities,
the coexistence side by side of ostentatious wealth and privilege on the one hand and
destitution and physical decay on the other are not unknown elsewhere in the United
States, but they are probably nowhere more visibly intrusive and unavoidable than in
the Core.
18

belonging to the ruling ethnic group. By contrast, the capital was always the most
tolerant part of the USSR, rapidly recasting peripheral “refugees” from nationalism
or poverty not so much into Russians as into generic “Soviets.” The non Slavic
physiognomies and names of many officially “Russian” Muscovites present a picture of
the population far more diverse than official statistics would have us believe.
The place where one can best see Moscow’s mixture of peoples is in its stores and
streets. Department stores swarm with visitors from the provinces, hunting for fancy
gifts. In post-Soviet times, western firms such as Estee Lauder and McDonald’s opened
outlets first in Moscow. People from the Caucasus and Central Asia swept the stores for
merchandise that was available in their home areas only from under the counter and
previously not at a fixed state price. The city’s prohibitively expensive farmer’s markets
were primarily occupied by Ukrainians or distinctively Mediterranean Azeris. Yet the
area where non Russian presence is most tangible is the criminal world dominated by
ethnic mafias, from the Vietnamese one to the especially notorious Chechens from
the northern Caucasus. Moscow now houses nightclubs where the young, newly rich
class of post-Soviet Russia may meet for one-hundred dollar a glass champagnes.
Mafia control of much of speculative trading activity in the capital is breeding strong
resentment against all dark skinned southerners collectively dubbed as Caucasians.
In such manifestations of racism, the nation’s ultimate city that so disdains its provinces
as “rural backwaters” itself demonstrates some parochial ruralism. With a large share of
its residents, especially the limitchiki, coming directly from the countryside, Moscow
may have been the least urbane of urban giants and was sometimes called the
“big village.” Still, Muscovites largely belonged to the Soviet breed of middle class:
outwardly loyal to the regime but also well educated and therefore deeply cynical.
Ironically, the Core of Russia is a city that is at once both sophisticated and provincial.
19

From the very beginning of European colonization, the cities of the Core embodied the
principles of capitalism as purely and singlemindedly as any other group of places in the
modern world. The burgeoning, nondescript, unplanned, and uncontrolled suburban
belts encircling Core metropolises are models of similar excrescences in other regions.
The same is true for the “Edge Cities,” those effectively autonomous agglomerations
of retail, office, entertainment, residential, and other facilities that have mushroomed
at strategic points along the peripheries of New York, Philadelphia, and Washington.
In general, the central sections of virtually every American city founded in the 19th
century or earlier have experienced serious economic decline and neglect, despite the
rehabilitation of selected neighborhoods. A decline in manufacturing employment
and the change to a “postindustrial” economy have exacerbated the gulf between the
well-off and the poor in the Core cities. But in no other region of the country has this
downward spiral progressed further than in some Core metropolises such as Newark.
In fact, New York City, Philadelphia and other Core cities have recently veered
dangerously close to bankruptcy and more such episodes are bound to occur in the
years ahead.
The vast accumulation of inhabitants and the presence of so many enterprises
consuming great quantities of water have led to increasing difficulties in insuring
adequate supplies, especially in the eastern portions of the Core, even though it is
a relatively well watered part of the world. In the case of a thirsty NYC, some of its
principal water sources lie many miles away. When drought occurs, as has happened
more than once in recent decades, the situation has been worrisome, raising the
prospect of outright disaster.
Declining quality of the natural environment is matched by deterioration in the social
structures necessary for the proper functioning of a great metropolis: public schools,
transportation lines, government facilities and services. But it may be premature to
write the obituary for New York and other cities of the Core: there is every likelihood
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No other city of the Core can even remotely compare to Moscow in size or importance.
The doughnut area that remains if one removes Moscow from the Core region is
known as Podmoskovye (literally, “Around and Under Moscow”), an unprecedented
placename, the likes of which was never coined for St Petersburg, Kiev, or any other
metropolis of Russia. In retrospect it appears that the Core’s historic mission was in
shielding, nourishing, and raising Moscow, the giant, which in a sense overshadowed
the region that nurtured it. Today, the Core is still synonymous with Moscow. The busy
activity of its outlying towns is largely part of the capital’s metabolism. It is a dominant
city indeed, more than twice the size of St. Petersburg or Kiev and ten times that of the
Core’s second largest city, Nizhniy Novgorod. Appropriately enough, in Soviet political
parlance Moscow was called simply “The Center,” and it has once again emerged in
post-Soviet Russia as a focus of power and prestige for the nouveaux riches.
THEME 2: POWER OF THE CORE
The Center perpetuates its power over the country by firmly controlling its
communications. In the past, the roads did not so much converge on Moscow as spread
out from it, sent out almost as tentacles to bind the nation with a single will. Moscow’s
transport supremacy is somewhat artificial but completely unchallenged. All roads
begin in Moscow in a strictly radial pattern. Frequently the only way to get from one
part of the country to another is via Moscow, and every day, the capital sees hundreds
of thousands of transit passengers. As a transportation node, Moscow is a transit point
for one half of the cargo traffic of the former USSR, and one fifth of its passenger
traffic. At the other end of the scale, the strictly hierarchical nature of Soviet society was
imprinted in the pattern of the streets of Moscow itself.
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All major streets and the lines of Moscow’s extensive subway system converge in the
center although only one major ring line is close to the Kremlin itself. While getting
from the outlying areas of the city to downtown center is fast and convenient,

that the region will continue to enact its well-established role as a leading member
in the ensemble of American regions, even if not necessarily with the same degree of
absolute dominance as in the past.
THEME 2: POWER OF THE CORE
The Core includes more territory than just Megalopolis, but Megalopolis in turn so
dominates the region as to drain out an established identity for other places in the
region. The small area of New Jersey that lies outside the built-up urban area, central
Pennsylvania, and the cities of upstate New York are all living in the shadow of
Megalopolis, dependent on it and yet resentful of its power and role in the spotlight.
The concentration of people, power, and wealth in the Core has been phenomenal,
but what proportion of the American population is in the region? From Connecticut
to Washington D.C, 47 million people, or nineteen percent of the United States, are
packed into the region, most living in urban concentrations along the coast. For the
better part of 200 years, it was residents of this region, along with those in a strongly
influential neighboring southern New England, who so largely molded the economic,
political, social, and cultural destinies of the entire country.
The case for the Core’s supremacy is strong, for example, in the field of
communications. New York City has a near monopoly of book publishing; the bulk
of important American magazines are edited there or in Philadelphia and other Core
metropolises; and the Government Printing Office in Washington is by all odds the
world’s single greatest generator of printed matter. The United States may not have
a full-fledged national newspaper, but The New York Times and Washington Post
are plausible facsimiles, while the contents of the nationally distributed USA Today
emanate from a Manhattan address. Commercial radio and television stations and
networks originated in the Core (as did electric telegraphy and telephones much
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tangential movements are difficult. Downtown (logically called “the center” in Russian)
dominates daily lives of all Muscovites, not least because it is as privileged in terms
of provision of goods and services compared to Moscow as a whole, as Moscow is
compared to the country. Being close to the center is a great advantage, and the value
of housing steadily declines as one moves away from the center. This pattern of housing
markets (typical not only for Moscow) was quite the opposite of the western one,
mirroring the chain of command structure of center dominated Soviet society and
economy.
In a predominantly non-private and non-market economy, Moscow was a general
headquarters, the home of ministries that controlled all the branches of the economy.
Their central location itself was hardly surprising unless one considers the peculiarity
of dozens of Soviet “industrial ministries” that were for all practical purposes corporate
headquarters of huge monopolies, and regulated even minute aspects of operations. It
was in Moscow, almost 400 miles from the nearest seas, that bureaucrats decided how
best to fish in the open oceans. Six hundred miles from the nearest vineyard, guidelines
were laid for preparing wines.
Moscow focused the thoughts and hopes of the people in all of the former USSR: in
the offices of Moscow’s ministries, many a career was decided, and there is hardly a
town in the country that does not have some graduates from Moscow’s institutes of
higher learning. With the population mainly consisting of migrants, the city is linked
to the rest of the country by networks of family ties, friendships, or personal loyalties.
In all of the country, a person aspiring to a promising career had much better chances
if he or she had some connections in Moscow. In the entertainment industry, acquiring
national fame was only possible by performing on the scenes of Moscow’s theaters, by
publishing in its publishing houses, or by exhibiting one’s work in its art galleries.
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earlier), and despite severe competition from Los Angeles, corporate control and much
programming remain in New York City. The early film industry came into being in the
metropolis, but subsequently became the only major mode of communication to escape
concentration in the Core.
Thanks to an early start and a convergence of favorable historical and economic
circumstances, not too many decades ago, the Core claimed a highly disproportionate
share of America’s manufacturing enterprises and industrial output, and was engaged
in every imaginable type of production. The major cities of the Core also rank
prominently within the retailing and wholesaling sectors of the American economy.
Moreover, few places in the world can rival New York City in the range and variety of
specialized commodities for sale in their shops and showrooms.
Impressive though the accumulation of transportation, communication, industrial,
and commercial resources in the Core may be, the most convincing measures of its
preeminence appear in the higher reaches of the economy and of human endeavor.
Wherever in the United States or overseas products or services may be physically
produced, it is in the Core, notably New York City, that control is exercised, that
governing decisions are formulated. There has been little erosion in the long term,
top heavy concentration of capital, of banking and other financial services, stock
market transactions, major law firms, and the ruling advertising agencies in a handful
of districts within a handful of Core cities. Within those same neighborhoods, in a
symbiotic relationship, are the offices of most of the major private foundations that
dispense support for so much philanthropic, educational, scientific, and artistic activity
throughout America and much of the rest of the world.
While the office towers of New York City symbolize economic power, political control
emanates from the purposefully low-profile government buildings in the nation’s
capital. Perhaps Washington’s situation is the most extraordinary among all the world’s
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The provinces reinforce a deeply embedded image of Moscow as a fairytale dispenser
of both benefits and punishments. Regional bureaucracies outside Moscow have always
tried to maintain their own lobbyists in the city. The very word “Moscow” contained a
certain magic for a provincial, and in local administrative centers, the words “I am from
Moscow” would frequently open the doors of a bureaucrats office closed to the locals.
Muscovites visiting remote corners of the country frequently find themselves in an
awkward position, as they perceive locals’ ambiguous attitude toward the Core. Bitterly
complaining about the problems in their own backyards, the provincials view “the
Center” as universal villain, but whose guilt, paradoxically, is neglect of local affairs.
The laments are underpinned with the hopes for some redress from the Center.
Moscow’s super centralization would frequently force people to come to the city to
solve petty problems that could in principle be dealt with locally. From early on, the
belief in the “good tsar” sitting in Moscow had been implanted in the Russian psyche,
as the capital symbolized not only power but also justice. The populace firmly believed
that local authorities did not want to address people’s problems, while the good tsars
of Moscow could do so. Thus, Moscow became the last resort of appeals against power
abuses back home.
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Moscow’s rulers were always concerned with the common good of the country and
therefore quite sincerely (and not so wrongly) believed that they knew what a particular
region should do better than the self serving bureaucracies of the region itself. The
caring and protecting parental hand of the center was sometimes very heavy, and yet
it would be wrong to say that Moscow merely profited at the expense of its children.
Preoccupied with its socialist egalitarian concerns, the “Communist City” redistributed
national product through all embracing centralized budget so as to preclude the
emergence within the country of unfairly privileged “oil emirates” or deprived,
depressed areas. If the Core’s success in this self appointed mission was indecisive it was
because of the failure of the grand socialist project itself.

cities in terms of the sheer accumulation of lobbyists, think tanks, influence peddlers,
and other would be manipulators of law, not to mention a world class array of
diplomatic missions and international agencies.
Parallel with this astonishing assemblage of economic and, in the broad sense, political
resources at so few points within the American Core, there is also an equally intense
stockpiling of cultural resources and activities in the same privileged region. Many
of the oldest, most prestigious, and most influential of colleges and universities
(public and private), such as Princeton, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins, are situated
in the Core. Many hundreds of notable museums of every description are established
in the region, and the Core also claims an unduly generous share of the nation’s
libraries, including literally thousands of specialized ones in addition to such immense
collections as those in the New York Public Library or Library of Congress. A good
many leading laboratories and Research and Development centers are also here,
whether in association with universities or private corporations. When it comes to
nearly all the more sophisticated forms of culture and entertainment, no city can
think of challenging New York City’s supremacy. It is there, on Broadway and off, that
American theater is most concentrated, venturesome, and alive (if also perpetually
dying). The city is also the great arbiter and marketplace, the place of ultimate
pilgrimage and performance, for practitioners and artists in the world of opera, dance,
symphony, and all other categories of art.
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The Pulse of Change: Moscow and the Devolution of the USSR

Moving Ahead: New York City and the Growth of the Sunbelt

“As is known, all the land begins from the Kremlin.”
- Mayakovskiy

Will Megalopolis continue its dominance of American life and the country’s economy?
The ever-changing geography of the United States may be witnessing a shift of the core,
either to the southern California, or to a dispersed Sunbelt along the southern and
western tier.

In a country which has fallen apart, these words may appear out of place, but they
contain an important grain of historic truth and neatly summarize the basics of
the region. Any weakening of the universal control center, like the one brought by
perestroika, set the provinces drifting apart. Having first lost the satellites in Europe,
Moscow then let go the former union republics, and now even Russia itself is cracking
at the seams. The demise of the USSR hit Muscovites hard by divesting them of their
privileged status, but it barely diminished the powers and vitality of the Core. To our
day, Moscow remains an indisputable economic frontrunner as the Core has emerged as
a leader in market reforms and a “free” economy.
Beyond Russian boundaries things Soviet are by no means dead. Moscow can feel
(with a certain vengeance) that it merely replicated itself in the capitals of the 14 newly
independent republics who fully emulate the old Soviet patterns of centralized control
within their respective domains. Their politics give ample proof that they imbibed
far more of the common all Soviet culture and attitudes than the nationalistic parties
would admit. However, none of the new states shows economic viability without
massive subsidies from Russia, directed as ever, by Moscow. The regions that hastily
scurried away from “The Center” are finding themselves drawn back by strings that
are stronger than alleged “Muscovite imperialism.” No less importantly, the lives of
people in the former USSR still depend on Moscow, and with the euphoria of local
sovereignties wearing off, the Core, stripped of its old coercive powers, may again find
itself presiding over some reborn Union.
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Various pieces of evidence support this notion: population change, which indicates
a movement of the American population center south and westward as the Sunbelt
grows and the so-called “Rustbelt” regions decline; political shifts as districts outside
of the traditional Core gain political representation at the expense of northeast states;
and economic change as the United States loses manufacturing jobs and moves into a
post-industrial employment base of service and white-collar occupations. Even popular
culture in the U.S. seems more defined by Southern California styles, speech, and
preferences these days than by those of Megalopolis.
But the Core cities are not going down without a fight. Revitalization of inner city
waterfronts, downtowns, and neighborhoods is beginning with such projects as
Baltimore’s Harborplace, New York’s South Street Seaport, and Philadelphia’s Society
Hill. High-tech employment, often associated with universities or government
functions, have grown in many areas of the Core, notably along the beltway around
Washington D.C. But despite the vitality and life that throbs in Megalopolis, economic
hard times are creating ever deeper divisions between rich and poor in the region, and
the middle class seems to be moving on down the highway. In a period of change and
in a society which always looks ahead, the Core may be in for a tough fight.
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THE NORTH
Aleksei Naumov

THE NORTH
Thomas Baerwald

In late May, the rivers and lakes near Cherepovets are thawing, and the air is filled
with the lapping sounds of cold waves, the screams of seagulls, and the whistles
of passing ships. Navigation and life are at long last returning to the Russian
North. The first thing that strikes the imagination of a tourist peeking from the
window of a cruiseship cabin is the solid wall of trees blocking the horizon. Yet
along the rivers are still seen quite a few sturdy, two-story log houses or glimpse
the gracious silhouette of a wooden church from the 17th century. Here and
there are the formidable stone walls and cupolas of a monastery - outposts of
orthodoxy and the Russian spirit. Are these images purely idyllic? No, for beyond
the stately pines lie thickets of pulp mills and the belching blast furnaces of the
city. Even a closer look at the forests themselves reveals they are far from virgin:
logging has exploited their treasures and left only thinned-out stands. Navigation
lasts a mere three to four months; and in September, when for Muscovites Indian
Summer is at its height, the ships have already pulled in for the winter. In a few
weeks, waterways will be frozen again and falling snow will hide the northern
flank of Russia in a white blanket, frozen stiff and seemingly dead until the next
fleeting summer.

In the New England autumn, the old graveyard in Massachusetts seems sad
and bleak. The oldest of the markers are tumbled down on the eastern hillside,
the flagstone cracked with names barely readable in old script. When you walk
among the graves, the red maple leaves at your feet rustle in the cold twilight.
From the hill, you can look out over North Weymouth to the sea. Earlier, it was a
colonial settlement, but then evolved into a blue- collar suburb of Boston. The
cemetery itself tells the history: Pilgrim family names now share the earth with
Irish and Italian souls, and the simple slate graves of many a Congregationalist lie
horizontal and flat beside elaborate and vertical Catholic angels. In the distance,
where the Fore River runs into Boston Harbor, the old shipyard and industrial
plants still stand; but many are empty now. The newer area of town has more
prosperous neighborhoods built with Route 128 high-tech salaries. Perhaps
the future lies with the younger families who have moved into the town, drawn
by the quaintness of the Cape Cod houses - people with college degrees and
employment in Boston. Yet tonight there is something in the autumn beauty
which draws out a kind of warning: winter will be here soon, and it will be long
and harsh. Meanwhile it is quiet on this lonely hillside. You can almost hear the
ghosts of Pilgrims and sea captains, millwrights and farmers, all coming together
on the north wind of October. ~ K. Braden
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THE NATURE OF THE NORTH

THE NATURE OF THE NORTH

For many Russians the image of the North is that of the harsh periphery of Russia,
associated with the well-known lines from Lermontov’s poem:

How do Americans define the North? New England has a well-established identity, but
does the North end at the borders of Vermont? We delineate “North” here as a region
split in two pieces, including not only New England, but also “The Northwoods”:
the Upper Great Lakes portions of Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan. Despite
the spatial separation, these two chunks of North have much in common to justify
their union as a single region; for example, they are often viewed as realms far colder
than most of the rest of the nation. While eastern New England does enjoy a climate
more modified by the Atlantic, the area still experiences with its Northwoods cousin
sub-freezing temperatures which occur during six or more months each year, and
forest covered tracts exceed areas where people actively control the use of the land. In
addition, the two sections of “North” are united by a cultural heritage which jumped
over the barriers of both the Great Lakes and an intervening stetch of southern Canada.
But this northern culture originated even further eastward, stretching back across
the Atlantic, and the environment of New England helped it become one of the two
original culture hearths in the United States.

In the North, wilderness stands in solitude,
On the bare peaks is pine.
And in slumber lurching, and with snow
Covering her in a mantle.
All of the North is heavily forested and sparsely populated, and the severity of climate
in its eastern part is quite siberian. In contrast, the weather of the more western parts
is moderated by proximity to the Baltic sea and the Atlantic, making the North one of
the two early cradles of Russia and its major interface with the western world. Yet even
in this more Maritime area, the harsh north climate influenced important departures
from what came to be all-Russian patterns, and the standard Russian label for it is
“Northwest” - a region of northern nature but western parentage.
The Northwest - Russia’s Window to Europe
During the ninth century, two cultural flows met on the Russian Plain: the northern
flow, originating from the young Scandinavian and Baltic countries (made up of
German merchants and Viking raiders); and the southern flow of religious influence
from the Byzantine Empire. Both flows traveled along the rivers from the Neva to
the Dnieper, forming the two apexes of the ancient waterway from the Baltic to
Constantinople. The Varangian (Viking) culture of the north was quite different from
the Greek at the other end, yet the trade route crackled like an electric current between
the opposites, and the two early cradles of the future Russian state were born: the
southern one in Kiev and the northern one in Novgorod. The city of Novgorod still
5

New England - Europe’s Child Prodigy
On September 16, 1620, the Mayflower set sail from Plymouth, England, and
ultimately created a namesake town along the unforgiving coast of the northlands.
Settlements in what are now Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Connecticut
followed, extending the Anglo frontier from the Massachusetts cradle and forming
a Confederation of New England, largely based on Puritan culture. The name New
England is indeed telling: having failed to dominate Old England, the Puritan leaders
crossed the ocean in hopes of creating their ideal community on virgin American soil.
6

proudly shows many relics of its ancient glory including one of only three surviving
churches in Russia dating back to the 11th century.
From the beginnings of its history, the North closely resembled Western Europe,
which eventually made the region the “odd one out” with respect to the rest of Russia.
This departure can be traced all the way from the republican government of medieval
Novgorod to St. Petersburg’s role as the cradle of Russian revolutions. Due to its
advantageous position for trade with Europe, the early Russian state (Novgord Rus)
experienced the emergence of a mercantile city economy. In the cruel climate, where
grains frequently had no time to ripen before the first frosts, non-farming occupations
(trade and crafts) were far more important. Engaged in riverine trade with places as
far afield as Persia, Novgorod was even a member of the medieval Hanseatic League of
Baltic city-states. As in the Western cities of that time, artisans were divided into guilds,
each concentrated in its own part of the city. The political life of the North was fully
dominated by city interests, and even the huge territorial possessions of Novgorod were
ruled as colonies to individual districts of the city. Whereas in the rest of Russia, the
autocratic rule of the princes was already tightening and the state increasingly emulated
oriental despotism, Novgorod hired its “princes” to serve as mercenaries guarding
the city’s wealth. Ruled by an oligarchy of rich merchants, Novgorod was, at least
ostensibly, a republic, where important decisions were taken by popular vote at town
meetings. When Novgorod was finally subjugated to Moscow in the 16th century, the
first deed of the new rulers was the destruction of the bell that called people for town
meetings.
For landlocked Russia, the Northwest long remained the only window to the West.
When Russia periodically opened to the West and experimented with pro-Western
reforms, the North became a primary testing ground. Tsar Peter the Great staged the
most significant of such social experiments when in 1712 he moved the seat of
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The deep initial imprint left by the period of Puritan control persevered in later years,
making the early cradle region something of an odd man out with respect to the same
country it helped create. The very success of these stubborn people in the cold country
on stony ground was very English. In many ways, the culture and institutions of past
and present New England are closer to those of Europe than to what became the
American norm.
Almost from the outset New England was ruled by urban leaders and urban values,
and the town came to be the focus of all life. In politics, consensus and oligarchic rule
by the “brahman” elite deviated sharply from later mainstream U.S. democracy that
evolved in the Core region. In economy, success was based on commercial enterprises,
since rocky soils gave few other options. The excellent pine forests that covered large
parts of New England were soon tapped to become masts for the British royal Navy
and merchant ships, with ship-building, maritime trade, fishing and other sea-bound
activities soon developing in the area itself. New England’s easterly location made it
closest to Europe of all British holdings in North America, and for roughly 150 years,
the character of the region’s people was influenced by close commercial contacts with
Europe.
In fact, it is the distinctive Yankee culture that makes New England (along with the
South) the most recognizable of American vernacular regions, and it is habitually
defined as the six smaller states in the northeastern corner of the U.S. However, it
is only in culture and stubborn self-identity that New England maintains regional
integrity today. Because of its metropolitan character and the influx of suburbanites
from New York City, most of the state of Connecticut is clearly a part of the Core.
In its economy and lifestyle, even Boston is part of Megalopolis, sharply contrasting
withsparsely settled parts of Maine or Vermont. And yet, all of New England has more
than history in common: this proud cradle of the nation is today largely a bypassed
region, the periphery of the national Core.
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government from Moscow to newly founded St. Petersburg - a city dumped into the
desolate swamps, far from the center of “true” Russia but close to the Europe Peter
loved.
A Region of Grievance and Resilience
The eventual relative decline of the Northwest is the typical story of an aging region
that was once the foremost pioneering cradle. The Northwest dominated the Russian
industrial scene first in Imperial Russia. St. Petersburg was the largest city, and, relying
on its advantages as a capital, it ruled the industrial scene of the country. In the mid19th century Petersburg was larger than Moscow by half and had twice as many
industrial workers, but these unique advantages were not to last. The abolition of
serfdom in 1861 triggered a swelling tide of indigenous Russian capitalism in the Core
region, signaling the relative decline of St. Petersburg. By 1917 Moscow had caught up
with Petersburg in numbers of industrial workers and overall population. Much more
advantageously located for the domestic market, Moscow attracted self-made native
Russian entrepreneurs, whereas St. Petersburg’s industry was mostly controlled by
foreigners or run by the state. The revolution of 1917 took away St. Petersburg’s status
when the capital was moved back to Moscow. The North ultimately lost its competition
with the Core, and today Petersburg’s population is only half that of Moscow.
Suspicious of its liberal traditions, Stalin routinely discriminated against Peter’s city,
forcing it into acceptance of the role of just another oblast center. Leningrad was left to
take comfort in the feeling of intellectual superiority to Moscow. The city still enjoys
a reputation as the most cerebral city of Russia, a place of refinement and high-brow
culture. The image of the soft-spoken, polite and reserved Petersburgian is the opposite
of the ebullient, expressive Muscovite, and Petersburghian types were always perceived
as the cream of Russian intellectuals.
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A Region of Grievance and Resiliance
New England, in comparison to the rest of the United States, experienced the fate of a
teacher outstripped by her pupils. Several times the region dominated the nation as the
focus of innovation, but even as waves of new ideas were spreading out, New England
was losing its leadership role. During the first century of European settlement, New
England was at the top of the national ladder, attracting more immigrants than other
colonies. But with competition from more fertile regions, many began to leave their
farms and join the migration west in search of better land. It was said that the only crop
New England’s fields could produce were rocks and that their only export was people;
and by the time of the American Revolution, the region’s leadership already was more
spiritual than economic. Nevertheless, it emerged once more as the national leader
during the Industrial Revolution which had blossomed beside waterfalls in the cities
of New England during the 1800s. But by the middle of the same century, misfortune
again took over, and the first signs of aging and inflexibility in the once young and
innovative region appeared. Shipping and shipbuilding sharply declined after 1860
because the region clung too persistently to sailing ships. The larger labor pools, coal
fields, and mineral deposits, and the more fully developed railroad networks of the
Core and Heartland soon placed the North in a secondary position, and by the early
20th century the South had lured away its textile industry. During the post-World War
II transformations that resulted in the modern, high technology- and service-oriented
economy, the North again experienced early success that was not sustained. The Route128 beltway around Boston became synonymous with the rapid expansion of computer
and related industries in the 1960s, but the Silicon Valley of northern California soon
surpassed Boston-area enterprises.
Feeling outrun and bypassed since the 19th century, New England developed a sense of
“area grievance.” While Boston natives finally acknowledged that New York’s
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Although the Northwest lost its role as the economic frontrunner of the country,
it preserves the advantages of accumulated industrial tradition and the propensity
for technical innovation. More than a mere appendage to the Core, St. Petersburg
maintains its lead in high-technology industries and continues to be home to some of
the biggest and most technologically advanced factories in the country, such as
Electrosila, producing super turbines for power stations, or the shipyards which turn
out nuclear icebreakers. St. Petersburg draws such innovative firms with its highly
educated workforce; in fact, the North was long known for superior educational
standards (even medieval Novgorod claimed a literate populace who maintained their
correspondence on birchbark paper).
Yet beyond the sprawl of St. Petersburg, the Northwest is essentially a bypassed region.
For potential migrants, the Northwest does not have the “Long Ruble” rewards of areas
farther north (high salaries paid to compensate for locations where few want to live).
The Northwest has been caught between the pioneer zone of the Northwoods and
industrial cities of the Core, both sides luring out its population. The countryside is
almost empty and has turned into a mockup frontier of sorts for residents of Moscow
and St. Petersburg who come here to fish, pick berries, canoe on the numerous rivers,
and enjoy vacations in cottages cheaply purchased in emptied-out villages. The once
glorious ancient cities are unnoticed by passengers of express trains between Moscow
and St Petersburg. The schedules of the line were put together to accommodate the
interests of bureaucrats shuttling between the two metropolises, so the trains whiz
non-stop through this abandoned land to be in either terminus by the beginning of
business day.

11

exceptional transportation connections gave it commercial supremacy, they never
made concessions on the cultural front. One of America’s most literate periodicals, The
Atlantic Monthly, continues to be composed in editorial offices in Boston. Culturally,
the region persistently lays claim to universalism and intellectualism of a rather
European brand. Early on, it developed a sense of “civilizing” mission with respect
to the rest of the nation and rendered it great service by exporting its public school
system, high educational standards and thousands of teachers. Education remains the
just source of regional pride, and residents of Northern states have some of the highest
literacy rates in the nation. A larger percentage have attended college than in most other
regions, and support has been given to a dense network of private colleges including
the best known “Ivy League” schools. The foremost complex of higher educational
institutions in the U.S. is along the northern side of the Charles River, where Harvard
University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology sprawl in stately splendor.
The higher educational levels of Northern residents are reflected in their incomes. In
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, median household incomes exceed the national
average by nearly 20 percent and poverty rates are well below the national average.
Yet industrial resiliency and intellectual leadership are essentially limited to
southernmost New England, while its north is a sea of forest. Hillsides of trees angle
down to picturesque lakes. A few cabins dot the shores, but many are empty for much
of the year. Small villages center on churches and a store or two, but the sawmills,
creameries, and factories around which economic life once revolved have long since
closed. With the ongoing abandonment of farm land in New England, the forests
seem to return from their temporary exile; while in the harsh environment of the
Northwoods, they never left in the first place.
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Our northern summer, swiftly flying,
In southern winter's travesty;
And even as we are denying
Its passage, it has ceased to be.
More often now the sun was clouded;
The sky breathed autumn, somber,
shrouded;
Shorter and shorter grew the days.
~Alexander Pushkin, "Eugene
Onegin" XL
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THEME 1: A DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT - THE FIRST SIBERIA

THEME 1: A DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT-THE FIRST NORTHWEST

The seal of neglect and the economic dependence on territories to the south are
felt even more strongly in the eastern part of the region. In this densely forested
Northwoods area winter lasts up to six months, and January temperatures sometimes
reach down to -80oF. Huge, sturdy houses, often two to three stories tall, were built
from pine, and to conserve warmth, served as living quarters, grain storehouse, and
cattlepen all under one roof. In terms of climate and environment, the Northwoods
is the doorstep of Siberia, while historically it served as the forerunner of the Siberian
frontier.

In terms of landscape, the Northwoods are a preview of the great interior wilderness of
North America. In this portion of the North region, the southern boundary (starting
in northwestern Minnesota and curving to the southeast) coincides with the limits of
the area dominated by conifer forests when Europeans first entered the region three
centuries ago. Farther south, mixed forests fell before the lumbermen to give way to
cropland, but in the North, the climate was too harsh and the soils too poor to permit
viable agriculture except on scattered dairy farms. It is revealing that historically
the Northwoods was termed “the Northwest,” as if in anticipation of future Pacific
Northwest, the culmination point of the great expansion across the interior of the
continent.

Initially explored by Novgorodians interested in tapping its wealth in furs, the area was
long a frontier appendage to the Northwest. During the trade fairs of old northern
cities, pelts were collected from surrounding forests and even from beyond the Urals.
Both Russian trappers and indigenous tribal hunters visited the fairs, and their reindeer
teams and tents lent those northern cities a frontier flavor. The harsh nature of the
North inevitably hardened the northern character, creating here a pioneer spirit of selfreliance and independence, qualities which were strengthened by the virtual absence
of serfdom in this region. Enormous expanses of land also ecncouraged wanderlust in
northerners and bred the talent for traveling great distances. The Northwoods was the
birthplace of many famous explorers who pushed the boundaries of Russia into Siberia
in the late 17th and 18th centuries. Semyon Dezhnev (the first to circumnavigate Asia
from the northeast), Valdimir Atlasov (who gave the Russian monarchy Kamchatka),
and Erofei Khabarov (who led the first expeditions to Maritime Far East and
Manchuria) all hailed from the Velikiy Ustyug area. The city of Tot’ma, now a small
district center without a single paved street, even served as the de facto headquarters of
the Russian-American trading company that ruled Alaska.

The sun that brief December day
Rose cheerless over hills of gray,
And darkly circled, gave at noon
A sadder light than waning moon.
Slow tracing down the thickening
sky
Its mute and ominous prophecy,
A portent seeming less than threat,
It sank from sight before it set.
~John Greenleaf Whittier,
"Snow-Bound: A Winter Idyl"

The settlement of the Northwoods was long retarded until loggers swept through
the Upper Great Lakes in the timber boom of the late 19th century. Lumbermen
were originally dominated by French Canadians from Maine, and later were mostly
Scandinavian. However like most activities in the Northwoods, the lumber industry
was Yankee-owned and directed, and “Yankee” descendants became the most dominant
group that settled the Upper Great Lakes states. Though the North looks split on the
map, movement between New England and the Northwoods across the Canadian
“bridge” was easy and traffic busy. The Grand Trunk and Soo Line railroads were built
across the bridge to provide access to Chicago.
While timber resources remain one of the mainstays of economy of the Northwoods,
its geologic history helped turn the area into an important resource appendage to the
American Manufacturing Belt. If the massive glaciers that moved out of northern
Canada left in their wake rugged, barren terrain unfit for agriculture, they also brought
the mineral wealth of Canadian Shield closer to the surface. Large-scale mining is
concentrated in the impressive open pits of northeastern Minnesota where iron ore is
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Yet Siberia was won not for Novgorod, but for Moscow. Novgorodian tenure in their
far-flung commercial empire was always precarious. The east-west link between the
Northwoods and the Northwest was assured by rivers and portages, but the eastern area
remained almost unpopulated, and was eventually colonized from the south. Using
the rivers that flow from the raised platform of Central Russia, colonists from the Core
region literally floated downstream toward the low Arctic coastlines in a movement first
foretold by fortified monasteries. The only obstacles to this colonization were along the
edges of the Northwoods: in the barren granite cliffs of Karelia and the equally bare
foothills of the Urals, where the indigenous populations of Finno-Ugric Karelians and
Komi survive.
Thus Muscovy, the newly ascendant Core of recent centuries, not only relegated the
Northwest to peripheral status, but also stole from its orbit the Northwoods which
it turned into a private resource storehouse. In economic terms, the North remains
a poorly integrated region: the Northwest gravitated to St. Petersburg, while the
Northwoods was tied to Moscow. Since Peter’s times the principal wealth of the
Northwoods was in its boreal conifer forests, the taiga. The North exported timber, tar,
wax and honey to Europe, and also became Russia’s lumberyard. Huge pulp and paper
mills (the one in Syktyvkar is the nation’s largest) ensure the Northwoods a monopoly
on the Russian paper products market. Iron ore mining (especially in Karelia) and
bauxite mining are equally important. The new industrial projects of the Soviet period
(such as the blast furnaces of Cherepovets) were characterized by gargantuan “Siberian”
scale and also by the wide use of prison labor. The original concentration camp of
communist times was opened in 1921 on Solovetskiy Archipelago in the White Sea.
Political prisoners and exiles felled the forest, built coal mines, and laid new railways
in the taiga and tundra. Even in recent times, prisoners accounted for every third or
fourth adult resident in the Komi Republic.
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removed from the Mesabi range. But as barges loaded with iron ore or logs float south
down the rivers and the Great Lakes, relatively little income returns to the North since
further stages of manufacture are located outside the region.
The livelihoods of Northerners are dependent on the fast-paced economy of the
Heartland and the Core in yet another way. The eyes of Americans increasingly turn
toward the rugged yet beautiful natural environments of the North, especially to the
resource that the North has in greatest abundance - water. The numerous lakes of the
North attract hundreds of thousands of visitors. Strips of summer cottages have lined
many of the lakefronts throughout the North for generations, and the number of
year-round residences increased significantly in recent decades. The lakes also lure more
transient visitors. Minnesota state officials estimate that nearly 2 million anglers swarm
the surfaces of that state’s lakes during the opening weekend of the fishing season,
an especially impressive figure when one realizes that the entire state’s permanent
population is only 4.4 million. The North’s forests complement the lakes, providing
what many find is an especially restful environment.
But the gifts of the North are not for everyone. While many visitors enjoy the bracing
weather and the thrill of various activities, they return to their more temperate homes
remarking that the North is a marvelous place to visit, but they couldn’t imagine
living there. Yet a significant minority of Americans find that the same characteristics
that others believe they couldn’t endure are exactly what convinces them to stay. For
example, a number of elderly individuals have converted their recreational homes
-- “the lake place up North” -- into permanent residences. As a result, the band
of counties dubbed by geographer Phil Gersmehl as “the Midnight Sun Belt” has
experienced population growth since 1970. The snow makes daily life more difficult,
but the white blanket helph many places become year-round recreational destinations,
as cross-country skiing and snowmobile trails follow the same paths where hikers trek
during the spring and summer and leaf-watchers amble during the fall. This belt of
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HOW TO GET BEREZOVIK
(birch wine)
1. Find a young birch tree in the northern
Russian forest
2. Wait until March or early April
3. drive a splint into the trunk and collect sap
in bucket
4. add wine and sugar; seal and store three
months
5. serve as a drink
6. good for what ails your heart and liver

The cold climate of the Northwoods allowed it to preserve the purity of its culture.
As if kept in a “cold storage”, the villages in the area still hold to many customs, songs
and dress of long ago. The people speak a very distinct northern dialect, immediately
recognized by any Russian. The survival of the indigenous Finno-Ugric-speaking
populations is another aspect of the region’s role as a refuge. Only one hundred years
ago, rich collections of tales and legends which were passed orally from generation
to generation were written down by scholars touring remote northern from the
universities of the capitals still wander around the North in the summer, but to little
avail. The last famous storyteller of northern epics died in the 1940s, and nowadays
northern culture mostly survives in its museums and unique wooden church
architecture. The distinctively “nordic” stubborn culture is the major unifying bond
between the two parts of the North.
THEME 2: A STUBBORN CULTURE
Lying well north of the main track of nomadic invasions, the North has preserved what
many believe to be pure Russian culture. Remoteness also protected the North from
the periodic outbursts of administrative “initiatives” from centralizing Moscow. For
example, the traditions of the Old Believer Movement (which originated in the 17th
century as a rejection of reforms undertaken by the official church) are still alive in
many northern villages. In the communist period, the North suffered comparatively
less from militant atheistic politics, and preserved most of its distinctive stone
monasteries and wooden churches.
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While the impacts of remote Central Russia were weak, west European influence has
left many tangible imprints on the region. A famous northern breed of livestock, the
Kholmogorskiy milk cows, were bred from Holsteins. The windmills and famed lacemaking of Vologda evoke Holland, and architecture in and around St. Petersburg
imitate European styles. A great admirer of things European, Peter saw his urban

belt of recreation and retirement counties stretches from the Maine coast through
New Hampshire, Vermont, into northeastern New York, and reappears in northern
Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota.
The North remains a place of small towns, but life in both parts of the region fully
depends on what is happening beyond its southern border. Little wonder that many
people who live in the northern parts of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota
periodically call for secession from those states and the establishment of a new state
called Superior, which is expected to serve this area in its own context rather than from
the perspectives that dominate in Detroit, Milwaukee or Minneapolis-St. Paul. The
latter metropolises are strictly peripheral to the Northwoods, and in many ways its
regional focus is still in New England. After more than two centuries of being separated
by the wedge of Canada, relatively few people in New England and the Upper Great
Lakes area realize the similarities of their situations, especially obvious in the “nordic”
stubbornness of the northern culture.

HOW TO GET MAPLE SYRUP
1. Find a good sugar maple tree in Vermont
2. wait until early spring
3. tap the trunk and collect sap in a bucket
4. boil in the sugar house 'til syrup forms
5. serve on a tall stack of pancakes
6. good for what ails your soul

THEME 2: A STUBBORN CULTURE
The challenging environment of the North may help explain the emotional reserve
and hardiness of the stereotypical northern character. Residents of the North have
developed reputations for a reserved stoicism that verges on the extreme. The laconic
speech of the “Down East” residents of Maine is widely lampooned, but discussions
in other parts of the North can be equally terse. The classic “town meeting” form of
government in New England is often characterized as seemingly endless discussions
among townsfolk about trivial issues, but the real wonder of the North is that citizens
can condense a year’s worth of discussions about how their governments should
function into a single night.
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creation as either the “Venice of the North” or as “New Holland.” Fyodor Dostoevsky,
all of whose novels take place in the St. Petersburg of palaces and hovels, believed it to
be “the most abstract and conjured up city in the world.” There is something of an air
of fantasy about the place. The regular baroque layout of St. Petersburg’s center, the
numerous canals, venetian palazzos, and Italian architecture, sharply contrast with the
charming irregularity of Russian traditions exemplified by Moscow.
Despite this outward westernization, the North is widely held to be a refuge of “truly
Russian” spirit. pilgrimage of tourists from mostly urban background who stream
here to commune with the soul of “The Real Russia.” The apparent contradiction in
regional identity stems from an attempt by both romantic nationalists and westernized
intellectuals to reinterpret Russian history - rejecting its “oriental” Muscovite pages as
deviations wrought by external forces, the Mongols. Since northern Russia was never
conquered and did not know serfdom, qualities attributed to its population (businessmindedness, industriousness and self-reliance) may therefore be interpreted as “true”
Russian traits.
On the other hand, one could maintain that northerners are self-centered and
isolationist, with aspirations to a worldliness which may be alien to people of the
Russian Core. The revealing episode is the failed attempt to reform the Orthodox
Church in a manner resembling North European reformation. Undertaken almost
simultaneously with the advent of Luther’s ideas in Europe, this movement was most
successful in the rich monasteries of the North, believed by many to be the buttresses of
orthodoxy, yet perhaps more remarkable for their successful entrepreneurial activities.
From early on, the monasteries became the nuclei of settlement and economic
development in the North. Even as late as the turn of the twentieth century, Solovetskiy
Monastery owned a shipping company, a shipbuilding wharf, a hydroelectric plant, and
a radio station to communicate with the mainland.
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Although quiet evenness is a primary characteristic of many Northerners’ personalities,
a certain air of superiority often underlies their attitudes. The American poet Robert
Frost championed New England in his verse and represented well this regional pride.
He wrote in his poem “New Hampshire”:
She’s one of the two best states in the Union.
Vermont’s the other. And the two have been
Yoke-fellows in the sap-yoke from of old
In many Marches. And they lie like wedges,
Thick end to thin end and thin end to thick end,
And are a figure of the way the strong
Of mind and the strong of arm should fit together...
The spirit of superiority that sometimes borders on smugness is energized by beliefs that
Northeners have reached their present status through hard work in difficult conditions.
New England’s culture in particular has been described as moralistic. On the one side,
there is restraint and moral idealism (especially in the attitude to hard work); on the
other, a tendency to self-righteousness and moralizing about the faults of others. Many
traits of this northern culture appear to be strikingly different from the mainstream,
almost un-American. In the words of George Pierson, Northeners tend to be pessimist
rather than optimist; introvert, not extrovert; frugal, not wasteful. The region
emphasizes the importance of words and ideas as opposed to the simple calculation of
interest. Not surprisingly, in terms of politics many states of the North are the most
liberal. Wisconsin and Minnesota display the greatest extent of social experimentation
at voters’ request, somewhat resembling the “welfare state” philosophy of Scandinavia
from where many residents came. The American belief that the best governed are least
governed has been historically weak in the region. Yet another Europe-like departure
from the American norm may be seen in the deep social and cultural cleavages between
the elite and proletarians, especially in New England. Even when the newer immigrant
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Ties between Europe and the Russian North may have had their benefits, but they were
still overshadowed by an often icy military and political standoff. What was at stake
was not only control over the bleak eastern shores of the Baltic in what is now modern
Latvia and Estonia, but also a choice which was to define the very character of Russia.
While the Core to the south was being overrun by Mongols from Asia and becoming
a vassal state to these Asian invaders, a decisive battle was fought in the North when
Prince Aleksandr of Novgorod defeated the Swedes on the Neva River in the 13th
century. Thus the great name “Aleksandr Nevsky” came into Russian history, and his
victory symbollized a choice between dependency on the Mongols (many of whom
adopted Russian culture) and struggle against crusading Germanic neighbors from
Europe whose purpose was to wipe out Eastern Orthodoxy. That choice of battle front
was one of the decisive turning points for the subsequent course of Russian history as it
saved the independence of Russian civilization and religion. Nevsky is therefore either a
hero or culprit, depending on whether one’s sympathies are nativist or pro-western.
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Since the erection of the first fortresses guarding the approaches to Novgorod and
Pskov, Russia has tried to strengthen its northwestern borders, and has succeeded to
some degree - it is the only place where Russia’s boundary is the same now as 1000
years ago. No other part of the country has such a concentration of both ancient and
relatively recent fortresses. Peter the Great built his city as an opening to the West,
but the northwestern boundary of Russia seems not so much a wide-open window as
a narrow embrasure in a fortress wall. This standoff on the western “front” continued
right up to the twentieth century; the Baltic states have long played the role of a
shatterbelt between Russia and Germany. Thus annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia by the USSR in 1940 may have served Stalin’s geopolitical purposes, but
one can also view it as part of a cycle of revenge against Germany for defeats suffered
centuries before. In fact, one year later, the pendulum swung back against Russia, as a
heroic 900 day-long defense of besieged Leningrad in World War II began.

underclasses (like the Irish) produced their own strong leadership, it came to emulate
the ways of the old aristocratic elite of New England, such as its intellectual and social
exclusiveness.
In fact the uniqueness of northern culture was born largely by exclusion. Colonies
established by the Puritans were to a surprising degree free of British rule, and later
New England was largely self-consciously distanced from mainstream American
developments. The resulting culture is extremely stubborn in its self-perpetuation.
Puritans became Yankees, and in the 19th century sections of the North became
dominated by the Irish, Italians, French Canadians or Scandinavians, and yet the
political attitudes of the Catholic clan of Kennedys continue the New England
tradition. The exclusiveness of the North, which still in many ways faces across the
ocean, was largely due to the fact that it was excluded from the frontier movement.
As the settlers moved westward, they were blocked not so much by the mountains as by
the activities of the French, established in Quebec since the early 1600s. One colonial
leader complained that the French were “running all along by the back” of the British
settlements. It was the French-Canadian fur traders, the riverborne voyageurs, who
initially opened the Northwoods to Europeans and left on its map a rich splattering of
French names. France ceded Quebec to England in 1763 only after a whole series of
British-French conflicts. But Britain discouraged its American colonists from further
incursions into the western frontierlands which would anger the indigenous tribes,
and in 1763 established the Proclamation Line that ran along the western edge of New
England.
When Britain, rather than France, became the major opponent, conflicts continued.
During the War for Independence the North was the setting for many battles, such
as the successful American taking of Fort Ticonderoga on the western front at Lake
Champlain. Several decades later, the North once again framed the scene for conflict
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At the same time the history of the Northwest was closely interwoven with that
of the Baltics, conquered by Peter at the same time that Petersburg was founded.
German elite from Baltic provinces traditionally made up the higher echelon of
Imperial bureaucracy of Petersburg, and for Dostoyevsky and many others the city
was a “German blot on the map of Russia.” In the late 1980’s Leningraders were the
most avid supporters of Baltic independence, some even harboring plans of a Baltic
Commonwealth including Leningrad.
Perhaps regions, as peoples, are the sums of opposites. The two contrasting faces of
the North are represented by the westernized Northwest on the one hand and the
ethnographic refuge of the Northwoods on the other. Blending into one in the city
founded by Peter the Great, the western and oriental streams of Russia’s soul come
together in a dazzling complex of both culture and conflict.
ST. PETERSBURG
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On the marshes at the mouth of the Neva River, Peter the Great was determined to
build a great city in the early 1700s, and St. Petersburg was thus born despite the
whims of the harsh northern environment. The fight cost Russia many casualties, as
thousands of lives were lost from deprivation and disease during the construction.
A Russian historian named this proud capital, boasting of its European architecture,
a “paradise built on human bones.” Conceived and built as a challenge to Russia’s
traditions, St. Petersburg has developed into a generator of social upheavals. Nowhere
else in Russia were social gaps so wide. The accumulated “negative energy” of discontent
reached critical mass in the 19th century. The city of bureaucrats and imperial triumphs
was fast becoming one of the global centers of capitalism, the center of Dostoevsky’s
“The Insulted and Humiliated.” The spark that ignited the discontent was liberal
thought imported from the West via the city, exploding violently on the more Asiatic
soil of Russia. A series of tumultuous events have thus torn St. Petersburg, beginning

with Great Britain, as naval engagements occurred along the Great Lakes during the
war of 1812. If all the British lands in North America had become part of the U.S.,
vast portions of Quebec and Ontario would have become part of the North, linking
New England with the interior Northwoods; but the failure to acquire Canada left
New England stranded on the coast. It is indeed ironic that the region that so fiercely
opposed European control of America was also the one that saw itself as the foothold of
European refinement in the young nation. The cousin-regions of Northwoods and New
England thus became permanently separated by geographic fate, but still united in a
uniquely northern character and history.
BOSTON
The paradoxes of the North are all on display in the city of Boston. The small peninsula
known to the local Indian people as Shawmut was not particularly imposing in 1630
when John Winthrop and Richard Saltonstall moved there from Salem. It would
have been hard to believe that by the nineteenth century, the people of Boston would
regard themselves as the center of the known world. Today, Boston is still proud of
the history that thrives on every street and draws in tourist dollars each summer along
the “Freedom Trail.” West of Boston are more sacred spots of Americana: the green
at Lexington and the bridge at Concord where the Revolutionary War was sparked.
New Englanders can be a perverse folk, stubborn in their consciences and old ties:
Concord holds a monument not only to the American colonials, but also to the British
soldiers who fought there. And when the commander of the troops who shot down
the city’s civilians during the 1770 “Boston Massacre” needed legal counsel, he found
help from an unlikely source: a Boston colonial lawyer named John Adams who was to
become the second President of the United States 27 years later. Boston thrived after
independence as the core city of the North, nourished by maritime trade with Europe
and a second “revolution” - this time an industrial one, as textile factories relying on the
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with the abortive Decembrist rebellion in 1845 and culminating in the two revolutions
of 1917. To this day, the city still spawns extreme political movements from both right
and left.
Peter’s city retains its universal intellectual pretensions. It is rational and detachedly
speculative, just as Moscow is irrational and feverishly active. The superb art created
in St. Petersburg bears an imprint of the west, but much of it is a refined art for art’s
sake, and something of the northern cold creeps into its beauty. Fittingly enough,
the period of unprecedented cultural florescence at the turn of the century was called
the Silver Age, the color of cold glitter evoking the eerie light of Petersburg’s famous
white nights. Nostalgia for decadent arts more than fits the decaying city. A murderous
climate, treacherous marshes and a lack of maintenance are slowly destroying the
“northern Venice.” The seal of decay marks numerous palaces, many of which are now
honeycombs of congested communal apartments, and much recent renovation has
only been bought by foreign investors. Many intellectuals are defecting to Moscow,
and the intolerant proletariat of the “city of revolutions” may be poising itself for a new
eruption. There is a sad beauty in the slow death of a once proud city, and the question
remains: even if it is Leningrad that is dying, will the resurrected St. Petersburg be the
same without its lost empire?
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water power of New England rivers brought money into the city’s economy. While
the Erie Canal and superior railroad connections shifted the Core focus southward
to New York City, Boston’s intellectual and cultural pride was still at its peak in the
nineteenth century as a series of literary figures emerged (Longfellow, Lowell, Whittier,
Emerson, Thoreau, Alcott, and Hawthorne). Boston spawned many firsts in America:
a college, a daily newspaper, a public school. The stuffy upper class, mainly of white
Anglo-Saxon Protestant ancestry and with names like Lowell, Cabot, and Winthrop
(often called “Boston Brahmans”) began to believe that their city was indeed the
Hub of the Universe. But by the early twentieth century, Boston started a downward
slide in its economic fortune. Industry had begun to leave, while immigrant families
arrived needing jobs. Boston became a city rich in ethnic neighborhoods, but with
a shrinking tax base as wealthier families moved to suburbia. By the early 1970s, a
busing program to integrate Boston’s schools resulted in violence. Yet the city of Proper
Bostonians has also been the cradle of such leaders as John Kennedy, Martin Luther
King, and Malcolm X. Today, the old revolutionary zeal is alive in both the intellectual
communities of Boston and the sports fans who fill Fenway Park or scream for (and at)
the Bruins and Celtics. And some of the stubborn streak is still there - just try to drive
or park on Boston streets. It is a city which has survived many an economic “revival”
and is looking to heal the wounds of racial division. Boston may have long ago lost the
battle for supremacy to New York City, but there is perhaps no other city in the U.S.
which has such a strong sense of identity. The universe has been shifting around a bit,
but Bostonians still know where they are.
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THE SOUTH
Aleksei Naumov

“As to Dikanka, I think you’ve heard more than enough about it...as to its gardens,
this goes without saying: even in Petersburg, you would not find anything like that.”
These words belong to a simple Ukrainian beekeeper, a character in Gogol’s famous
series, “Evenings on the Croft Near Dikanka.” with plots that mix the realities of
rural life in the Ukraine with fantastic folklore stories.
Thanks to standard school courses on Russian literature, fictional Dikanka is a wellknown place and an easily recognizable one: the Ukrainian village has not changed
much in the one and a half centuries that have elapsed since Gogol’s times. Gently
rolling picturesque landscapes of benevolent South and the rural way of life in the
Dikankas of today convey an image of a country idyll. To the Slavic ear, the very
placename Dikanka sounds cozy and lyrical. It seems to resonate with the softness
of melodious Ukrainian speech and evokes the sounds of folk songs, which are still
often heard in these parts. The impression is conveyed not only by the whitewashed
daubed brick cottages engulfed by the green of cherry tree gardens and by the gold
of ripe grainfields, but also by the richness of the local harvest. Moscow’s farmers’
markets overflow with Ukrainian lard, early potatoes, fruits, and honey. Today,
much more than in the past, the southern village appears to be colorful and full of
life, in stark contrast to the emptied and drab villages of the North.
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THE SOUTH
John Florin

“Maycomb was an old town, but it was a tired old town when I first knew it.
In rainy weather the streets turned to red slop; grass grew on the sidewalks, the
courthouse sagged in the square. Somehow, it was hotter then: a black dog
suffered on a summer’s day; bony mules hitched to Hoover carts flicked flies in
the sweltering shade of the live oaks on the square. Men’s stiff collars wilted by
nine in the morning. Ladies bathed before noon, after their three-o’clock naps,
and by nitefall were like soft teacakes of sweat and sweet talcum.”
Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird
The South has a deep, rich literary tradition tying the region of today with its past.
That past often seems set in eternal summer, with its shimmering heat, lazy days,
and sudden rainstorms. It may be hard for Yankees to understand, but to Southerners
the heat of summer was not simply something to be endured; rather, the season’s
languid pace helped define the special character of the region, a character that made
it somehow better than the rest of the country. “People moved slowly then. They
ambled across the square, shuffled in and out of the stores around it, took their time
about everything. A day was twenty four hours long, but seemed longer” (Ibid). The
South in literature is also a place of small towns, courthouse squares, and farmers.
Urban America with its Atlantas might have intruded upon the reality of the modern
South, but the South of the region’s literary imagination remains firmly fixed on its
more rural past.
2

-

•Moscow

s
.rula \

8 E

LARU S
~

c

)

.

... ......,;"

u

•

Oklahoma City

p.

\l.

i

~'~

•voronezh
'

.Belgorod

-....,..._ . . .. / \ ,

T EXA

s

MISSISSIPPI !

pINE

I

w0

D~S

0

f

•poltava

K

SL 0

soDA

UKRAINE
(WEsr)

DEEr

f

.
•
\
Birmingham \

iI A l A B A M A .\

Ja_ckson

)
RIGHT

•
Vinnytsya

I

p. \l.

Zhytomyr.

~

Tambov

~ p..

\.. .. /'\,,\

('I

~

--,

Fort Worth• • Dallas

sumy.

~

•

Upetsk

\l.

• Kursk

'

"....

tl i

1p. c

p.. \.

.

.Penza

OKLAHOMA

s \. •

orel

.,

s"l s ~<

u

R

A

sou f

Charleston

1-1

1 GEORGIA
~--~- --

..,~~,..,.

8"~1\1.-r

f: - - - - -

•

(

Kirovohrad
G

u

1

f
0

f

M e

-

X

j

C

0

0

3

200

4

-

5

THE SOUTH: MORE THAN UKRAINE

THE SOUTH: MORE THAN DIXIE

The South spills more definitively across a new international border than any of our
other regions, and outlining a “south” without Ukraine would be unthinkable. Yet
the South incorporates more than the elusive southerness of Ukrainian and southern
Russian culture. The region has been largely “made” by its warm climate and fertile
soils. In the 17th-18th centuries, the rewarding environment helped make the South
Russia’s granary, but its bounty was based even more on the backbreaking labor of
bonded peasants, the serfs. Only in the South was the low productivity of forced labor
(in comparison with free labor) offset by the high efficiency of nature itself. The origin
of the Russian derogatory word for people at the bottom of society, “chern’” (literally
“the black ones”) may have been in the South, where the rich black soil collaborated
with serfdom. The heritage of serfdom has left a lasting imprint in the region’s social
conservatism and persistent ruralism.

Everybody knows the South: it is Dixie, the land of cotton and confederate flags! Yet
the reality of regional identity is much larger and more complex. In attempting to
define the South, the Southern historian Ulrich B. Phillips wrote about the region
in 1929, suggesting “Let us begin with the weather. [It] has been the chief agency in
making the South distinctive. It fostered the cultivation of the staple crops, which
promoted the plantation system, which brought the importation of negroes, which not
only gave rise to chattel slavery but created a lasting race problem.” One might include
the additional legacies of cultural conservatism and poverty. The war that ended slavery
was fought nearly 130 years ago, but the triad of race, conservatism, and poverty (all
easily and directly attributable to the culture and economy of the region’s pre-Civil War
plantation system) continue to be defining regional themes. By almost any measure of
regional poverty, Southern states rank at or very near the bottom.

The economy of the South is still firmly rooted in the soil: 45 percent of the working
population are farmers, while another 15 percent are employed in processing farm
products. Life revolves around very large villages, while most towns are small service
centers and themselves in essence glorified villages. Cozy village-like wooden cottages
are surrounded by fruit and vegetable gardens, and even “cityfolks” cultivate plots of
land to provide for their tables. A surprising 80 percent of the region’s territory is under
plow, which accounts for the breathtaking open landscapes of rolling fields.

But defining the area by these characteristics alone gives an incomplete story. Change is
a seemingly contradictory but almost equally well recognized component of the South’s
identity. “The New South” is heard so often across the region that it has become a
cliche. Prior to this century the South was a strikingly rural place, another consequence
of its historic agricultural economy. Large cities were few and widely scattered. As late
as 1940 nearly half the population of states like Georgia and South Carolina were
classified as farmers by the Census. Today the typical Southerner is far more likely to
live and work in a city, and the South leads the nation in the share of its population
employed in manufacturing. But then again, manufacturing is no longer synonymous
with progress in a service-based economy. Is it perhaps a region permanently trapped in
a race to catch up with the rest of the nation?

To a large extent, the parochial agrarian society of the sleepy South is the living past.
Its conservative culture is permeated with the ideals of peasantry, quite literally bent
to the soil. In the ousiders’ stereotypical view, southerners are “country bumpkins”
with limited horizons. Yet today’s provincial periphery has ample reason to be proud of
its historic glory. The South was one of the two cradles of Slav statehood and culture,
while its later frontier history largely shaped the two major successor peoples of ancient
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I grew up in orchards
where warm pears ripened,
where a leaf was covered with dust,
and juicy stalks were fragrant.
I grew up in fields
where the sunrise was like a flare,
where disturbed tillage
softly steamed at noon.
I grew up in forests,
where pines like slender waists grew pink,
where dew fell heavily
on light blue sylvan glades.
I grew up on the Dnieper,
where blue slopes tower above,
where fishermen-a not very talkative peopleset out their nets at night.
And the hues of those distant yearswherever I may go,
whatever I may write, lie like a reflection
on white paper.
Lina Kostenko, Selected Poetry: Wanderings
of the Heart, translated from Ukrainian by
Michael M. Naydan, Garland Publishing Inc.,
New York & London, 1990, p. 4 (from "Earthly Rays" collection, 1957)
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Kievan Rus, Russians and Ukrainians, who share the region. If today the South has
been cut in two by the line between Ukraine and Russia, the split is actually again
about history - an offshoot of the old dispute over who is more senior. Reliving old
glories and quarrels, the South remains trapped in the past.
Ukraine - Hearth or Periphery?
From the 9th to the 12th centuries, the Ukrainian segment of our region was the
southern hearth of that loose confederation of Eastern Slavs’ principalities known as
Kievan Rus. As with Novgorod, Kiev’s ascendancy was due to trade carried on the
Dnieper along the route from the Varangians (Vikings) to the Greeks. But while the
North was in many ways a transmitter of influences from Northern Europe, Kiev
became the major way station for introducing Byzantine cultural models and Orthodox
Christianity into Russia. The area was formally baptized in 988, and the temple of
Sophia was erected in Kiev as a replica of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople. By the 13th
century, Kiev was one of the largest and most resplendent cities of Europe. The mixed
forest-steppe environments of the South proved conducive to farming that was far more
productive than in the barren forest zone to the north, while scattered riparian forests
provided protection from the warlike nomads who roamed the open grasslands farther
south. After centuries of uneasy coexistence with the steppe nomads, the South was
overrun and utterly destroyed by Chenghis Khans’ in 1240, and it never managed to
recover its focal role.
When the South reemerged from protracted obscurity in the 16th century it was
no longer a hearth, but merely a periphery to northern Slavic culture and a bone
of contention between Poland and the young heir to ancient Rus, Muscovy. While
repopulating deserted Ukrainian lands, the Polish government also divided them
into the huge estates of Polish landlords. As no longer self-sufficient Western Europe
demanded wheat and sugar beets (for which Ukraine is ideally suited), something like

The Lowland South - From America’s Hearth to Periphery
The Coastal South was one of the two original hearths of the young nation, where
history took a course quite different from the Northern hearth in New England. From
the outset, colonization of the South by Europeans was commercial. Immigrants into
the South did not seek religious freedom, but material gain. The east coast of North
America from the Chesapeake Bay southward was, by comparison with northwest
Europe, an area of long, hot summers, mild winters, and substantial precipitation. It
offered the opportunity for an agricultural economy complementary to that of Europe,
taking advantage of crops that could not be grown in Europe but were nevertheless in
great demand there.
In contrast to most of colonial North America (where agriculture was based on the
individually owned and family operated farm), the South shared an agricultural style
with other areas of tropical and semi tropical crops in the Caribbean Basin and along
the margins of Middle America- the plantation.
A plantation was a large-scale business enterprise, encouraged by the combination of
cheap land and economies of scale; its goals were cash return and export. The labor
requirements of the plantation generated a tremendous demand for field hands. At
first, and especially in the Chesapeake Bay colonies, that need was met by indentured
servants, individuals from Great Britain who signed away their labor for a period of
years in return for transport to America and the eventual promise of obtaining their
own land. Well over 100,000 indentured servants migrated to Virginia alone during the
17th century. By the end of that century, however, the indentured servant labor force
had been largely replaced by slaves from Africa.
The first Africans had come into Virginia as slaves back in 1619. Their forced migration
route was the infamous triangle trade among Europe, West Africa, and the Caribbean.
By the early 18th century slavery was legally established as an acceptable form of

Perhaps my Northern brothers will not
believe me when I say there is a great deal
of positive material I can draw from my
"underprivileged" background. But they
have never lived, as I have, at the end of
a long road in a house that was faced by
the edge of the world on one side and nobody for miles on the other. They have
never experienced the magnificent quiet
of a summer day when the heat is intense
and one is so very thirsty, as one moves
across the dusty cotton fields, that one
learns forever that water is the essence
of all life. In the cities it cannot be so
clear to one that he is a creature of the
earth, feeling the soil between the toes,
smelling the dust thrown up by the rain,
loving the earth so much that one longs to
taste it and sometimes does.
~Alice Walker, "The Black Writer and
the Southern Experience", In Search
of Our Mothers' Gardens, San Diego,
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1983.
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colonial plantations developed, owned by Polish landlords and worked by enserfed
Ukrainian peasants. What an irony that the harshest variety of serfdom evolved in
Ukraine in direct response to the development of European capitalism. While the
North served as Russia’s window onto dynamic Northern Europe, the South recreated
the social order that was a throwback to Medieval Europe.
Since the immense wealth accrued by the new landlords lured the old Ukrainian
nobility into adoption of Polish ways, the resistance to Polish atrocities and attacks
against Slavic Orthodox culture was led by Ukranian Cossacks. These freebooters
gathered beyond the southern boundary of the region to live by plunder. On the great
bend of the Dnieper, the Cossacks created a sort of anarchic independent republic
(Zaporoz’ye Sich). At first completely opportunistic in the choice of their victims, the
Cossacks gradually came to see themselves as protectors of Orthodoxy and the common
man, and during the uprising of 1648 they briefly established a virtually independent
Ukrainian state. Unable to stand on their own in the squeeze between Poland, Russia,
and the Ottoman Turks, the Cossacks chose the lesser evil and applied for Muscovy’s
protection, granted in 1654. From then on Ukrainian fate was inextricably linked with
that of Russia.
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property rights for citizens. In 1790 slaves constituted 43 percent of the population of
South Carolina, 39 percent in Virginia, and a third of the populations of Maryland and
Georgia.
The plains of the lowland South created a pattern of broad, slow moving, lazy rivers
along which export products from the plantations were shipped downstream to the
coast where they could be transferred to ships. The goal was to export those crops as
efficiently and inexpensively as possible. The transport system, and thus the pattern
of cities, emphasized the rapid movement of goods to the coast; overland connections
between cities were few, and less important than direct economic links to Europe. The
elite also maintained close cultural ties with Europe. They sent their children there for
education, purchased their fine furniture from European craftsmen, and long clung to
the coast to maintain close transport ties with the continent.

Although the realm created by the Cossacks on the east bank of the Dnieper was for
a century an autonomous part of Russia, it was fast losing its distinctively Ukrainian
character. Wooed into the wider imperial culture and service, the self-styled Ukrainian
nobility (of former senior Cossacks) was thoroughly Russified and actually became the
greatest opponent of Ukraine’s political separateness. For a second time Ukraine lost its
intellectual and political leaders: first to Polonization and now to Russification.

The society and economy that emerged in the South was in many ways a world of its
own, with attitudes and aspirations quite different from those of the northern colonies.
Many Southerners still insist that the terrible war between the North and the South
should be properly called the War Between the States, not the Civil War.In the South,
Europeans did not come to create a new world as did the Puritans, but rather to
recreate the old European one and in a form that was by then disappearing in Europe
itself. The chivalry and aristocracy of Southern society were almost a recreation of
medieval Europe, just as slavery carried European serfdom to the logical extreme. At the
same time, African traditions expressed in such diverse areas a food, architecture, and
speech became part of the broader Southern culture, helping to further differentiate it
from the North.

The Ukraine was clearly quite different from the rest of Slav lands, and yet it seemed
permanently reduced to peripheral status. Under the Poles, it was merely an economic
appendage to Europe. Polish Catholics, who saw non-Catholics as inferior semi-

Only after the Civil War was the South integrated (forcefully) into the all-American
economic fabric instead of being a mere appendage to European markets. Yet the region
long remained something of a semi-colonial periphery, this time to the industrial
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barbarians, were the first to call the South the Ukraine, a word that literally means
“borderland” or “periphery.” Under the Russians the Ukraine was a periphery again
and fittingly enough Russians called it Malorossiya, Little Russia. From the time that
Peter the Great obtained a direct “window to the west” in the North, Russia was fast
becoming far more westernized and secular than Ukraine, which was sinking into
provincialism. No longer just a geographic term, the name Little Russia began to
acquire condescending overtones.
The Central Chernozem Region, the South Claimed from the North
The South thus grew from two segments: a Ukrainian part that was acquired by
Moscow as it gathered former Kievan lands under Orthodox rule and a Russian part
that was an extension of the new Muscovite Core, conquered and settled from the
north.
After the Mongol conquest, the forest-steppe south of the Oka river remained
practically deserted, and came to be known as the Wild Field, disputed between
Russians and the nomads. While Russians gradually moved south along the river
valleys, the nomads annually made plundering raids north along the dry watersheds.
Moscow itself was last burned by the Tatars in 1571, finally spurring the government
into decisive southward expansion. To obstruct the advance of mounted Tatars, fortified
margins pushed south to the Belgorod line, coinciding with the present southern
boundary of the region, completed in the 1650s at the same time as the acquisition of
Ukraine. Since the area was settled by Russians from the Core, a sharp ethnic boundary
separates it from Ukraine even to present day. Yet the original capitals of both the
Ukrainian realm (Baturin) and the Soviet Ukraine (Khar’kiv) were located on this
boundary which stitched together this Russian portion of the South and the “Old”
Ukrainian South.
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North. With the region’s defensive withdrawal into Dixie nostalgia about past glory, the
rest of the U.S. increasingly came to view the South somewhat condescendingly: a place
doubtlessly colorful and touchingly romantic yet certainly provincial. The Old South
became “Down South” - a name defining the region in relation to its marginal nature in
the eyes of northerners.
The Piedmont, the South Claimed from the North
To the west of the southern coastal lowland from Virginia to Georgia lies the rolling
upland of the Piedmont, an area once regarded as the rough, interior wildlands by the
coastal southerners. The zone of contact between the young, relatively soft, and easily
eroded rocks of the coastal plain and the older, harder, and less easily eroded rocks
of the Piedmont is marked by a stretch of waterfalls or series of rapids which bar the
upstream movement by river boats. One consequence is that for much of the colonial
period this Fall Line served as an effective barrier to the westward expansion of the
plantation economy and its demand for cheap water transport. The line is straddled by
a series of towns (from Richmond to Montgomery) initially established to deal with
the transfer of goods shipped across the line or to take advantage of the water power
generated by harnessing the tumbling streams.
In the first half of the 17th century, the uplands were occupied substantially by
settlers who wandered southward from Pennsylvania down the Great Valley (called the
Shenandoah in Virginia) and then through gaps in the Blue Ridge. By the 1730s the
Great Philadelphia Wagon Road marked the route. The result was that the Piedmont
population was largely white, and often German, into the early national period. With
comparatively few slaves the Piedmont had notably lower black percentages than the
coastal plain areas of the old cotton and tobacco belts. In the late 18th and first half of
the 19th century thousands of white migrants from the region, seldom rich but usually
individualistic, carried the distinctive Upper Southern culture westward.
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This Russian part of the South has been called the Central Chernozem region, the
epithet “Central” reflecting the region’s key economic role and central location. The
area “made” by the Core was also central in the sense that it helped shape Russian
serfdom. The southern frontier attracted thousands of peasants who fled the tax burden
imposed by the centralizing state (not least for the purpose of guarding this same
southern frontier). The drain bled Russia, which needed both money and armies. The
attachment of peasants to the land became the answer to military challenges of the
frontier, and little wonder that it occurred between the 1550s and 1649 - exactly the
period of southward expansion. Ironically, the very freedoms of the frontier reinforced
the emerging system of universal serfdom. The region that had been the Wild Field
became the Russian Field, the outwardly serene stronghold of landowning gentry that
was the pillar of the conservative political and social system of pre-capitalist Russia.
THEME 1: ECONOMY BASED ON HERITAGE OF INJUSTICE

13

By the early 18th century the South had lost its frontier character, and its lands were
occupied by larger estates. While serfdom existed over all of European Russia, its forms
varied and were nowhere so entrenched as in the South. In the less fertile northern
regions, the labor duties of serfs were reduced to payment of a money rent, which the
peasants were free to generate by pursuing any trade. The system paved the way for
the eventual growth of commercial enterprise in villages and towns. In the South, on
the other hand, an obligation to provide actual labor prevailed, and a number of days
every week had to be devoted to work in the landlord’s fields rather than on the serf ’s
own plot. Normally a whole village would belong to a single landlord, and the strong
institution of the village commune enforced collective compliance, while at the same
time stripping the individual of responsibility and initiative. A high southern culture
may have developed among the landowning class, but it was paid for by serfs who lived
in poverty and ignorance.

In the decades after the American Revolution plantation the economic life of the
country rushed into the Piedmont, led by cotton production. With a rapidly growing
population, the region eventually surpassed the coastal lowlands in economic and
demographic clout. In a symbolic severing of the umbilical cord to the Old World,
state capitals were relocated from lowland (and thus colonial) to piedmont (by
definition non colonial) locations Virginia’s from Williamsburg to Richmond, North
Carolina’s from New Bern to Raleigh, South Carolina’s from Charleston to Columbia,
and Georgia’s from Savannah to Atlanta. When the dominant focus on agriculture in
the South began to erode in the 1880s, the development of manufacturing focused on
the Piedmont. The lead was taken by the relocation of the cotton textile industry away
from New England to the rolling hill country from south central Virginia across the
central Carolinas to northern Georgia. In part this resulted from the local availability of
abundant water power resources.
In many ways the Piedmont became “another” South, largely shaped by the North
which first sent down its settlers; a century later, northern carpetbaggers and companies
presided over the birth in the Piedmont of the industrial South. The Piedmont can
perhaps be seen as the formative area for the New South, a South which was already
more than just the old Dixie.
THEME 1: ECONOMY BASED ON HERITAGE OF INJUSTICE
For over three centuries Southern culture was dominated by the legacy of the plantation
system. Virginians began exporting tobacco from their James River settlements in the
early 1620s. Despite the lament of many that it was a “noxious weed” that was sure
to damage the health of its users, the acquired taste and demand for tobacco swept the
continent. By the end of the 17th century the coastal swamps of South Carolina and
Georgia had become a major source for rice and indigo. Long staple (or Sea Island)
14

CHICKEN, KIEV-STYLE
6 chicken breasts halves, boned
and flattened
1/2 cup cold butter cut into six
pieces
3 tbsp chopped green onions
2 eggs, beaten
1 cup bread crumbs
salt and pepper
flour for dredging; oil for frying
Place butter in middle of each
chicken breast, sprinkle with salt,
pepper, and green onion. Roll up,
dredge in flour, dip in egg, roll in
bread crumbs. Fry in hot oil.

However, the big landowners and lowly serfs were only the two extremes of a rigidly
hierarchical social system. The number of serfs barely exceeded 50 percent of the
population, while at least a third were the so-called odnodvortsy, the “poor whites” of
the Russian South. They were a vestige of frontier history, when free people of humble
origin had to be lured to settle on the land in exchange for state service. Squeezed out
by large estates, these semi-gentry grew impoverished but fiercely defended their social
status. The majority had no serfs and were not much better off, but never mingled with
the lowest classes and strongly disdained the notion of working for someone else. The
odnodvortsy were a uniquely southern social layer, sharing with serfs a reputation for
sloth, poverty, and ignorance.
Thanks to the institution of serfdom, all layers of southern society lived by a hierarchy
of status and privilege. Southeners acquired a conformist respect for authority and
brute force. At the same time, the suppressed peasantry of the region learned to be
cunning and secretive. Outwardly demonstrating faithfulness to the existing social
order, they learned to effectively dodge work while trying to benefit from the system in
any possible way. Ukrainian literature in particular espouses the trickster types, perhaps
simple-minded but achieving all they need on the sly.
In contrast to the somewhat paternalistic serfdom of the Russian South, modified by
the enlightened aristocracy of the Russian gentry, serfdom achieved its ultimate and
harshest form in the West Bank Ukraine. That area remained in Polish hands until
1793, and Polish landowners were capitalists, not aristocrats. Even in 1850 about
5000 Polish magnates in the West Bank Ukraine owned 90 percent of all land and 1.2
million serfs; this was the truly “Deep” South.
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Altogether, the South was the major area of commercial agriculture. West Bank Ukraine
produced the bulk of Russian sugar, while East Bank Ukraine accounted for half of the
output of tobacco and alcohol was distilled in both areas. At least 70 percent of all

cotton emerged early in the 18th century as a major export of the agricultural lands of
the many islands lining the shores of those two colonies.
Prior to the Civil War the system led to the economic, political, and social domination
of the region by a small group of influential white plantation owners. Contrary to
common perception, most Southern farmers who produced plantation crops worked
their own land, but this numerically predominant group of white “yeoman farmers”
was marginal in terms of political and economic power. A willingness to respect the
leadership of the plantation aristocracy led to a kind of conformism in this group: while
they seldom owned slaves, they readily accepted the need for slavery. At the same time,
many in the aristocracy were members of early abolitionist societies, the majority of
which were located across the South. However, by the time of the Civil War acceptance
of the economic rationale for slavery had changed this attitude.

FRIED CHICKEN, SOUTHERNSTYLE
1 chicken cut into pieces
2 eggs
bread crumbs seasoned with salt and pepper
flour for dredging, oil for frying
Simmer chicken 20 minutes in saucepan.
Dry on paper towels. Coat with flour, dip in
beaten egg, roll in bread crumbs. Fry in hot
oil. Serve with cream gravy.

Cotton production moved westward across the lowland and Piedmont South and
northward as far as southeastern Missouri and southern Illinois during the first half
of the 19th century. The development of machines that could remove the small seeds,
or lint, from short staple cotton encouraged the geographic expansion. The rich black
soils of the Deep South were ideal for cotton, and soon the area’s population became
predominantly Black as well. The aristocratic paternalism of Old South was replaced by
a harsher, more strident relationship between purely business-oriented slaveholder and
slave, and the Deep South became the ultimate expression of the slave-based economy.
The President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, was a Missisippi senator, and the
headquarters of the Ku Klux Klan were in Tuscaloosa. Little wonder that Alabama
became the scene of fiercest fighting during the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s,
and Martin Luther King started his crusade in Birmingham.
In the pre-Civil War United States, the toil of the slave turned the South into a pillar of
wealth and power. Many of the first presidents of the new nation were drawn from
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cultivated lands owned by the Russian nobility were in the South, and only
their resistance delayed the final abolition of serfdom until 1861. In a sense, the
emancipation of serfs was a victory of the industrial-capitalist North of Russia over the
retrograde South, and it dealt the region a deadly blow.

Virginia. The South was the major region of export economy during much of the
country’s early national period. On the eve of the Civil War cotton, exported almost
entirely from the South, accounted for to-thirds of total exports from the United States
by value.

Decline and Conservatism

Decline and Conservatism

Neither the serfs nor their masters could easily adapt to Emancipation. Freed serfs
received little land, but had to pay heavy “redemption debts.” Many estate owners (such
as described in Chekhov’s classic “Cherry Orchard”) proved to be lousy entrepreneurs
and went bankrupt. In Chekhov’s play the nobleman returns to his dilapidated
hereditary estate to sell it to a nouveau riche capitalist, who has already scheduled
the destruction of the pride of the estate - the cherry orchard with all its nostalgic
memories. The fragmented fields of southern peasants could not compete with the
huge, flat geometric fields of the new national granary that developed in the once
empty grasslands of southern Ukraine. The fertility of the long mercilessly exploited
soils sharply declined, while in the more southerly steppes rich virgin black earth
abounded.

With the end of the Civil War and the advent of slave emancipation in 1863, the
South, which had been one of the wealthiest regions, was suddenly the nation’s
poorest. Plantation owners found their assured labor force gone and their property
often destroyed, while freed African-Americans were assured of political rights and
quickly gained many elected positions. This period of change was short lived, and a
decade after the war the region had returned to something remarkably like its old self.
As sharecropping replaced slavery after 1865, control shifted from slavery to the crop
lien system, where a merchant (also often a land owner) provided basic needs of the
sharecropper’s family in return for a portion of the crop. The system encouraged eternal
indebtedness. For decades after the war many landless rural southerners, both black and
white, never had the opportunity to accumulate the capital needed to improve their
circumstance.

The old estate economy relied on the serfs’ numbers, but the emancipated South found
itself overpopulated. Industrial growth was as phlegmatic as the proverbial southern
character and provided no outlet for landless peasants. Although the South acquired a
widely dispersed sugar-refining and grain-milling industry, most of the development
impetus came from the North. In Ukraine, Ukrainians hardly participated in the
city-based commerce and industry at all. While northeners moved hundreds of miles
south to the local factories, land-craving southerners preferred massive exodus to
new agricultural frontiers thousands of miles east. The southerners, and especially
Ukrainians, made up the majority of migrants into the newly opened southern
grasslands of Russia all the way to the Far East, and even to the USA.

Blacks, while now free, found that slavery had been replaced by institutionalized
segregation enforced by a series of “Black Codes” that restricted access to economic
opportunity outside agriculture and to educational opportunities. In the 1890s
the states of the South began passing so called “Jim Crow laws” that legalized the
segregation of the races in a wide variety of areas. In education, southern states
provided separate systems for whites and blacks. While the U.S. Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) had given its approval to the separation provided the two
systems were equal, the reality soon became white systems with vastly superior resources
18

Following a brief breathing spell after the 1917 revolution, the region suffered a nearcomplete resurrection of serfdom in the guise of the collective farm (kolkhoz). Under
Stalinist socialism, labor duties reappeared in the form of obligatory work to be done
on the collective fields. Until the 1970s, the peasants were even denied freedom of
migration. Little wonder that once “the second emancipation” of the later Soviet
period arrived, a new exodus followed, and Southerners made up the majority of high
wage-seeking migrants to Siberia. Today the population of the South is a staggering
11 million less than it was in 1897, but even so its heavily rural population is second
only to the industrial-urban Core of the country. Farming gives proof of the relative
immutability of the South. Although its productivity today is among the highest in
Russia, it still loses to the Breadbasket in terms of scale and specialization. The region
itself essentially consumes its agricultural bounty. But then self-sufficiency is exactly
its ideal. The South always tended to revert to comfortable subsistence whenever
central power was weakened. The latest such period arrived in the 1970s when the
more laissez-faire policy of Moscow allowed southern peasants to farm private plots.
The southerners’ creative tendency to circumvent the system helped them to work
out a comfortable modus vivendi with the kolkhoz. A few pigs secretly fattened by
fodder stolen from kolkhoz fields bring the southerner a good annual income on top
of guaranteed pay. Stripped of initiative by centuries of serf labor, southerners are not
eager to assume the insecurities of private farmers. The region lags behind the rest of
Russia in the spread of private farms, as the kolkhozes carry on. The region spawned a
corps of collective farm chairmen, a strongly conservative lobby in new Russian politics
and worthy successors to the big landowners of the South who once dominated the
Emperor’s ultra-conservative Private Council.
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The southerners’ conservative political culture largely rests upon a respect for the
existing order and reliance on the wisdom of traditional superiors. During the first
Soviet free elections in 1988, the region overwhelmingly elected the old communist

compared to their black neighbors. Segregation eventually permeated nearly every
aspect of southern life.
Blacks were excluded from some urban occupations and industries (such as cotton
textiles) or confined to the lowest paying jobs. This trend was to dominate Southern
industrialization until well into the last half of the 20th century. Manufacturing was
located in areas of largely white populations, sections away from the centers of the
plantation economy. Stranded Black populations had no option but to migrate to
the industrial centers of the north, sparking the great exodus that so altered the racial
composition of the northern metropolis.
The institution of slavery, and later the widespread availability of cheap labor (often
black) limited European immigration to the South, as reflected in the insularity of
ethnic identities in the region (largely English and Scots- Irish). Shunned by new
immigrants and losing its own population, the South rapidly slipped down on the
scale of population that had given it so much political leverage in the past. Whereas in
1810, Virginia was the nation’s most populous state, and Virginia and North Carolina
together accounted for one-third of all U.S. population, by the time of the Civil War,
the share of these two states had declined to 10 percent. With a growing local sense
that the area had been treated poorly, the two terms best defining southern culture
were conservatism and loyalty. To many in the region, the two have a close meaning,
defining loyalty to the past and to tradition.
Former President Lyndon Johnson, proudly Texan, referred to himself as a “Yellow Dog
Democrat” given a choice, he would rather vote for a yellow dog than for a Republican.
That statement was one most southerners clearly understood and supported.
Democrats presided over a period when black disenfranchisement and segregation were
institutionalized. For decades state legislatures were prohibitively Democratic. The
system that developed placed most real power in the hands of a small group of elected
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party functionaries and emerged as a bastion of political conservatism. Outwardly
conformist, southerners actually seem indifferent to politics, as long as they are left
alone to quietly enjoy fruits of the land. Even the political tempest of Ukrainian
independence left most southerners cool: within a one-year period a strong majority of
Ukrainian residents (including Russian-speakers) voted first for the preservation of the
Soviet Union and then for independence. Be it in politics or modernization, the South
came to stand for conservatism as much as the North stands for experimentation.
THEME 2: HOW INDEPENDENT IS AN INDEPENDENT SOUTH?
Change has not completely bypassed the South. Its economic rebirth started in the
1960s when the North again reached into the south with new industrial enclaves such
as the metallurgical complex of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly. The two largest cities
of the South, Kiev and Voronezh, have emerged as economic capitals of respectively
Ukrainian and Russian parts of the region, and were chosen as sites for many laborintensive, high-tech industries such as electronics and aircraft building. Yet industrial
centers are few, and the share of the South in Soviet national industrial output was still
below its share of population. With urban population barely one half of the total, the
South remained the least urbanized of the Slavic regions of the former USSR.
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Maybe a more valid sign of the recent revival of the South is the fact that the southern
villager is now better off than those in the north, the reverse of previous patterns.
Surreptitious farming on private plots, with the produce of the fertile South carried
to markets in the North, brought a modicum of prosperity. Statistically speaking, the
southern standard of living still lags behind that of more northerly parts of Russia,
particularly with inflation problems in post-independence Ukraine, but few southerners
would agree that their quality of living is inferior. In the USSR, where the chronic food
problem made the easy availability of good food a major yardstick of well-being, the
South acquired a new stereotypical image of the land of satiety. Actually, support of
Ukrainian independence among common people largely rested on the premise that

officials and party leaders, tended to encourage lengthy stays in office, and gave
the South a powerful say in national politics through seniority control over many
Congressional committees. Only in the 1940s did the Democratic Solid South (at least
at the national level) begin to erode, as the increasing liberalism of the party scared off
many whites while attracting black voters. Former Southern Democrats fiercely loyal to
the tradition argue that they have not left the Democratic party - the party left them.
The South’s white voters often support Republicans now, favoring conservative values
reflected in their religious as well as political lives. Southerners of most stripes are
much more likely to attend church regularly than are people in most other sections
of the country; their Sunday mornings, and at least one evening each week, are given
over to church activities. Southern white Protestants are more likely than other white
Protestants to listen to religious shows on radio and television and to name a religious
person (usually Billy Graham) as their most admired individual. Most southern religion
is conservative, evangelical, and democratic. Northerners were often surprised by the
strong church involvement on both sides of the Civil Rights movement; in fact, it was
just part of the participatory nature of southern religion.
Over nine in ten southerners identify themselves as Protestants. Fully half of those are
Southern Baptists, and a majority of the remainder are Methodists. Blacks are even
more likely to be members of (usually all black) Baptist or Methodist churches. The
Southern Baptist Convention was created in 1845 in a dispute with northern Baptists
over slavery and sectionalism. It emerged from the war as one the most important
molders and carriers of southern culture. A map of Southern Baptists today is very
much a map of the South and of those places to which southerners have migrated in
large numbers.
THEME 2: HOW NEW IS THE NEW SOUTH?
The last half of the twentieth century has seen a remarkable integration of the South
into the national economy, coupled with the breakdown of racial segregation. Some
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Ukraine is a cornucopia feeding “hungry” Russia, and it would be even better fed if left
alone.
On a different plane, Ukrainian independence can be seen as the culmination of a
long southern resistance to peripheral status, and easily the most important harbinger
of the arrival of some “New” South. What had been grievances related to geographic
discrimination became a sense of national consciousness in Ukraine, following a
pattern typical for Eastern Europe. Since local loyalties of the traditional elites were
lost to wider political entities, the future nation had to be bound by ethnicity, the path
beginning with the “reinvention” of language and culture. For centuries, the Ukrainian
language was considered a lowly peasant dialect unfit as literary medium. The best
known writer produced by Ukrainian soil, Gogol, refused to consider Ukrainian a
fit language even for his burlesque novels. Only by the 1850s was the new Ukrainian
(constructed as a sum of several regional dialects) becoming recognized, largely due to
the efforts of Ukraine’s greatest poet, Shevchenko. Yet Ukrainian national consciousness
is a very recent phenomenon: even three generations ago, most Ukrainians still
called themselves “Little Russians”, khokhols, or “locals.” Ukrainians, rather than
Russifiers from Moscow, demanded Russian-language schools for their children, so
that they could advance beyond the limited opportunities existing in the rural South.
Throughout recent decades the use of the Ukrainian language in schools, publishing,
and even daily life has been steadily declining.
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In Russia, the establishment of the protectorate over Ukraine in 1654 has been viewed
as the reunification of peoples sharing common descent from Kievan Rus. Since
Russians were the only surviving political heirs to “the glory that was Kiev,” they felt
themselves to be the elder brothers, or Greater Russians. Because the Ukrainian and
Russian culture and language are very close, it seemed logical to see their differences
as the result of a temporary separation. Ukrainians were Little Russians, or younger
brothers that could be expected to blend eventually with “true” Russians of Muscovy.

viewed the revitalized economy and social changes as evidence that a “New South” was
emerging. In 1880, 90 percent of the nation’s textile production was centered along the
streams and coastlines of New England, but in the following decades what had been
a trickle of economic change developed into a flood. By the 1910s half of the cotton
textile industry was in the South, and by 1940 the industry was largely southern.
Cotton textiles were a low skill, low wage industry, and a prime attraction of the South
was the availability of a large and poor labor force.
World War II brought a new level of economic change to the South. The federal
government invested billions in new and expanded military bases and defense plants
in the region. The farm population fell 20 percent while farm incomes flourished. For
the first time in recent history, much of the region’s people, especially its whites, had
a disposable income. The boom continued after the war, as entrenched politicians in
Washington used their influence to send development into their districts. Georgia
legislators, for example, helped make defense contractor Lockheed the largest private
employer in their state. Huntsville, Alabama, emerged as a major center for space
exploration and research. In North Carolina, the state’s governor encouraged the
creation of what became the highly successful and emulated Research Triangle Park.
Many national and international manufacturers established southern plants in response
to the region’s new wealth and demand for products.
Atlanta especially boomed with a concentration of a broad spectrum of firms choosing
to establish regional management centers in the South’s centrally located economic
capital. Perhaps nothing better symbolizes the “arrival” of the New South than Atlanta’s
success, personified by the election of President Jimmy Carter in 1976 and the selection
of the city as the host of the 1996 summer Olympic games.
Meanwhile, a combination of local civil rights demonstrations and actions of federal
courts and the U.S. government eroded much formalized segregation. In 1940 only five
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The provincialism of Ukraine gave the Russian view some credence. Ever since
“Evenings on the Croft near Dikan’ka” Ukraine has been seen as a picturesque and
romantic ethnographic corner of Russia, the preserve of lyrical folklore and songs. In
the Soviet “family” of peoples, Ukraine was the privileged but junior partner, second
among equals.
The Ukrainian counterargument to Russian claims of seniority is that the true Kievan
heritage was passed on to future generations not through Muscovy (peripheral to
Kievan Rus) but Ukraine. In Russians such claims cause fits of laughter: imagine
a family where a younger brother declares himself to be elder! This laughter is true
to the long Russian tradition of seeing Ukraine as a humorous place. Following the
lead of Gogol, Ukraine came to be seen as almost a parody of Greater Russia. This
Russian amusement is all the more offensive to Ukrainians because of its familylike, condescending nature. Since Ukraine was in no way discriminated against or
lagging behind Russia economically, such condescension is the major irritant that
provokes Ukrainian anti-Russianism. Russia and Ukraine seem to be tragically unable
to understand each other. It may be unavoidable for such closely related peoples that
antagonism toward Russia becomes almost the sole basis for shaping Ukrainians’
separate identity. Even Russian laughter is used to Ukrainian advantage: the first
president of newly independent Ukraine once said that “it’s better to appear crafty, than
ominous.” People are not afraid of what is funny, and while Russians refused to take it
seriously, Ukraine slyly emerged as Eastern Europe’s second-largest state, gaining more
territory from the Soviet dissolution than any other successor republic.
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percent of voting age black southerners were registered, but by 1955 the share had
increased to 25 percent. By 1969, after the Voting Rights Act eliminated nearly all
special barriers to black registration and voting, nearly two thirds of African-American
adult Southerners were registered. Blacks have been elected mayors in several large
southern cities and scores of smaller ones, governor of one state, and to the supreme
courts of most states in the region. Federal Supreme Court decisions in the late
1980s concerning proportional representation resulted in the 1992 election that sent
southern blacks to state legislatures at the U.S. House of Representatives in numbers
approximating the black share of their state’s population.
Although inherited racism is still a vibrant theme in Southern life, the erosion of the
institution of segregation and the impact of that erosion have been real. More blacks
now hold public office in the South than in any other section of the country. In the
1980s the average income of black southerners increased while declining nationally, and
surpassed that in the Midwest. Most dramatically, perhaps, more blacks now migrate
to the region than leave it, a change reversing a dominant trend of much of the century
that would have been unimaginable at the time of the passage of the Voting Rights Act.
Economically, the region may still rank at the bottom in most measures of wellbeing, but the bottom is not nearly so far from the top as it once was. In 1910 a poor
Southern state might have an income half that of the average for non Southern states,
but by 1990, it was more likely to be 85 percent of the average for the rest of the
country. However, it is important not to overstate the real meaning of this change.
While many Southerners consider the upward trend momentous, it unfortunately in
part reflects the opposite: progress looks good because the starting level was so low.
The region is still the poorest in the country, and its overall rate of economic growth
compared to the national average has slowed after the spurt of the 1960s and 1970s.
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One South or Many?
Even at its zenith (1648-1667) the historic forerunner of independent Ukraine
included only the Ukrainian portion of the South, less than half of the area of the
modern Ukrainian Republic. Interestingly enough, this historic Ukraine played little
part in the independence movement fermented by the aggressive nationalism of
Galicia (the westernmost part of Ukraine that had a completely separate history from
the 13th century until 1939) and emboldened by the economic muscle of southern
Ukraine, which belongs to the Breadbasket region. The Russian Empire wrested the
southern grasslands from the Ottomans and nomads and largely settled the region
with Russians. The historic separateness of Breadbasket Ukraine is well highlighted
by a language division in which Russian-speakers even slightly outnumber Ukrainianspeakers. Adding Breadbasket ethnic statistics into all-Ukrainian figures is routinely
used as false proof of Ukraine’s Russification. In reality, the Ukrainian language prevails
in the historic Ukraine, where 90 percent of the population call Ukrainian their mother
tongue.
Deep historic and cultural cleavages persevere even within this Ukrainian portion of the
South. The Dnieper remains a major divide. The East Bank is the most “authentically”
Ukrainian part of Ukraine. Due to a relatively short period of serfdom and the absence
of the village commune system, East Bankers have a reputation as the most thrifty and
entrepreneurial of all Southerners. The East Bank experienced only a short period of
Polish rule, while centuries of almost unperturbed control had strongly Polonized the
West Bank. The West Bank’s villages were dominated by Polish nobles, and its cities by
Jewish merchants, while the East Bank was long dominated by native Cossack elite and
developed an egalitarian ethos. Through ties of common history, East Bank Ukraine has
a strong kinship with Russia, while the West Bank gravitates to the West. Only Kiev
serves as a unifying link for these two parts of Ukraine.
27

One indicator that the South may be stuck in its relatively poor economic situation is
its persistent ruralism. The plantation South had little need for towns and cities, and
small market centers or the coastal plantations were enough to serve as local collection
and transshipment points; larger cities were not needed, and therefore few in number.
Today in such states as Georgia and South Carolina, fewer than one person in 25 can
be thought of as farmers. But even though most Southerners have urban occupations
they preserve a strong link with the countryside. The Carolinas, and the South in
general, lead the nation in what the census calls the “rural non farm” population, i.e.
people who live in the country but have a city job, people who love their family farms
but now earn a living elsewhere.
One South or Many?
Change has created a Southern economic (and, in many ways, social) geography
that looks a bit like a wildly distorted checker board. “Integration into the national
economy” in fact means the growth of cities with activities that are not much different
from cities elsewhere in the U.S. Large cities have dominated the South’s economic
surge, while much of the rest of the South has experienced far less change. The
traditions of Georgia, however lacking they may seem in Atlanta, are alive and well
across much of the rest of the state.
Is there more to the “South” than the geographic south itself? The region defined here
may be only part of a wider southern cultural entity, yet perhaps the divisions may well
be more visible than factors which bind the region together. In the United States, we
speak of many Souths: thus, Appalachia was settled by southerners, but this Upland
South was so oppposed to the social system of planters’ domination in the Lowland
South that it took the side of the Union in the Civil War. The area consisting of
adjoining parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Missouri, known as the Border
South, combines cultural proximity to the South proper with economic orientation to
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The scale of differences between parts of Ukraine is comparable to that between the
Ukrainian and Russian parts of the South. The customs and ways of life of Ukrainians
and Russians in the region are strikingly similar, and this close proximity seems obvious
to outside observers. Thus the southern dialect of Russian language seems to speakers
of standard Russian to be almost Ukrainian and just as “funny.” At the same time the
majority of Ukrainians in reality speak the so-called surzhik, a Russo-Ukrainian mixture
driving the purists to apoplexy. The traditional Ukrainian pejorative for Russians,
moskali, literally means Muscovites, and conveys very southern resentment toward
big government and northerners rather than toward fellow-Russians in the South. In
fact, among those who hail from the South itself, the feeling of a common southern
culture is stronger than ethnic divides. A good example is Nikita Khrushchev, a typical
mercurial southerner who first brought southern speech into the Kremlin halls. Born in
a Russian village in the south of Kursk Oblast, he made his political career in Ukraine
and favored the republic in many ways, including the generous transfer of the Crimea
from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. Today the dispute over the Crimea is among issues
that antagonize the two states, but among common people relations are as cordial as
ever: after all, according to the 1988 data, about half of all marriages in Ukraine were
between mixed Russo-Ukrainian couples. While irresponsible politicians quarrel over
maps, the people of the South know better.

29

the North, and characteristically tried to stay neutral in the Civil War. Both areas never
had high proportions of black population. Even the remaining “South proper” is a
territory of great physical and cultural diversity. Its pattern of internal variation can
perhaps best be thought of as the joint beat of two rhythms: the Lowland Piedmont
economic dualism on the one hand and the east west extension of the original southern
hearth on the other. The Old South embraces the Virginian and South Carolinian
core areas linked by North Carolina. Although it was the cultural metropolis of the
Old South, in terms of the plantation economy Charleston may be thought of as the
easternmost point of the Deep South extending to Mississippi. The newest parts of
the South are the Yazoo Delta area, the agricultural lowland between the Mississippi
and Yazoo rivers in Mississippi (often simply called locally “The Delta”) and the Piney
Woods. Both were not developed until after the Civil War, but were important parts
of the cotton belt and strong supporters of the Confederacy. Today, the “Delta” is a
productive agricultural region dominated by large, often corporate farms producing
huge quantities of soybeans, rice, cotton, and pond grown catfish. The Piney Woods,
where the South reaches into East Texas and Oklahoma is today a densely wooded,
economically marginal region famous for its wildlands. However distinct, the
flamboyant Texan culture is unmistakably southern in its foundations, and the strong
native American ingredient to Oklahoma’s mix reminds one that Oklahoma territory
was a receptacle for Indians deported from the South.
Deep South, Upland South, Old South, Lowland South: each section of the region is
distinct and somewhat isolated from the others, contributing to a regional pattern of
cultural provincialism seen in the strong sense of local identity. Southerners are not just
Southerners they are Tarheels (Central North Carolinians), or residents of the Bootheel
(of Missouri), or from the Valley (of Virginia). But despite very real internal variations,
southerners and non southerners alike nearly universally identify the South as a separate
and special place. When asked where they would most like to live, only Californians
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are as likely as Southerners to say “right here.” They may well dislike the obvious
disadvantages of their region (low wages, poverty), but southerners still have a special
fondness for the South, and are likely to say that the best state is their own. Money is
important, but the sense here is that it is not the only important element in a region’s
quality of life.
“American by birth, Southern by the grace of God” is an often seen bumper sticker
proclaiming a strong regional allegiance. The common opinion of people living
elsewhere in the country is that the region is separate and somehow different, and no
other section of the country possesses such regional persistence. Southerners know they
are a people set apart in their own country, and gain a regional solidarity from their
own sense of distinctiveness.
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THE HEARTLAND
Raymond Krishchyunas and Aleksei Novikov

THE HEARTLAND
Thomas Baerwald

The beautiful provincial town of Yelabuga cozily nests on the high shore of
the Kama River right across from the huge industrial city of Naberezhnie
Chelny. Little in the town hints of the typical dull vistas of Russia’s industrial
heart just on the other side of the river: you cannot even hear the hum of
the massive truck assembly lines or the screeching noise of nearby oil
rigs. Surrounded by industrial giants, Yelabuga manages to preserve the
charm of an old merchants’ town. Well-built squat and solid stone houses
with warehouses on the ground floor hide behind secure iron-clad doors
and window trellises. The vistas from the Kama shore would do nicely
on the cover of a “Beauty of Russian Landscape” photo album. And yet,
paradoxically, the runaway industrialism of the Heartland provides the
necessary contrast that makes Yelabuga seem like such an idealized
Russian scene. Little wonder that the Russian landscape painting tradition
originated in the Heartland, and its founder, Ivan Shishkin, was born, lived,
and discovered inspiration in Yelabuga.

It was the end of another day, and as he left the mammoth River Rouge
industrial complex, the worker mused about the immense contrasts that
repeatedly confronted him. Within miles of crumbling brick factories
abandoned decades ago were stylish steel structures within which
computer-controlled robots assembled new vehicles while workers
maintained supervisory watches. The gleaming glass-walled offices of
multi-national corporations stood beside modern shopping malls and
hotels, which were connected by an automated transport system of small
vehicles scurrying along on elevated monorails. After a few turns, however,
the worker drove down a thoroughfare that might well have been in 1970s
Beirut, as numerous small shops and restaurants owned by Lebanese
and other Middle Eastern immigrants crammed into storefronts that once
housed German markets.

The city seems a strange spot indeed, all the more so because this very
Russian place and archtype of Russian landscapes ironically is located on
Tatar land.

1

He passed through areas where small, battered houses stood amid weedand asphalt-covered lots and zones where mansions lay protected behind
security gates and dense woods. The latter clearly spoke of the promise
that so many people had realized in the area. But as the man listened to
radio news reports of industrial plant closings and a new wave of random
murders, he realized that for many people, the promise was past and the
future looked grim.
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MOTHER VOLGA: SOMETHING SACRED AND INDUSTRIAL

MIDWEST: THE BACKBONE OF AMERICA

The region that embraces the middle section of the Volga river basin is the land which
is the cornerstone of the sprawling Russian state. The Core may bind the country with
invisible threads of political and intellectual control, but the Heartland cements Russia
through its pivotal location and intense economic metabolism. While the Core had to
build its supremacy purposefully by imposing over Russia a spidery web of radial roads,
the Heartland is Russia’s predestined transportation hub. Here the mighty north-south
tending trunk of the Volga branches to the west and the east, and this tree-shaped
river system provides easy outlets into Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Siberia. In the
era before railways, this great inland waterway was Russia’s commercial mainstreet,
and later the road of trade became the road of industry. If the Core is an emanation of
Moscow as the nation’s commanding brain, the Heartland was “made” by the Volga,
the muscular working river which is the country’s backbone.

Soon after he resigned as President of General Motors to become U.S. Secretary of
Defense in 1953, Charles Wilson stated, “For many years I thought what was good for
our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.” This declaration generated
considerable controversy, as many Americans objected to its implicit assertion that
a primary role of government was to serve the interests of private corporations. That
perspective still engenders lively debate nearly a half-century later, but from another
perspective, Wallace’s observation that the fates of major companies like General
Motors and the nation as a whole are highly correlated still rings true. When the
nation’s economy booms, when most people are working, when sales are high, General
Motors has prospered. But when the American economy sours and the output of its
factories sputters, many GM workers find themselves unemployed. In 1991, when
the deficit of the federal government exceeded $350 billion, General Motors posted a
loss of $3.5 billion, a mammoth amount for a private corporation. Just as the health
of a body is related to the strength and consistency of the beating of the heart, so the
economic and cultural health of the United States has been reflected in the prosperity
and degeneration of the Heartland of America.

For Russians, the Volga has always been much more than just a river. Its popular image
was well captured by the philosopher Rozanov: “a lot of what is sacred and something
industrial.” The river’s unique life-nurturing and nation-building role is comparable to
that of the Nile for Egypt. For a landlocked country, the Volga was the great internal
sea, which opened wide horizons to the mind and many opportunities to enterprising
souls. Little wonder that the river is venerated in folk culture as “Mother Volga,” the
benefactor who breast-fed early Russian trade and industry, and it was on the shores
of the Volga that Muscovy made a decisive step to become Rossiya, the world’s largest
state.

5

Actually you can read the whole history of Russia in its shifting centers of gravity from
one river basin to another. Early on and before the Muscovite period, ancient “Rus”
clung cautiously to the North’s waterway which linked Viking and Byzantine lands, an
imitative society out on the periphery of Europe. But with a bold step into the basins

Commonly identified as part of the “Middle West,” the region may also be called
“MidAmerica.” “Middle” is in many ways the key word describing the region. The
middle-sized town served as the formative environment of the midwestern personality,
and popular and literary images of American “Middletowns” have their prototypes in
such places as Muncie and Kokomo, Indiana. The Midwest invented skyscrapers and
is dominated by major metropolises today, but many of its cities have been described
as lacking the cosmopolitan vigor of cities in the Core. Large corporations dominate
the modern Midwestern industrial economy, but it also remains a region of healthy
medium-sized farms. Henry Ford, J.D. Rockefeller, and other prominent industrialists
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of the Oka and Upper Volga rivers, Muscovy (the Core) truly emerged and Russia
almost severed its umbilical chord to Europe. Finally, the conquests of the Middle and
Lower Volga from the 16th through late 19th centuries created a springboard for the
impressive Russian thrust to the East that followed. Within a hundred years Russians
jumped from the Volga shores all the way to the Pacific, and what had been the small
core of Muscovy became the Russian Empire. It was here in the Heartland that Russia
first emerged as an uneasy synthesis of European and Asian, Christian and Islamic
worlds. The Heartland, with its largely non-Slavic population, became the model
Russian melting pot.
Industrial growth in the 20th century only strengthened the region’s role as Russia’s
strategic and geopolitical heart. During the Second World War the importance of the
Heartland was recognized both by the Nazis, who saw control of the Volga as the key
to victory, and the Soviets who chose Samara (Kuibyshev) as a reserve capital in case
Moscow fell.
Swift Rapids and Quiet Eddies of Povolzhye
The traditional title for this region in Russian is Povolzhye, literally “along the Volga”,
and its shape does indeed suggest the line and flow of the river itself. The major cities
of the Volga, all with populations now ranging up to 1.5 million, were vital to the
industrial expansion of the 1930s-1960s that solidified the character of Povolzhye as
the industrial Heartland. Old cities which were once Russian fortresses, such as Kazan,
Simbirsk (Ul’yanovsk), Samara, Saratov, and Nizhnii Novgorod (Gorky), acquired
industrial satellites on the opposite bank of the river. Thus, a string of dual cities was
created and the region’s urban corridor functioned much like the main channel of the
powerful Volga.
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who hailed from the region started out on farms and in small-town shops. Recent
history shows the vulnerability of the corporate behemoths they established, but the
family businesses likely would not have grown to such prominence had it not been for
the economies of scale that could be achieved in this pivotal location.
It was in the Heartland that America really arrived as a mature world of its own rather
than a European transplant clinging gingerly to the Atlantic seaboard. In the minds of
many people in other parts of the world, things American are Midwestern. Cultural
geographer Raymond Gastil commented, “It is a commercially minded area because
of its New England heritage, yet ruggedly individualistic as a heritage from the Upper
South. It is here that the rationalism of nineteenth-century Yankees fused with the
familism and folk beliefs of central Pennsylvania and the Upper South to produce a
new industrial folk ideology. The American cult of the average, which in fact gives the
average man a good deal, owes much to the Middle West. In this region reform has
generally been a middle-class rather than upper- or lower-class concern. This naturally
follows, for the middle class rules.” The Heartland has historically served and largely
remains as the backbone of America the citadel of its values and economic might.
In the Shadow of Smokestacks
The American Heartland is first and foremost a set of industrial cities. The major urban
corridor running from Buffalo, Cleveland, and Toledo along Lake Erie to Milwaukee
and Chicago on Lake Michigan lines the Great Lakes, the unsurpassable natural artery
of commerce. Many smaller aging industrial cities speak of the former importance of
local resources.
Geographers traditionally have seen the Heartland as the western part of the “American
Manufacturing Belt.” The Belt is not limited to the U.S. though. Across the transparent
border, southern Ontario is a spillover of the same industrial Heartland, replete with
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But the Heartland is also a place of quiet backwaters in its outer boundaries. These
rural hinterlands have largely non-Slavic people which creates the melting pot image
of the region. What links them to the main channel are urban centers located on the
tributaries of the Volga, possessing the same diversified manufacturing base as the larger
cities. These linking cities are themselves largely Russian and belong to the region’s
main urban rapids. For example, heavily industrialized Izhevsk also serves as the capital
of the nominally non-Slavic Udmurtian republic, and Ufa, a major petrochemical
center and million-plus city, is the capital of Bashkortostan. Several smaller centers on
the Volga (Cheboksary, Ioshkar-Ola and Saransk) are the capitals of other autonomous
republics of the non-Russian peoples of the Middle Volga area. The compact blocks of
native populations appear on the map to be facing away from major river corridors, cut
off by nearly uninterrupted currents of Russian predominance. On all four sides the
middle-Volga variety of native people is encircled by purely Russian territories, and this
ethnic divide helps to draw the boundaries of the diverse region. The area north of the
latitudinal stretch of Volga and Kama with its forests and Finno-Ugric speaking native
Mary and Udmurt people strongly resembles the North. South of that line, fertile soils
dominate, and the native people speak Turkic languages (with the exception of the
Mordvinians). With such a diverse ethnic and economic landscape, it is no surprise that
it takes a river like the Volga, the Heartland’s great inland waterway and backbone, to
hold the region together.
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subsidiary plants of many U.S. corporations, while Toronto is regarded as a twin of
Chicago, one of the most representative American cities. Most of the remainder of the
Manufacturing Belt falls within the Core, but only in a small stretch of upstate New
York do the Core and Heartland abut against each other. Though the corridor south of
Lake Erie links the Atlantic Coast and the interior areas, the cities at each end of it look
in opposite directions both literally and figuratively. Buffalo may be within the same
state as New York City, but the latter faces across the Atlantic and considers itself the
senior sibling in a family of ports that includes Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston,
while Buffalo faces west and sees its problems and potentials mirrored in cities like
Cleveland and Detroit. Finance, trade, and other forms of commercial activity may be
more common in the cities of the Core, but Heartland metropolises have throbbed to
industrial rhythms. The Heartland’s boundary from the west is that line beyond which
the smokestacks and storage tanks of Heartland factories cast deep shadows over nearby
fields, and agriculture takes a backseat to industrial enterprises.
In other directions, the boundaries of the region are the product of natural forces that
led other areas to be less conducive to industry. As you head south toward the Ohio
River, you move away from the areas of recent continental glaciation which scooped
out the Great Lakes into more rough terrain. To the north, denser forest cover and
thinner soils that reflect harsher climatic conditions and more frequent glacial erosion
inhibit development. Thus the Heartland is surrounded by areas of greater natural
wealth in terms of forests, minerals, and soils, but the costs of moving goods, or
processing them in the more rugged terrain are higher. The Heartland has always relied
on the relative ease with which it could establish and maintain superior transportation
networks, and its central location among diverse neighbors to draw in raw materials for
processing in its factories. As a result, the magnitude of the circulation of people and
goods has been one of its most distinctive characteristics.
10

There is a kind of dryness about the
land along the quiet reaches of the Volga
between Samara and Saratov. The
Volga-the ancient waterway of Russiaflows among great plains, among solitudes
and wildernesses. In July the grass of the
hills dried up, the smell of wormwood is
everywhere, flint gleams in the moonlight;
the traveler's feet become dusty and sore;
the leaves of oaks and maples are stiff,
as if made of tin, and it takes more than
a man's strength to split a pine; only the
Tatar maple stands unperturbed; there
are no flowers, and the bonfires on the
hills..are visible from the Volga for many
versts through the dust clouds rolling up
from Astrakhan.
~Boris Pilnyak, "Mother Earth", in
Mother Earth and Other Stories, transl
by Vera T. Reck and Michael Green,
Anchor Books, Doubleday, Garden
City, 1968, p. 3
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THEME 1: RUSSIA’S MAIN STREET

THEME 1: MAIN STREET U.S.A.

Even before the arrival of Slavic populations, the Volga region enjoyed unique
advantages of location that helped it become a Main Street through the Eurasian
continent. What was to be Russia’s Heartland long ago was also the focus for
commerce and kingdoms of many diverse peoples. Just as trade along the Dnieper
created the early Slav state of Kievan Rus, so commerce that linked Europe with the
Islamic Orient via the Volga created a cradle where many states were formed along the
great river. By the 10th century both areas had adopted the religion of the southern
ends of their trade routes: Christianity on the Dnieper and Islam on the Volga.

The story of the transport supremacy of the Heartland began with opening of the
famous “gangplank” route West from the Core along lake Erie. This route followed
navigable streams and relatively flat terrain, but its value was not fully realized until
1825, when the state of New York completed work on the Erie Canal, the “Big Ditch”
that extended for more than 360 miles. Although boats were pulled along the canal
by horses, shipping times from Buffalo to New York City were reduced from twenty
to eight days, and freight costs dropped to five percent of their previous levels. West
of the Appalachians, the natural features favored westward movement. The chain of
Great Lakes to the north and the Ohio River and its tributaries to the south were both
oriented along the westward axes of expansion. Using these routes to gain access to
the Mississippi River, people could move along tributaries that flowed across the Great
Plains. More than two-thirds of the continent’s width thereby could be spanned, and
within 30 years, American expansion rolled on to the Pacific. The Heartland’s early
transportation routes therefore made it an empire-builder, a crucially important region
that served as springboard for the major thrust of frontier movement.

The first Volga state was formed by a branch of the same people who gave their name
to modern Bulgaria. These Volga Bulgars traded with Central Asia by way of Astrakhan
and across the Caspian Sea or by caravan routes. After the Mongol invasions of the
early Middle Ages swept through, the Kazan Khanate (a kingdom governed by a “khan”
or leader) inherited this trade. The Volga (or Kazan) Tatars are thus descendants of the
ancient Bulgars and other local tribes, but with a strong Mongol element. This complex
genesis is mirrored in the confusion surrounding the very name “Tatars.” The Mongols
used “Tatar” as a pejorative term for all conquered people, but gradually as the never
numerous Mongols were dissolved among the conquered masses, they came to be called
Tatars themselves. For Russians, the name “Tatar” became synonymous with “Mongol.”
This original mistake has fed early and persistent Russian biases against Tatars,
manifested in the saying “An uncalled-for guest is worse than a Tatar.” But in reality
the Volga Tatars were vastly different from the fierce nomadic Mongols. In the words
of Rozanov, “Since long ago, Asia and in particular Islamic Asia created here a home
not for nomadic hordes, but for civilization; for long trading and industrial people, the
Bulgars established a foothold here; even before the times when Russian Slavs started
building the first Christian churches along the Oka and did not even dream about
claiming the region for European civilization, Bulgarians listened to the teaching of
Qu’ran on the shores of the Volga and Kama.”

Leaders in the rapidly settling states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois saw great
opportunities for building canals between the streams draining into the Great Lakes
and tributaries of the Ohio River. But despite the improvements the canals provided,
they quickly fell into disuse when railroads arrived in the region and provided even
broader, better, and cheaper service. By 1870 the Heartland had the nation’s densest rail
network. Freight costs fell dramatically, and shipments reached eastern ports in three
days or less. Detroit’s pivotal location along the waterways connecting Lake Huron and
Lake Erie epitomized the locational advantages of waterway-based centers, but Chicago
took greatest advantage of the railroad. Using land grants and investment schemes,
Chicago made itself the terminus of more than a dozen lines. For nearly a century, most
rail shipments passing through the north central U.S. were transferred from one line to

Under the rolling clouds of the
prairie a moving mass of steel. An
irritable clank and rattle beneath a
prolonged roar. The sharp scent
of oranges cutting the soggy smell
of unbathed people and ancient
baggage. Towns as planless as a
scattering of pasteboard boxes on
an attic floor...It is September, hot,
very dusty...Here-she meditatedis the newest empire of the world;
the Northern Middlewest; a land
of dairy herds and exquisite lakes,
of new automobiles and tar-paper
shanties and silos like red towers,
of clumsy speech and hope that is
boundless.
~Sinclair Lewis, Main Street,
NY, 1920
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Thus never barbarian, the early Heartland became the scene of rivalry between two
matched and intermingling rivals, as the Russian and Tatar states met and established
emissary cities along their mutual Main Street. The Kasimov Khanate on the Oka
River served as a waiting station for Moscow-backed claimants to the Kazan kingdom.
In turn, the Russian city of Nizhni Novgorod was founded on the Volga in the 13th
century to spearhead downstream colonization movement and has been the connecting
hinge between the Core and Heartland ever since.
In the 16th century, with the formal annexation of Kazan (which had been Russia’s
dependency for much of its brief history) and Astrakhan at the Caspian end, Russian
merchants inherited their trade routes to the Orient. Commerce was long limited,
however, to luxury items because of primitive transport technology. Flat-bottomed
boats were pulled upstream by teams of the so-called burlaks, the famed Volga boatmen
or barge-haulers, and the journey could take months. Economic growth on the Volga
was greatly spurred only with the wide introduction of steamboats in the 1850s, when
the Volga truly became the Main Street of the country at last. The eastward shift of
Russia’s population helped propel the changes. By the early 19th century, Russia’s
population east of the Volga had caught up with that to the west, and the Heartland
could enjoy a pivotal location in the emerging all-Russian market. Grain from the
Breadbasket and salt from Kazakh saltpans were carried upstream, later supplemented
by far more important cotton from Central Asia, coal from Donetzk basin and oil
from the Caucasus. Downstream, the main commodities were northern lumber and
industrial products from the Core. Trade thrived in those prime locations where the
Volga made sharp bends and several overland routes converged. Thus, Kazan is located
near the point of confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers. Samara prospered on the
famous loop of the Volga where it flows around the so-called Zhiguli mountains.
13

another in a Chicago railyard, and many manufacturing, handling, and storage
facilities were established on nearby tracts to take advantages of this trade. In late 19th
century, the combination of a dense railroad network and the region’s proximity to
waterways that were well suited to the transport of heavy bulk materials enabled it to
become the center for new kinds of industries. The coal and mineral wealth of the Old
Mountains and Crossroads fueled blast furnaces, while iron ore was easily floated from
the Mesabi and other ranges of the North. First canals and then railroads also greatly
expanded the area within which farm products could be sold at reasonable prices.
Agricultural products started flowing to Heartland processing plants, reappearing as
breakfast cereals, sausages, cooking oil, and hundreds of other products. This spurred
development of the nation’s first commercially oriented farm system based on the
diversified production of small farmers. In the Heartland there evolved the commercial
agricultural complex that soon flooded all of the U.S.
The Heartland’s industrial boom created a peculiar “mercantile” element of regional
culture. Because industrial success in the Middle West generally resulted from real
productive achievement rather than speculation, no moral stigma was associated
with wealth. Those who accumulated money commanded additional respect when
that money was used for public benefit. Philanthropists like Rockefeller and Andrew
Carnegie endowed numerous projects that gave them popular prestige unknown to
aristocrats and other rich people elsewhere. Middle Western attitudes toward material
success were reflected in other cultural traits like pecuniarism, the measurement of a
person’s standing based on income; functionalism, which placed great emphasis on how
“useful” people and things were; and conspicuous consumption. Salesmanship
became the hallmark of the Midwesterner, and in the Heartland more than in any other
region success in business was regarded as a proper purpose in life. Midwesterners also
came to be strong believers in technology, as industrial know-how was often the key to
prosperity. The region became known for its technological competence and its many
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The advent of railroads strengthened, rather than undermined, the competitive
advantage of the Volga emporiums. Since the formidable width of the majestic
Volga severely limited the number of bridges, a few large cities became the major
transshipment points where industrial processing developed. Particularly representative
of the flurry of commercial activity in Volga cities was Nizhnii Novgorod, long the
home to Russia’s largest annual trading fair. With its huge turnover and national
scope, the fair was crucial to the evolution of the all-Russian market (it was there that
the gold ruble’s exchange rate was determined). Nizhnii Novgorod also developed as
Russia’s major early free labor market, beginning with the annual congregation of huge
numbers of people who were needed as burlaks. According to estimates in the 18th
century there were as many as four-hundred thousand burlaks hauling barges on the
Volga. Recruited among the restless “drifter types” attracted by the freedom of life on
the river and strongly organized into collectively bargaining teams (artels), the fearless
and loud-mouthed burlaks and hands in the Volga’s ports became Russia’s first true
proletarians. One of them, Maxim Gorky (a penname meaning “bitter”), for whom
Nizhni Novgorod was renamed in the Soviet period, came from the very bottom of
Russian society.
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After years of vagabond drifting up and down the river and intense self-education,
Gorky emerged as an immensely successful realist writer. His characters were self-made
industrialists and steamship owners, heirs to the great Volga merchant families who
also climbed from the lower rungs of the social ladder. These were the people who
combined business grip with civic spirit and deep religiosity with patronage of the
arts, who pursued material success but also felt a very Russian guilt about their wealth.
Such contradictory pulls are typical of the Russian character, but only on the Volga
could they peacefully coexist within “balanced” single personalities. On the whole, the
Heartland seems the only Russian region where there was no stigma attached to “new”
(as opposed to inherited, land-based) wealth.

innovators. In part, early development of steam-powered devices was encouraged by the
flatness of the terrain, which ruled out extensive use of waterwheels.
The relatively flat topography also permitted the ready adoption of automobiles in the
20th Century. Motor vehicles required smooth, dependable roads, and as had been
true with the expansion of railroads, the Heartland led the way in the provision of
improved roads. When the burgeoning number of cars quickly overwhelmed old twolane highways, the region’s engineers responded by constructing “dual highways” with
limited points of access, the forerunners of modern freeways. Among the earliest were
the tollroads leading from Chicago across northern Indiana and Ohio. By 1947, Ohio,
Illinois, and Michigan were among the nation’s leaders in terms of miles of multi-lane
highways. As the nation’s network of freeways expanded to provide all parts of the U.S.
with high-speed roadways and as airports were improved to provide all major cities with
ready access to air service, the transportation supremacy of the Heartland somewhat
diminished. Nevertheless, for nearly 50 years, the nation’s busiest airport has been
in Chicago and more recently, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleveland emerged as major
airline hubs.
For nearly two centuries, the Heartland has been the region through which a vast
share of the nation’s movement has been channelled. Walter Havinghurst saw this land
without barriers as an avenue through which restless people moved on to new frontiers
beyond the Mississippi. To cross the country you still must cross the Heartland.
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Large-scale transport projects undertaken between the 1930s and the 1950s improved
the Heartland’s position as a transport hub. Three canals, the Volga-Baltic, Volga-Don,
and Volga-Moscow, finally created the unified system of waterways for all of European
Russia conceived so many years earlier. Even if these improvements arrived when
the role of river transport was increasingly taken over by railroads, automobiles, and
pipelines, the region’s transport supremacy persisted. All major oil and gas pipelines
from Siberia still cross this ancient Main Street on the way west to domestic and foreign
consumers.
Marketplace Turned Workshop
The industrial ascendancy of the Heartland started modestly with lumber and flour
mills at transshipment points, but the energetic drive of the Volga merchants soon
assured it a prominent place in technical innovation and industrial growth. It was on
the Volga that oil was used in railway and ship engines for the first time in the world,
or the first Russian mechanized lumberyards appeared. From modest beginnings in
ship repair, Sormovo works in Nizhnii Novgorod grew into Russia’s major general
engineering manufacturer, ship-builder, and car-maker. But the real development
spurt arrived during the Soviet industrial revolution. With the general shift of Soviet
industry to the east, the Heartland found itself midway to Siberian mineral resources.
During the Second World War large-scale oil production began in the Tatar and
Bashkir republics, and before the later oil bonanza in West Siberia, the Heartland was
the nation’s leading producer, accounting for 60 percent of oil output. Nowadays the
share of the region has dwindled to 20 percent, but its leadership has already been
firmly established in petrochemical and chemical industries. Location of other heavy
industries was promoted by the attraction of abundant water and cheap electricity from
the large hydroelectric stations on the Volga.
17

The Foundry Turned Rustbelt
The long-established link between the Heartland’s transport role and its economic
profile was only strengthened with the 20th century arrival of the automobile industry.
Building on earlier successes in wagon and carriage production, the Detroit area
emerged as a production center for motor vehicles in the first decades of the century.
Henry Ford ensured his company leadership in the nascent industry by using massproduction techniques to rapidly assemble large numbers of inexpensive yet dependable
cars. As Detroit’s two largest firms, General Motors and Ford, rapidly expanded, the
Heartland became the preeminent motor vehicle manufacturing center in the world.
The two giant companies sped the establishment of related industrial operations
throughout the Heartland as they strove to control nearly all aspects from iron mining
and steel production to the transportation of finished cars to dealers. The explosive
growth of automobile sales throughout the first half of the century sent repeated waves
of automobile-related manufacturing expansion across the Heartland. Such industries
as rubber in Akron and glass in Toledo provided products used by other industries, and
manufacturing diversified in the region.
By 1950 almost one third of the value added in U.S. manufacturing came from the
Heartland. But by 1986, that share dropped to less than one quarter, as many relative
advantages of the Heartland faded. To a great extent, Heartland industries fell victim
to their earlier successes. Many of the massive investments in facilities and equipment
made in earlier decades became obsolete. Many industries also seemed to lose the
determination that fueled their earlier ascendancy. Both Ford and General Motors,
which had pioneered automobile manufacturing, were known for their conservatism by
the 1970s, and only when foreign autobuilders severely eroded their markets did they
respond with new designs and operating procedures. The assembly lines constructed
during World War II were becoming obsolete, and the skilled labor forces of Heartland
cities became increasingly expensive and superfluous as many operations were
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As if oil alone were not enough, other transport-related industry was drawn into the
region, continuing the symbolic link between the Heartland’s main street role and its
industrial profile. The Heartland is the dominant automobile-manufacturer in Russia.
The three biggest automobile producers in the country formed “auto triangle” within
the region. Its three apexes were in Naberezhnie Chelny (where the KAMAZ truck
factory is located), Togliatty (the VAZ factory mass-produced the Soviet “people’s car”
-Zhiguli) and in Nizhnii Novgorod (GAZ factory turned out cars and trucks). KAMAZ
and VAZ were conceived on a grand scale as breakthrough projects in the Soviet
attempt to overcome the backwardness of the auto industry, and they are the worlds
two largest individual auto factories. Togliatty and Naberezhnie Chelny may well be
the world’s largest company towns as well, both growing from scratch in the 1960s to
exceed a half-million by 1990. In the smaller towns, these automobile giants spawned
a whole panoply of supporting industries turning out anything from car electronics to
tires to draperies. Faithful to its romance with the transport industry, the Heartland is
also the major focus of the nation’s civil and military aviation industry.
In the turbulent world of post-Soviet ethnic resurgence, control of the major industrial
and transport assets of the Heartland has become a trump card in the hands of
new nationalist movements. Tatarstan alone is in a position to block the supplies of
practically all Russian oil and natural gas, and to cut the trans-Siberian and Volga
routes. Such threats are a sharp reminder that the great river of Russia is not so Russian
after all, but the melting pot of many nationalities.
THEME 2: THE ETHNIC SALAD BOWL

19

Intense economic metabolism aside, the Heartland’s pivotal location also set in motion
some intricate ethnic chemistry. An insight into its peculiarly Russian “melting pot”
is provided by the history of the Tatars, who experienced a longer period and greater
degree of Russian political control, cultural influence and modernization than any

automated and as new factories were built in places where labor costs were far lower.
The massive blast furnaces that symbolized the power of the steel industry became
obsolete as new technologies reduced the demand for heavier metals or offered new,
smaller scale ways of producing them. Between 1977 and 1986, the number of
industrial jobs in the region declined by nearly 20 percent. The precipitous drop in
manufacturing left the Manufacturing Belt reeling, inspiring the new and somewhat
pejorative name “Rustbelt” for the region.
Still, even as smokestacks retreat into memories, industrial decline is countered
somewhat by the construction of new plants in new Heartland locations where the
most advanced technology reestablishes the region’s competitiveness. While no longer
the dominant industrial concentration within the United States, the Heartland remains
an area where diversified manufacturing operates at scales evident in few other places
on the globe.
THEME 2: THE ETHNIC SALAD BOWL
The region was not only a crucible of American industrialism, but also a melting pot
for the evolving mainstream culture. The roots of the region’s remarkable population
diversity were established quite early, soon after American independence, when a series
of forced Native American land cessions were converted into the sale of individual
tracts to new settlers. Eager migrants converged on these easily cultivable flat lands
from all directions. Immigrants from New England and New York who used the Erie
route generally flocked to the northern parts of the Heartland. Those coming from
Pennsylvania and states farther south traversed the mountain passes that conveyed
them into the Ohio River system along the Heartland’s southern margin. The arrival of
many southerners helped create a representative cross-section of “old stock” Americans.
The linguistic blending of these diverse people produced a dialect that many believe
provides the norm of standard American speech.
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other Islamic people in Russia, and yet appear today to be far from Russified, possessing
a thriving ethnic culture and strong nationalism. With 5.5 million people, the Tatars
are the Russian federation’s largest minority.
After the Russian conquest under Tsar Ivan IV, crusading policies were at times harsh
but never consistent, and the Islamic population of the Volga was not displaced or
forced into conversion. The freedoms of Volga Tatars in the Empire were finally
secured during the enlightened reign of Catherine the Great, who regarded the
Muslims as a civilizing influence on other peoples of the Volga and favored them.
The official encouragement of Tatar trade with Kazakh steppes led to the rise of the
rich commercial Tatar bourgeoisie in the 19th century. Of the greatest importance in
transforming Tatars into a modern nation were Russian policies that strongly favored
education in the native Tatar language (rather than in traditional Arabic). The first
printing press publishing religious books in the Arabic script was opened in Kazan
by the Russian government as early as 1802 (the second Arabic press in the Islamic
world). Turning out thousands of titles, the printing press effectively countered any
proselytizing attempted by the same government. By the late 19th century, new Tatar
schools appeared which focused on teaching the Arabic alphabet in a way suited to
spoken Tatar. This helped Tatar to emerge as a literary language, and a veritable mania
of Tatar book publishing followed, creating new bonds of culture and language.
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In the field of tension between the secularizing impact of historically close Russians,
and religious influences from distant Islamic brethen, a religious-secular symbiosis
was forged, a new strong identity held together by emerging Tatar nationalism.
In marked contrast to the conservative Islam propagated from Central Asia, Tatar
reformers advocated more flexible Islam tuned to modern challenges. Armed with their
cosmopolitan “Eurasian” culture, Kazan Tatars came to fulfill the role of mediators
between Russians and the peripheral Islamic peoples of the Empire, and helped spread
Russian influence deeper into Asia. At least until the 1920s, they remained the

As diverse elements mixed in the homogenizing environment of the Heartland, the
prototypical Middle Western character was formed, of which Alan Parker asked, “Is
it too fanciful to see in its upper reaches the drives, acuity, shrewdness, and hardness
of the Yankee combined with the animal energy, competence and sturdiness of the
German peasant, and among its common people an emotionality, tempered by a
sophistication about human suffering, that must have belonged to a people that
grew up among the moral and human ambiguities of southern slavery?” Finally,
Pennsylvanian Quakers added to the mix, and their steadfastness and careful behavior
were traits which became a hallmark of Midwestern business.
Following the “old stock” population were Italian, Irish, and East European
immigrants, who arrived in the Heartland in greater numbers than in either the North
or the South. This new wave first appeared in the latter decades of the 1800s, when
new opportunities increasingly concentrated in the region’s cities. The industrial jobs
seen as less desirable by already established Americans were filled willingly by newer
immigrants. It was during this time that Chicago earned its reputation as the second
most populous Polish city in the world, and Cleveland’s West Side became an amalgam
of eastern European nationalities as complex and diverse as the lands between the Baltic
and Adriatic seas. As industrial development continued, employment opportunities
in Heartland cities attracted Americans from the south. Many blacks forsook the
economic bonds that left them shackled to the rural south for decades and moved to
Heartland industrial centers, with major movements occurring during both world wars
and continuing into the 1960s.
This mixture of peoples seemingly made the Heartland the nation’s preeminent melting
pot. However, the coalescence of significant numbers of so many types of people from
so many different places was highly uneven. Groups more similar to the white, Englishspeaking, economically successful citizens that came to symbolize American culture
tended to assimilate themselves into that culture, readily discarding their old practices
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undisputed leaders of cultural and political life of Russia’s Muslims. Even today, a large
segment of the educated urban elites in Central Asia and Kazakhstan are Tatars, and
Tatar communities are dispersed all across Russia.
Among other Volga peoples, Islam and Tatar influence fully prevailed among the
Bashkirs, while Russian influence proved stronger among the Mary, Udmurt, Mordvin
and Chuvash peoples, who by the 18th century were Christian and had largely adopted
Russian ways. Even in facial features it is hard to tell Russians from native Volga
peoples, since both are products of an ethnic cocktail. Names and facial features of
many local Russians lend credence to the proverb “scrape a Russian and you’ll find a
Tatar.” Lenin, who was born in Simbirsk, is a good example: his father was Chuvash,
while his mother was German, and the leader of the Russian revolution hardly looked
a Slav at all. Today the native inhabitants of the Heartland are barely distinguishable
from Russians in levels of education or social mobility. They participated in the
Slav colonization movement to previously vacant tracts in the region, furthering an
incredibly complicated pattern of interspersed settlement of various ethnic groups.
The Russian attempt to carve autonomous territories from this crazy patchwork of
ethnic groups was but high-minded idealism. Thus only a third of all Russia’s Tatars live
in Tatarstan, while in Bashkortostan, Tatars actually outnumber Bashkirs.
For all the impact of a mostly Russian population and considerable modernization, the
Volga peoples are far from dissolved in the Russian sea. Throughout the Soviet period
the proportion of native groups in the Heartland remained nearly unchanged. While
most residents are bilingual, full linguistic assimilation into Russian is very limited and
not growing. In four hundred years of Russian control, native groups were changed but
not annihilated or assimilated, as often the case in western nations. In the Heartland’s
“bowl” the ethnic salad is still very fresh.
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in order to conform to the norm. People who were more distinctively different
because of their skin colors, accents, or ways of life were less likely to be accepted,
however, and discriminatory practices and sometimes violence accompanied their
settlement in the region. More so than in any other part of the nation, wealthier and
middle-class residents of Heartland cities responded to growing diversity throughrigid
spatial segregation of communities. In record numbers they moved to suburban
locations where houses and lawns were larger, schools were funded amply to provide
better education, and fewer people who were different were encountered. Countless
old neighborhoods were allowed to deteriorate, turning many locales into readily
recognizable symbols of inner city decay and racial tension. Heartland commentators
once pointed with pride to the emergence of a hybrid American culture created in the
“melting pot,” believing that the best characteristics of those groups blended together
in a distinctive new entity. As the end of the 20th Century approached, however,
observers seeking to cast reality in the best possible light came to talk of a demographic
“salad bowl” within which different people maintained their own distinct identities
while working together.
In addition to being the place where a composite American identity was being forged,
however incompletely, the Heartland was instrumental in working out quite a few
valuable elements of the American cultural heritage. Although the region acquired
wealth rapidly, and life focused on economic enterprise, its social character did not
degenerate into the individualistic pursuit of profit at any price. The foundations that
preserved the essential liberalism of that society were education and justice. The respect
for practical education was deeply imprinted in the psyche of major groups that settled
the region, especially the Puritans and Quakers. Since the mid-1800s, a proliferation
of land grant universities set high educational standards and produced armies of
skilled public servants. Southern individualism was balanced by the Puritan belief that
freedom in society includes the willing acceptance of an orderly discipline.
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The Volga has not become a Russian river in the narrow ethnic sense, but more in a
spiritual sense, the unifier of Rossiya and its culture which transcends narrow ethnic
limits. Even though the Heartland opened the history of Russian expansionism, it is
far more representative of the expansiveness of the Russian character, of its ability to
adapt to other cultures and to peacefully coexist with them. Among the people of
the Volga, the eternal contradictions of the Russian soul were tempered by traditions
of learning and pragmatism. The educational feats of the Tatars reflect the belief of
Volga eoples in practical learning as a vehicle for individual achievement. It was in
the Heartland that the first Russian provincial university was opened in 1804, and it
enjoyed far wider than provincial fame, especially in sciences. Quite in contrast to the
refined intellectuals of the capitals, the Volga peoples were distrustful of education for
education’s sake. These were self-made practical people, whose careers were due not to
aristocratic privilege, but to abilities. The most action-oriented (and successful) of all
Russian social democrats, Vladimir Lenin, obtained at Kazan university the practical
profession of a lawyer. Another lawyer who came from Simbirsk was Kerensky - the
prime minister of Russia’s short-lived democratic republic in 1917. And appropriately
enough, Lenin’s and Kerensky’s fathers were both educators. Spirituality and
pragmatism, Lenin and Kerensky, solid merchants and unruly burlaks - many mutually
opposite Russian traits and types were fostered by and peacefully coexisted on the
Volga. The river had room for both individualism and collectivism, provoking in such
thinkers as Rozanov a purely Russian answer to universal dilemma of individual vs
collective - the notion of sobornost’ (togetherness), where balance is reached on a moral
basis.

25

In the words of Rozanov, the Volga “...moved everything ahead, moved somehow
nobly, without imperiousness or coercion.” The Heartland is indeed the embodiment
of Russia “on the move.” The heyday of the region was in the great period of economic
change and cultural florescence in Russia, roughly between 1861 and 1917, the

This freedom was derived and also curbed by laws, which emerged as a real foundation
of American society.
Building on the earlier frontier spirit of mutual aid, the region helped shape a very
American answer to the dilemma of how to reconcile individual rights with collective
responsibilities. Alan Parker thought that this response was best illustrated by the
phenomenon of individualistic friendliness. Individualistic in their businesses,
Midwesterners “were generous to neighbors and combined readily in community
projects. Clubs, churches, circles, lodges, societies flourished in the Midwest soil the
more so because their members felt themselves to be free and equal individuals. And
certainly there were some who found in such association the means to respect and
status that seemed so hard to achieve in a near-egalitarian society.” The blunt character
of intellectual and political life in the Middle West was the reverse side of this venerable
egalitarianism. Seeing themselves as pragmatic doers, Heartland residents often have
taken what they like to think is a no-nonsense, business-like attitude to the world.
Such an approach often has appeared to others as overly simplistic. The region’s political
culture is strongly job-oriented, in contrast with more liberal, issue-oriented politics in
the North, or the Core.
If Midwestern beliefs and values are not universally accepted in the United States today,
they remain close to the image that many people in other nations have of America
as a whole. This foreign association may result from the fact that in the period when
America was rising spectacularly to world dominance, the Midwest was America. The
region largely embodies the great period of industrial revolution, booming growth,
swelling immigration, and socio-economic change roughly from the Civil War through
the 1930s. Those were self-confident times when fortunes accumulated with regularity,
and the values of capitalism and American democracy were hardly ever questioned.
Not coincidentally, the period was an era of Republican Party dominance. Over a 44year period from 1869 to 1913, six of nine U.S. presidents hailed from Ohio, and one
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times of fast-growing and self-confident capitalistic Russia. Will the region, long
overshadowed by Moscow’s omnipotence, regain its prominence in the new times
of change? It may be too early to tell, but Nizhnii Novgorod’s leadership in marketoriented economic reforms may be a harbinger of the region’s revival as Russia’s inner
heart.
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of the other three came from the Heartland portion of upstate New York. As the
relative economic stature of the region has slipped in recent years, however, so has its
political prominence. Since 1930, the only Heartland residents to fill one of the nation’s
top two positions were Gerald Ford and Dan Quayle.
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THE CROSSROADS
Raymond Krishchyunas

THE CROSSROADS
Stanley D. Brunn

Linking up Russia’s railways with those of Europe at Brest is not an easy
task, perhaps because the track widths do not match. Train delays are
caused by the change from the European railway gauge to the wider
Russian one, a choice made in the 1840s in a conscious attempt to prevent
the possibility of western attack by railway. The history of the region
suggests that the precaution was far from paranoid. But even in peacetime,
the bustling railway station in Brest has always been the major entry point
into Russia from the West. Around the battered trains bound for Warsaw
or Minsk swarm crowds of luggage laden characters, whose clandestine
border trade activity bears witness to close links between Poland and
Belarus. There also are elegant trains of uncrowded sleeping cars, bound
for Paris or Berlin. For their passengers, Brest with its unnerving delays and
even Belarus itself is but a nuisance on the trunk road between Russia and
the West. A short ride from the station is one of the major symbols of Soviet
resistance to Germany in the Second World War the famous border fortress
of Brest which was besieged and defended to the last man under German
attack in 1941. This defense earned Brest the distinction of being called
the premier Hero city, but also left it fully destroyed. Aside from the gloomy
ruins of the fortress and the frenzy of the station, it was the ultimate Soviet
city of standardized apartment blocks that could have been anywhere in
the USSR.

The waters of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers near Cairo, Illinois do not
blend smoothly. To a towboat captain pushing a tightly strapped barge
up river, the Mississippi’s thicker brown waters become distinct from the
thinner and creamier Ohio, supporting writer Jonathon Raban’s observation
that the mixing of the waters from the two rivers was “a confluence of thick
machine oil and rosewater....so different that it was hard to believe they
could fuse into a single element without curdling.” At the junction itself, the
tow will head one way or the other, but this is only the first of many channel
choices the pilot will make. Within a few hundred miles, more channels
appear as the Missouri and Illinois flow into the Mississippi, while a shorter
reach along the Ohio would encounter the Tennessee, Cumberland, and
Wabash. In fact, decisions made along this stretch of streams could
ultimately lead boaters in all compass directions because at this midcontinent meeting point, north meets south and east grades into west. But
the crossroads where the waters mix in an uneasy union is a truly a place of
transition, and the primary bonds of the people here are to regions on the
outside.
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BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST

BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH

Some atlases have a two-page spread of Europe out to the Urals, and there is one
section of the map that usually ends up in the page binding. Perhaps this fact is
symbollic of the mixed identity of the Crossroads: its history, political boundaries, and
exchanges of dominant ethnicities all bear witness to a place with a turbulent location.
The story of the Crossroads is that of Russia’s borderland, for centuries caught in a
devastating tug of war between Russia and the West. With fortunes of the contending
sides shifting many times, their overlapping imprints created a region where the
transition from Russia to Belarus to Poland is nearly imperceptible, a violent playing
field facilitated by a lack of physical barriers to movement.

The Crossroads of the United States pops up all over the place in an atlas: smaller
sectional maps may have portions of it variously in the Northeast or the Central region
or the Southeast. Because it is a region which is everywhere and nowhere at once, it
has a poor identity for many Americans. Sometimes, the area has been called “The
Border South,” presenting the image of a transition zone, particularly during the Civil
War when it was torn between the Union and Confederacy. Culturally, the region is
definitely more southern than northern. On the other hand, its economic orientation
is North, not South. Agricultural and industrial economies in southern Illinois,
Indiana, and Ohio as well as central Kentucky are tied strongly to urban centers in the
Northeast. Yet to say this region is merely a transition zone would do disservice to its
full identity.

The fortress of Brest guards what is in fact a narrow bottleneck opening the easiest road
from Europe into Russia. To the south along the river Pripet’ are formidable marshes
and forests, nearly impassable for mass movements of peoples and armies. To the north,
ancient glaciation erected barriers of barren sandy hills covered with dense pine forests
and surrounded with thousands by lakes. Between lies an elevated watershed known as
the Belorussian Ridge that goes all the way from Brest to Smolensk. In this amphibian
land of rivers, lakes and marshes, the Ridge offers the only convenient dry route from
the West into the Core of Russia. Not surprisingly, ever since the first Russo Polish
conflicts in the 16th century, the Crossroads has been a veritable theater of war, and the
axis from Brest to Moscow became the corridor of overland invasions.
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While the Crossroads includes portions of western Russia and northern Ukraine,
Belarus takes up much of the region. The heroic role of the Crossroads as first line of
defense against invaders from the West is epitomized by the popular image of Belarus
known to all people of the former USSR: that of the indomitable “Partisan Republic”
which withstood so much abuse from Hitler’s forces. But geography was no friend to
the Crossroads, and the landscape allowed armies to roll relatively quickly even over

Perhaps the Crossroads is just a place of leftovers and “between-ness.” for it does indeed
borrow from each of the surrounding regions. The Crossroads does not have the far
more prosperous economy of the Heartland or the Breadbasket, and the irregularity
of its metes and bounds land survey contrasts with flat geometric terrain north of the
Ohio river. It is culturally close to the Old Mountains, but is far more densely settled
and less marginal economically. Even the Ozarks, which many geographers would
regard as an outpost of Appalachia, are far better suited for agriculture, are more
actively farmed, and enjoy higher educational standards, to say nothing of the recent
influx of amenity-seeking transplants (tourists and retirees) from the north. Perhaps
the Crossroads is exactly as the name implies: a transition or “fusion” zone where
transportation lines criss-cross the territory of mid-America - a region smack in the
middle, a bridge for the country’s traffic, both literally and culturally.
The truth seems to be that the Crossroads is all of these, and yet the sum is much more
than the parts merely added up. If the region is a cultural transition zone and a
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In the library the other day I happened
upon a Polish-French atlas of the
second half of the eighteenth century,
and...I found my village of Zagora...It
can safely be assumed that the village
had been there long before the atlas
came out and that the name too came
from long ago, stubbornly held to...I,
however, have quite another feeling
when I see this familiar scene superimposed on the picture of what it used to
be like-the greyness of thatch, the much
smaller and incomparably poorer, darker
West-Byelorussian village which will
never again be what it was although it
seemed fixed for eternity.
~ Yanka Bryl, "The Common", in
Nikolai Atarov, ed., Anthology of
Soviet Short Stories, vol. 2, Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1976,
p. 123-124

Belarus, with resistance growing toward the east. The Crossroads bled various historic
enemies until they were stopped in decisive battles almost at the walls of Moscow.
In fact, the eastern boundary of the region can be drawn along a line of cities which
have seen more than their share of battles over the centuries from Borodino, where
Napoleon lost 50,000 of his troops, to Bryansk, a city vital to the Soviet Army’s return
thrust against Germany in 1943.
Perhaps the place which most epitomizes the cost in human blood of controlling
the Crossroads is Smolensk, Russia’s foremost city of military glory and Moscow’s
gatekeeper from the west. From the early 16th century, the shield belt from Smolensk
to Chernigov served as Moscow’s military frontier with Poland, and until Russia’s
decisive victory over Poland in 1667, Smolensk changed hands four times. When Hitler
invaded in 1941, Smolensk again put up a valiant but futile defense which slowed the
German advance. The total human loss to the Crossroads region during the Second
World War was greater than for any other part of Europe: one quarter to one half of
the population perished. It took Belarus almost thirty years to bring its census numbers
back to prewar levels, while in the Russian segment of the Crossroads, the population
count has never recovered.
In a region of such volatile identity, political boundaries have likewise traveled back
and forth in the competition between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian state. The
13th century had brought disarray to Russia after the Mongol invasion, and the Grand
Principality of Lithuania used this to its advantage, taking over the Slavic lands of the
Crossroads. Russia did not manage to regain the lands of present day Belarus until
1795. But in 1920 Poland again prevailed over a weakened Russia and occupied the
western part of Belarus (and Ukraine) until 1939.
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In this land of shifting boundaries, the international border on its western edge is the
only one of long standing; it first emerged as an internal divide between Poland

geographic “borrower,” it is because its neighbors to the north and south were engaged
in a back-and-forth interplay of cultures and politics across the region, leaving deep
footprints on the Crossroads landscape. Each imprint of the crazy dance pattern
of North and South stayed, and somehow, when the dust settled, a distinct region
emerged.
The Crossroads straddles the confluence of the country’s three greatest rivers - the
Mississippi, Ohio, and Missouri - and in the pre-railroad era this was the natural
transportation intersection for the continent’s interior. This water route’s northern
section is the St.Lawrence waterway opening up into the Great Lakes, while the
southern channels are the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. The role of the link between
the two is the easy portage between the headwaters of rivers flowing respectively
into the Great Lakes and the Ohio-Mississippi system. Until 1763 both terminals
of this great river arc were controlled by the French, who were firmly established in
Montreal and New Orleans. Realizing early that the region held the key position on
the St. Lawrence-Mississippi axis, the French established trading outposts within the
Crossroads as early as 1701-1703. Finally they founded Saint Louis, which was to
eclipse its predecessors as the great midway city, near the confluence of the Mississippi
and Missouri in 1763, the same year that France lost all of its American territory:
Quebec to Britain and the Louisiana territory to Spain.
But by that time a new player was emerging in the fight for the interior - the thirteen
British coastal colonies. The French were spread too thinly across their huge territory
and their trade was almost exclusively with the indigenous populations. The coastal
colonies, on the other hand, had built up sufficient demographic pressure to make
westward colonization relentless once they could bridge the Appalachians. In the early
19th century, the decisive role in the fight for the continental dominance belonged
not to the old French North-South trade axis, but to the East-West axis of American
frontier movement along the Ohio-Missouri line.

The man they called Ed said
the muddy Mississippi water was
wholesomer to drink than the clear
water of the Ohio...And they
talked about how Ohio water didn't
like to mix with Mississippi water.
Ed said if you take the Mississippi
on a rise when the Ohio is low,
you'll find a wide band of clear water all the way down the east side of
the Mississippi for a hundred miles
or more, and the minute you get out
a quarter mile from shore and pass
the line, it is all thick and yaller the
rest of the way across.
Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain)
Life on the Mississippi, NY, 1931,
"Huck Finn on the Raft" selection
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and Lithuania (which included Belarus) as early as the 14th century. A geographer
attempting to draw the boundaries of the Crossroads in other directions may well
decide it is a “leftover” region, less distinct than its neighbors with more precise
characteristics. The region includes small portions of adjacent Lithuania, Russia, and
Ukraine, all marked by dense forests and peculiar, in-between cultures. The identity
of these three interfaces is so fuzzy that native residents define themselves simply as
“locals,” rather than by any ethnic label.
A certain “watery” elusiveness of the region’s character seems to mirror its amphibian
environment. Plenty of rain, a water-retaining forest canopy, and widespread marshes
account for an extremely dense network of rivers and lakes. Spring floods inundate
large areas and are frequently of catastrophic dimensions. But if rivers endanger life
in the Crossroads, they also once provided an excellent network of natural roads. The
Belorussian Ridge that forms the spine of the region is the watershed between river
basins that empty into the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas. Since the watershed is low,
the rivers here were easily linked by portages, forming the great interior waterway
system. In the times of Kievan Rus’, the region found itself in the very middle of the
Varangian-to-Greek waterway that had been so important to the development of the
Russian hearth in the North, and the system of portages opened access to Novgorod,
the Baltic and Muscovy. In the western direction, the Dnieper’s tributaries nearly
interlock with the tributaries of rivers that penetrate the heartland of Poland. Hence the
region was the roundabout in the movement of people and trade between all parts of
the Slavic realm.
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The Wilderness Road through the Cumberland and Pine Mountain gaps and the Ohio’s
southern tributaries served as natural access roads for expansion westward, and it was
also the line of least resistance. The entire territory between the Ohio and Tennessee
rivers had no permanent Native American settlement and was used as neutral hunting
ground. As early as 1763, the Proclamation line that elsewhere limited white settlement
to the Atlantic coast and eastern Appalachian slopes traced a sharp inland wedge into
the lands between the Ohio and Cumberland rivers ceded by the Indians. By the 1790s
the area roughly corresponding to the Kentucky Bluegrass was the only contiguously
populated region west of the mountains, and Kentucky (originally part of Virginia)
became the first state west of the Appalachians. Mounting pressure by American
colonists helped Thomas Jefferson persuade France to sell the Louisiana territory
(which it had only just retaken from Spain) to the United States in 1803. Jefferson then
commissioned Lewis and Clark to explore the lands beyond the Mississippi. Saint Louis
soon became the gateway to the western lands they mapped and described.
As population growth and the political call to extend the United States’ control across
the continent propelled westward expansion, the Crossroads, once at center stage
of continental geopolitics, was increasingly bypassed and soon appeared to be little
more than a borderland between North and South. Yet during the Civil War both
sides considered control of the Crossroads crucial. For the Union, the Mississippi,
Cumberland, and Tennessee rivers offered easy corridors into the very heart of the
Confederacy. Likewise, the Confederates considered the Ohio to be a vital line of
defense. Kentucky was torn asunder, its declared neutrality ignored by the invading
Union. The region’s internal fragmentation came sharply into focus when Kentucky
sent volunteers and recruits to armies of both sides, while Tennessee joined the
southern cause only after long hesitation. Remarkably, the Union and Confederate
leaders, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, were both born in Kentucky within 50
miles of each other. While the Midwestern states were Northern supporters, their
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THEME 1: THE CROSSROADS OF CULTURES
Both blessed and cursed by its “in-between” location, Belarus had little chance to shape
a distinctive culture and identity. Russia and Poland alternately dominated the region
and developed a falsified view of Belarus as a cultural desert: the Russian perspective
focused on the subjugation to Poland and the aping of alien western cultural forms;
whereas the Polish perspective saw all Eastern Orthodox Slavs as barbarian pagans
unless civilized by Polish ways and the adoption of Catholicism. At a cursory glance,
the dearth of Belorussian cultural figures of wide renown would seem to support such
pejorative views. As the Belorussian language was reduced to the role of peasant patois,
and upward social mobility depended on learning first in Polish and then in Russian,
Belorussians themselves came to be known under Polish, Russian, or Lithuanian labels.
For example, the American Revolutionary War hero, Thaddeus Kosciuszko (often
identified as a Pole) was Belorussian by birth, as was the great poet Adam Mickiewicz,
who wrote in Polish and Lithuanian and is claimed by both cultures. Under Polish rule
both the language and faith of Belarus withstood severe onslaught. Between 1620 and
1654 the Jesuit order unleashed religious wars against non Catholics which cost Belarus
55 percent of its population. Because the use of Cyrillic characters in the Belorussian
language ensured a strong bond with the Russian language and church (in contrast to
the Latin based Catholic Church), even the public use of Belorussian was prohibited in
1696.
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And yet, far from being culturally sterile, Belorussia developed into a relay station
for western culture movement into Russia. Thus in the 16 17th centuries, Belorussia
became the easternmost participant in the European Renaissance. It was through the
mediating offices of educated Belarus that the faint wisps of western humanism reached
17th century Russia and paved the way for its opening up under Peter the Great. Well
into the 18th century the Crossroads preserved its role as cultural mediator. Between
1700 and 1760 Belorussians and Ukrainians outnumbered Russians among the

southern sections (included in the Crossroads) had “Copperheads,” who were Southern
supporters. The war was a bitter civil one indeed in Kentucky and Tennessee, the two
states which suffered the greatest losses of civilian population.
THEME 1: THE CROSSROADS OF CULTURES
The majority of original Crossroads settlers came from the South. These were not the
representatives of Coastal South plantation-based culture, but poor yeomen of the
Upper South. From the Virginian and Carolinian Piedmont, these people retreated
west into the isolation of Appalachia and then moved beyond, where they found
a similar forested environment. In this fashion, Upper South culture spread all the
way to the Ozarks, ensuring a degree of cultural unity across the region. Many early
migrants into Kentucky later moved across the Ohio river. While Cincinnati with its
Kentucky suburbs is a typical industrial metropolis of the Heartland, southern Illinois
and Indiana with their rolling hills and marginal economies are not typical of the
richer agricultural Midwest. In fact, the southern portion of Illinois was in the past a
northern extension of the cotton belt stretching along the Mississippi, and large African
American populations were brought into the area for work on the plantations.
Mid-Atlantic culture was carried into the Crossroads by migrants following the Ohio
River, a major route used by settlers from Pennsylvania. From the 1840s numerous
Germans from their European exodus moved into the Ohio valley where they
frequently still outnumber residents of Anglo-Saxon heritage. Although most Germans
in the area were Catholics (traditionally more conservative than German Protestants),
they brought a whiff of fresh liberal air into the Crossroads, including the virulent
rejection of slavery. These overlapping patterns of past migrations are evident in the
region today in the dilution of typically southern cultural traits. Thus travelers from the
North will begin to note slightly slower speech and a distinct “southern drawl” once
they cross the Ohio River, but those traveling north into the Crossroads from the
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hierarchy and theologians of the Russian Orthodox Church. In the literary movement
known as Latinism, western educated Slavs composed orderly and imitative verses and
odes in Latin. The authors were frequently Catholics, since church sponsored education
was the Belorussian’s rare opportunity for upward progress, but, ironically, the topic
of the odes was likely to be the glorification of the ancient splendor of Orthodox
Kievan Rus. Himself a Latinist, Franciscus Skorina worked on the revival of Russian/
Belorussian as a literary language by cleansing it from Polonisms. The first printed
books and Bible in Russian were published in Minsk, showing the deep respect for
learning among Belorussians, a characteristic which still serves them well today.
In many ways Belorussians seem to be western Europeans in Russian guise, and the
Crossroads to be the easternmost West. But then, the opposite is true as well; if
language is the greatest element of self identification, the Crossroads is the westernmost
bulwark of things Russian. The extreme proximity of the Russian language to
Belorussian (far more so than to Ukrainian) and the role of Russian as the language of
science and vehicle to high social achievement explain the Belorussians’ near universal
adoption of Russian. Russian language schools have numbered three out of every
four in the republic, even though Belorussians account for 78 percent of their state’s
population. Attempts to revive the Belorussian language are supported only by a
handful of Minsk literati in obvious contrast to Ukrainian linguistic revivalism.
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Perhaps due to a history of Polish oppression and the devastation of the Second World
War, the Crossroads is understandably wary of the West, and looks more toward Russia.
Belarus never knew secessionism or possessed a nationalist movement comparable to
the Ukrainian one, and the separate Belarus state was twice created by external forces:
after the Revolution by Moscow’s desire for a buffer state on the boundary with hostile
Poland, and in 1991 by the dissolution of the USSR. The region’s dramatic resurrection
after the complete destruction of the Second World War encouraged allegiance to the
Soviet Union as well. In many ways, Belorussia (along with Lithuania, Estonia, and

South will note that the drawl is less pronounced. The pace of life is not as fast as in the
urban areas of the Core or the Heartland, nor is it as slow as one might associate with
the South.
In national politics the region is never consistently associated with either liberal or
conservative votes. Legislators and officials at all levels are more likely to prefer taking
a “wait and see” attitude before acting. To the northener the wait may seem too long,
while to the southener it may not be long enough. While conservatism (especially
in rural areas) can be seen in the large number of dry counties (not selling alcoholic
beverages), in opposition to gambling, and in support for teaching creationism and
prayer in schools, conservative sentiments are far from uniform within the region.
Newcomers, especially from the north, tend to broaden the region’s somewhat parochial
outlook, and sometimes the urban social and political climate is very distinct from the
traditional rural atmosphere. During the 1980s, Lexington twice voted on whether
restaurants should be able to sell liquor on Sundays. In much of “dry” Kentucky, such
sales were considered an unacceptable and unwelcome innovation. In Lexington the
vote passed the second time, in what some residents consider proof that the city’s
newcomers from the north and reformed native Kentuckians vote in tandem.
The North and South mix together at the Crossroads, creating a surprising mosaic
within a relatively small region. For example, Little Egypt (around Cairo in Southern
Illinois) with its acute rural poverty is to our day something of a deep southern enclave
within the region. The Bluegrass area with its physical beauty and rich soil seemed fit
for establishing plantations, and once attracted many aristocrats from Virginia and
Maryland. This “aristocractic” outlook is evident in its social life and unique landscape,
as well as in the noble mainstays of the local economy: horse farms, bourbon distilling
(the area used to account for 85 percent of national output), and tobacco production
introduced from Virginia. These traits are no less pronounced in middle Tennessee in
the Nashville Basin, which along with the Bluegrass remains something of an oasis of
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Latvia) evolved into a showcase of socialist success, the more efficient “westernized”
brand of Soviet socialism, and has therefore been much less reform-minded than
some other USSR successor states. There could not be a greater contrast than that
of Belorussian allegiance to Russia (and later to the Soviet Union) with strong anti
Russian and anti Soviet sentiment in Western Ukraine or Lithuania adjoining the
Crossroads.
What an irony, then, that it was Lithuania which in a sense preserved these lands for
Russia. The very survival of Belarus as an entity in the Russian-Polish tug of war is
largely due to its historic association with the Grand Principality of Lithuania, where
Russian was long used as official language and the regime tolerated Orthodox culture.
Belorussians therefore were able to remain Orthodox, and peasants called themselves
simply “Russian;” the name “Belorussian” only came into use in the late 18th century.
Even today, some traits of Belorussians resemble those of Lithuanians and other Baltic
nations: industrious, disciplined, and lacking the anarchist bent of both Poles and
Russians, who see these qualities as docility and submissiveness. Rational and level
headed, Belorussians shun the mysticism and religious fervor of their neighbors, which
the latter certainly interpret as a lack of spirituality. With a reputation for being honest,
reliable, quiet, and soft spoken people, they once again contrast with ebullient Russians
and Poles.
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The identity of the Crossroads is a sum of contradictions. While hardly distinguishable
from Russia in language, proud of its role as Russia’s defender and faithful to socialist
ideals, the region also somehow shares a superiority complex about belonging to the
West. It is not merely a blurred zone of overlap between Russian and Polish cultures
with no identity of its own: in fact, the most distinguishing feature in Belorussian
character may be stubbornness and resilience. People in the region simply know they
are different.

the Old South. Traditions of cultural sophistication make Lexington and Nashville
(in the past called the “Athens of the South”) vie for the title of cultural capital of the
Crossroads. At the same time, Nashville is best known as the world capital of country
music, a style which is actually a heritage from the southern Appalachians. Even the
Old Mountains region has something of a smaller replica within the Crossroads - the
Ozark Plateau, which resembles Appalachia in its gentle upland topography, low level
of economic development, and relative cultural isolation.
If the Crossroads is tugged between North and South culturally, it at least faced
westward. The westward dynamic of the region is symbollized by the life of that
legendary pioneer, Daniel Boone, who grew up in North Carolina, led the first settlers
into Kentucky, and died in Missouri. Frontier leaders like Boone left a lasting imprint
on the region. In the opinion of Ellen Churchill Semple, a geographer from Louisville
who wrote about Anglo-Saxons in Eastern Kentucky in 1901, those who grew up in
the westward-facing Crossroads were the first genuine white Americans (the seabord
population were but Europeans, transplanted across the ocean). In 1796 a traveling
Frenchman remarked that the inhabitants of the Atlantic coast called the lands beyond
Applachia the Back Country, but the new, trans-Appalachian Americans applied the
same name to the Atlantic coast. The region became the earliest embodiment of traits
that later came to be considered the generic American frontier heritage: democratism,
vigor, enterprise and independence. The region does indeed seem all-American in
self-identification by many of its residents, with a high proportion of persons claiming
their ethnic identity as simply “American”, rather than German- , Irish-, or some other
hyphenated American group.
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Torn asunder, the Crossroads found peace and calm only within the Russian Empire,
but it was a deadly calm. The dynamic industrial regions of the Empire surrounded
the Crossroads on all four sides: St. Petersburg and Riga to the North, Donbass to the
south, Moscow and the Central Industrial region to the east and the well-industrialized
Kingdom of Poland to the west. The region was crossed by transit railways that linked
the industrial areas with each other and effectively prevented any significant industrial
growth in the intervening space of the Crossroads. The region did not even benefit
much from the final improvement to the ancient transportation system, when in the
late 18th century two major canals were constructed linking the Dnieper with the rivers
Neman and Bug, leading respectively to the Baltic and into Poland. This impressive
waterway allowed direct navigation from Ukraine to Germany, but it was useless for
Belarus, which it traversed in the least developed Polesye region. The only important
commercial centers of the Crossroadss (and still its major cities) were those located on
the Dnieper axis: Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Gomel. Beyond them the bypassed region lost
much of its old cottage industry and acquired a strikingly rural character.

The prohibitive costs of transporting produce upstream and across the mountains long
focused the commercial interests of the Crossroads on the Mississippi River. Until the
railway age, most regional produce was sent downstream to New Orleans and from
there by sea to the east coast. So paramount was the role of New Orleans as the de
facto regional business capital that in 1799, the federal government had great difficulty
preventing an expedition of local militias to capture it from Spanish hands. The route
became even more important when, between the 1830 and 1850 the old Louisiana-toQuebec waterway finally acquired the missing link: a system of canals that connected
the Ohio’s major northern tributaries with the Great lakes. It was soon clear, however,
that the competition to become “Main Street USA” was won by the Heartland even
though the Crossroads controlled the major water thoroughfares and was populated
earlier. Prime location proved to be less important than the expanding market and
growing industrial muscle of the Heartland. Instead of encouraging local industry, the
new canals took the mineral and forest wealth of the rugged terrain to be processed in
the urban Heartland.

However, the sandy or waterlogged soils of the Crossroads with their ubiquitous
birches and peat bogs are barely suitable for farming. The only staple that thrives on
these poor soils is the potato, which in the past was the basis of the Belorussian diet
and exposed the populace to frequent potato famines. Native Belorussians in particular
suffered from rural poverty, as they were practically left out of urban life where Jews
and to a lesser extent, Poles, dominated. In 1897 Jews made up 18 percent of the
total population of Belarus, but half the urban population. When the Russian Empire
acquired its western belt during the partitions of Poland, it also acquired the world’s
greatest concentration of Jews. Migration of Jews was limited beyond the so-called
Pale of Settlement. The core of this huge territory stretching from Riga to Rostov was
former Polish lands: Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. Before the great exodus to

Today, the economic base of many Crossroads communities remains marginal and
dependent on northern control. In parts of southern Illinois, Indiana, and western
Kentucky the significant economic enterprise is coal mining. Strip mines produce
high sulfur coal which faces stiff competition from better coals produced in Wyoming
and Montana, even among utility companies in Kentucky. Forest products industries,
including paper and pulp and small furniture enterprises, also face competition with
companies farther south and overseas. The marginal nature of many of these enterprises
is felt by the small communities for which they are the economic backbone. In terms of
average per capita income, much of the Crossroads is near the bottom of state rankings,
with Kentucky and Tennessee 43rd and 42nd in the United States. Yet there are
exceptions to the marginal rural economies, for example in Kentucky’s “Golden
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America and Palestine in the late 19th century, more than half of the world’s Jews were
concentrated within the Pale. It was here that the distinctive Yiddish-based Jewish
culture of small townships (schtetls) was finally shaped and such important religious
developments as Hassidism occurred.
After the emancipation of the serfs, with poverty pressing and opportunities beckoning
beyond the region, the overpopulated land of potato famines became the land of
emigration. The more enterprising element of the population was washed out of the
region in all directions. Between 1896 and 1912 Belorussia generated 16 percent of the
settlers who moved to Siberia, although it accounted for only 8 percent of European
Russia’s population. The Crossroads did not have a single university, and aspiring
youths, many of them sons of Polish nobility or Jewish merchants, had to go elsewhere.
Thus, the most feared of the early Bolsheviks, KGB founder Felix Dzerzhinsky, came
from a family of impoverished petty Polish nobility in Belorussia, but his life and
revolutionary activity were divided between Lithuania, Poland and Moscow; in the
19th century, hundreds of thousands left for the new lands of the Breadbasket and
for the port of Odessa, where the tradition-bound Jew of a schtetl finally found open
horizons. The sons of the first wave of migrants left through the porous Pale line for the
university centers of Russia, becoming doctors, lawyers and industrialists, or radicals
who constituted the backbone of either the Bolshevik party (like the famous Leon
Trotsky) or the Zionist movement.
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In retrospect it seems clear that the central location of the Crossroads was a very mixed
blessing. The region has never been more than a dependent pawn of its powerful
neighbors, alternately serving as either the thriving hub of interaction between them
or a devastated buffer zone. After the Second World War, the ancient role of the region
was resurrected as a hub of Slavic lands united within the Eastern bloc. Its locational
advantage allowed the Crossroads to return to its status as a relay station, but this time
for the adoption of western technologies. Railways which had previously drained life

Triangle” linking Cincinnati-Lexington-Louisville and in the Nashville Basin. The
growth of such cities as Saint Louis, Louisville, and Nashville continues to be helped by
busy navigation along the important water arteries, but for the Crossroads as a whole
most of the traffic passing through it is strictly transit. In contrast to the Heartland, the
Crossroads is not so much a thriving business hub on a busy downtown intersection as
a crossing of country roads.
Although cultures meet and cross-fertilize in the region, major migration flows after
the mid-nineteeenth century largely bypassed it. The Crossroads was not northerly
enough for job-seeking migrants from the South, while in recent decades it proved
not warm or exotic enough to attract Sunbelt-bound businesses or retirees. Instead,
marginal economies encourage massive outmigration, especially toward the nearby
industrial Heartland and the Atlanta metropolitan region. Bypassed by the intellectual
mainstreams, the Crossroads retained a strong rural flavor that may be seen in the
relatively slow pace of political and social reforms.
The region preserves a strongly rural character. The proportion of rural population
in Kentucky was 50 percent in 1990, twice the national average, and most urban
population lives in small towns. The land, aside from the Bluegrass and Nashville
Basin areas, is marginal, and farms are small and not suitable for highly productive
agriculture. The farms are seldom specialized to the degree they are in the Heartland,
and they often mix beef cattle, hogs, corn, wheat, and (in Kentucky) tobacco. Small
farmers cannot compete with large agribusinesses, and many farmers must maintain
full-time jobs off the farms. Many will commute seventy or eighty miles to small
industrial plants or to seek service employment in county seats or mid-sized cities.
Because of the region’s strong agricultural heritage, outdoor living is very popular.
Hunting and fishing are favorite pastimes, and many enthusiasts proudly display their
guns or fishing poles in the rear window of pickup trucks. Community and church
celebrations and civic festivals are an important part of social life, as are family
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out of the region now helped develop modern industry in the Crossroads, augmented
by pipelines leading into Europe. If Belarus (and Lithuania) entered the postwar years
as the least developed parts of the European USSR, they emerged as the most dynamic
and successful regions by the time of the country’s dissolution.
Since the republic had skilled and disciplined labor but almost no mineral resources,
the emphasis was on advanced industries: electronics, automobile building (sturdy
agricultural tractors and trucks), engineering, and the chemical industry. In levels
of per capita GNP, Belorussia by the late 1980’s was in the leading group of Soviet
republics, well ahead of Ukraine. Belarus was the only republic other than Russia to
have a positive balance of domestic trade within the USSR in the early 1990s. The
frenzy of industrial development rapidly made the region predominantly urban,
with the proportion of urban population in Belarus rising from 43 percent to 66
percent between 1970 and 1990. Minsk was the fastest growing of Soviet cities with
populations of over a million throughout the postwar years.
The very name Minsk means “the place of exchange,” and Belarus was a leader within
the Soviet Union in the rate of trade it conducted. But it also meant that the economy
was vulnerable: Belarus received almost all raw materials and energy from Russia,
and marketed the products of its highly specialized manufacturing beyond its own
boundaries. The very economic survival of the Crossroads thus still depends upon
unified commerce and the splintering of the economy across the former USSR has hurt
the region.

21

Both the need for and the precariousness of Slav unity were dramatically brought
into focus by the nuclear catastrophe of Chernobyl which contaminated areas in all
three Slav republics of Belorus, Ukraine, and Russia. Although the plant is located in
Ukraine, the lion’s share of damage was suffered by Belarus, and both republics blamed
Russia for the accident.

gatherings. Many communities have developed special “days” during the past decade
to bring in tourism or to promote boosterism, local pride, and dollars into the local
economy. Metropolitan newspapers carry descriptions of such upcoming small town
events as music and craft fairs, outdoor performances, food events (ice cream socials)
or local beauty pageants. Although such activities are not unusual for small-town
America elsewhere, they round out the image of the Crossroads as an embodiment of
poorer rural America with its low budget forms of relaxation and leisure. Maybe it is no
coincidence that the famous Kentucky colonel of Kentucky Fried Chicken fame, and
the founder of the WalMart retail goods chain were both from the region.
In recent decades the drain of the region’s resources seems to be abating. Transportation
again proved crucial: as interstate highways opened the region during the 1970s, central
location relative to U.S. markets and proximity to the industrial Heartland proved
beneficial. The region attracted branch plants of companies with headquarters in large
northern cities. Although many such jobs are low paying and demand low skills, the
Crossroads also seems to enjoy a peculiar revenge toward the Heartland with location
in the region of some major new automobile plants, including General Motors’ popular
“Saturn,” the Nissan pickup plant near Nashville, and a large Toyota Camry plant near
Lexington. This plant even hired some workers who became unemployed because of
closures in Michigan and Ohio. Nashville also has an aviation industry and extensive
banking and insurance industry that earned it the nickname “Southern Wall Street.”
General Electric operates a huge electric appliances factory in Louisville. IBM in its
heyday built a large plant in Lexington in the 1960s, and with its excellent amenities
and low unemployment the city became a magnet for out-of-state migrants, including
many highly educated professionals.
Despite recent upturns, the whole history of the Crossroads suggests that optimism
about the future should be tempered with caution. The drawback of its central location
is in the volatility of its fortunes being determined by events outside the region. Saint
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THE BREADBASKET
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There is hardly a person in Russia not familiar with the name Uryupinsk. Invariably,
it is uttered with a contemptuous sneer and even sounds somewhat indecent in
Russian. Uryupinsk became the embodiment of what Soviet Marxist ideology with
its strong anti-peasant thrust branded as the “idiocy of rural life.” At first sight
Uryupinsk, a small town lost amidst the flat grain fields, is a sleepy hollow that has
grown torpid from boredom. In summer, all is sultry and downcast in a dull feather
grass steppe, once in a while crossed by a chain of low hills, much like Chekhov’s
description of the rural scene: “A kite-bird glides right over the surface, smoothly
flapping its wings and suddenly stops in midair, as if struck with the thought of
how boring life is.” Much akin to their crops, the locals seem to spend their lives
locked into unchanging seasonal cycles.

The landscapes of the flat plains in the center of the United States have always
generated strong opposing judgments. Hamlin Garland, raised in South Dakota
in the late 19th century, expressed one view: “How poor and dull and squalid it
seemed! The one main street ended at the hillside at his left and stretched away
to the north between two rows of the usual village stores, unrelieved by a tree or a
touch of beauty.”

Yet the air of slumber is deceptive. At harvest time the place awakens to frenetic
activity, as what was called in sovietspeak “the battle for the harvest” began, and
the national media touted the best workers in places like Uryupinsk as heroes of
bread harvesting campaigns. These annual fenzies were actually a modern twist
on the real battles that Cossacks fought here against Russia’s nomadic neighbors.
Uryupinsk once was a district headquarters of the Cossack armies and was
also widely known for its vibrant district fairs. In modern times, both the unique
militarized lifestyle of the Don River Cossacks and this lively commercial activity
are reviving, underlining again the traditional ambiguity of a region sleeping with a
ready eye open.

1

But others see different textures in the landscape. From any small knoll in central
Iowa, for example, you can gaze out in all directions at rectangles of green and
yellow. Different shades of green dominate. Taller stalks of corn undulate in the
breeze, while the deeper green of the soybean bushes crouch lower and are more
still. In contrast with the corduroy texture of the row crops, scattered fields of
golden wheat sway in the gentle wind like a finely woven sheet.
To some people such a summer scene of the rural Breadbasket makes it the
most boring place in America, but these landscapes have their own beauty, and
their placidity is deceptive. As the late summer turns into autumn, the landscape
changes abruptly. Large combines strip first the wheat and then the soybean
and corn fields. Trucks of all sizes pulse along the roadways, carrying many
of the kernels and beans to silver, cone topped storage bins beside the area’s
farmsteads. Other truckloads will unload their cargoes at the massive, cylindrical
concrete grain elevators that loom over every village and town in the region. Like
the crops around whose planting and harvest the region’s economy revolves,
the rhythms of the American Breadbasket are geared to the seasons. Despite
long periods with little apparent activity in summer and winter, the fields of the
Breadbasket provide enormous yields that help keep Americans well nourished
and supplement the diets of millions of people in other parts of the globe.
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RUSSIA’S FERTILE TRIANGLE

AMERICA’S FERTILE TRIANGLE

The Breadbasket region is first and foremost Russia’s granary. The majority of
people actually live in cities and work outside agriculture, but the popular and not
so misleading image of the region is sharply brought into focus during harvesting
campaigns, when newspapers are crowded with photographs of the campaign heroes,
the best harvester operators set against the backdrop of mountains of threshed grain.
Like their Egyptian counterparts, these pyramids of grain convey a somewhat sacral
image, and were part of the official myth of the happy socialist village, while the major
product of the Breadbasket, wheat, is something of a national cultural symbol.

Since the 1840s, when immigrants from eastern and southern states and from Europe
started settling the region in large numbers, the Breadbasket has been a region focused
on agriculture. Few parts of the world produce as much food, and while the number
of people who live and work on farms has steadily declined during this century, the
ebb and flow of the farm calendar still regulate the rhythms of the region, just as the
fortunes and failures of the agricultural economy establish the roller coaster on which
many other establishments ride. Agriculture remains the backbone of economic activity,
and farms dominate rural landscapes.

The harsh conditions of Russian regions limited staple grains to the coarser varieties,
such as rye or barley, and wheat bread became a lingering symbol of bounty and wellbeing. Honored guests are still greeted with the present of a ceremonial loaf, and
Russians eat far more bread than any western nation. Russian language abounds with
sayings like “Bread is master of everything,” and to the extent that such sayings are true,
the Breadbasket is the master of the country.

The Breadbasket’s agricultural bounty results from the lavishness of nature. Nowhere
else in the world is there such a large region with an ideal combination of fertile black
soils, a sufficiently warm and moist climate, and flat terrain. When Vermont native
Robert Frost saw the prairie soils, he reportedly remarked that they could be eaten
without the bother of conversion into plants. Because of the region’s interior location,
the temperatures are continental, with daily averages differing by more than 70 degrees
F (40 degrees C) between winter and summer. Annual average precipitation is quite
adequate (from 20 to 40 inches), but often streaky. Periods of drought or heavy rains
often last for months or even years. Droughts rarely extend throughout the region,
however. The large area of the Breadbasket relative to the fluctuating pressure systems
and jet streams ensures that abundant yields in some parts more than offset diminished
harvests in others. The region therefore is always a major exporter of food products.

In most of Russia, climate makes agriculture akin to Russian roulette, rather than an
orderly activity with predictable outcomes. But the Breadbasket was and is a region
with a stable output of surplus grain and other products, which makes it vitally
important for feeding the mostly urban nation. The region became Russia’s cornucopia
thanks to its black soils, the chernozems, named for the thickness of the black organic
layer that accounts for their proverbial fertility. According to a common saying, it is
enough to stick a broomstick into the soil for something good to grow out of it. During
the Paris International Fair of 1900 a sample of Russian chernozem was dubbed as the
world standard of soil fertility.
5

The triangular shape of the modern Breadbasket is remarkably similar to the area east
of the 100th meridian that two centuries ago was dominated by grasses. The region’s
eastern point thrusts into central Indiana and the Heartland region. In his sweeping
study of the places and characteristics associated with the term “the Middle West,”
geographer James R. Shortridge observed that all Midwestern states historically were
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The natural vegetation of the Breadbasket is that of the steppe, the Russian grasslands.
Over milennia, the decaying stems and massive roots of tall grasses enriched the organic
content of the soil, while the flatness of the steppes allowed for orderly landscapes
of huge rectangular fields. On this flat and monotonous plain, the boundaries of
the region (which fittingly enough resembles a ploughshare in outline) are a classic
expression of the relationship between human activity and a precarious physical
environment. Farming is a risky business in the steppe belt, where average yearly rains
from 12 to 20 inches are not generous. The harvest can be scuttled not so much by a
dry year but by the unpredictability of the climate itself. Despite these ups and downs,
the Breadbasket performed a crucial food supply function, located between the betterwatered farmland of the South and a region where soils become too dry to support
farming without irrigation. The Breadbasket provided a wedge between cultures as well,
since this drier land on its southeast flank was home to populations of Asiatic ancestry.
Today the Breadbasket is a bucolic landscape of European-style farming, but in the
past the whole region was the scene of prolonged fighting between the worlds of the
sedentary European farmer and the Asian nomad. Gained by Russians only in the
closing years of the 18th century, the Breadbasket became the symbolic middle between
the developed and tamed Slav/European part of the country and its unruly Asiatic
periphery.
The Cossack Range to the Granary
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Just as the region’s climate alternates devastating droughts with good years, so its
history is a seesaw between the farmer and the cattleman. The steppes were fleetingly
dominated by such diverse and more sedentary peoples as Christianized Germanic
Goths, the Khazarean Jews from the Lower Volga, Kievan Slavs, and Muslim Bulgars,
but it was the nomad who always regained the upper hand. The northern boundary of
the region is laid down not only by nature, but also by history, as Russian expansion

associated with the pastoral image. But as manufacturing became preeminent in the
urban centers of the eastern Middle West, that region emerged as a not-so-bucolic
industrial Heartland. In terms of culture, the Breadbasket is part of Midwest and a
continuation of Heartland, but differs in its agricultural profile. The Breadbasket’s
western boundary is similarly defined by the growing importance to the west of nonagricultural activities and landuse. As Joel Garreau stated, the boundary follows the
line “where carbohydrates become more important than hydrocarbons.” The “middle”
in the name Middle West when applied to the Breadbasket today designates not only a
geographic position but also a symbolic median between the industrialized East and the
more natural West.
From Buffalo Range to the Granary
Today the landscapes of the Breadbasket are as tame as those found in any American
region. Yet only 150 years ago these lands were a nomadic range. Confrontations
between alternative possible uses of this environment, between farmer and rancher,
settler and nomad, were an important part of the region’s history and help define its
western boundary.
In the early 1800s, when future President James Monroe asserted that the territory of
Illinois was a flat plain unadorned by a single tree and so barren that it would never
attract enough population to form a state, he was wrong about both the future and the
past. Even before Europeans arrived, the indigenous people had long been reshaping
the natural landscape of the region. For example, the climate is suited to broadleaf
deciduous forests, but the emergence of natural grasses as the dominant vegetation
(with forests limited to river valleys) was fostered by frequent fires ignited by Native
Americans to aid their hunting. Tribes like the Dakota were edged into the region
from the east by the struggles between the French and English around the Great Lakes.
Forced out of the woodlands that nourished them for centuries, these tribes accepted
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After the rain the earth was swollen
with moisture and, when the wind
scattered the clouds, it languished
in the dazzling sunlight and steamed
with a dove-grey haze...Over the
steppe the quitch-grass rose above
the knee. Beyond the pasture
lands the melilot was in blossom.
In the late afternoon its honeyed
scent spread all through the village,
filling the girls' hearts with a fretting
languor. The winter wheat extended right to the horizon in a solid
dark green wall; the spring grain
rejoiced the eye with its unusually
close-sprouting shoots.
Mikhail Sholokhov, Harvest on the
Don, Putnam, London, transl by
H.C. Stevens, p. 9
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Many people think of the Cossack as quintessentially Russian, but Cossacks (from
the Turkic word for “adventurer”) would pointedly draw a line between themselves
and other Russians. The beginnings of the Cossack story may be traced to the Tatar
warbands of the steppe, expert horsemen who lived by the plunder of adjacent states
or mercenary service, and Cossacks include both Slavic and Tatar blood. Only in the
16th century did the Slavic element finally predominate among the Zaporozhian
Cossacks of Ukraine and the Don Cossacks of Russia when a swelling flow of fugitives
from serfdom fled into the steppes. Yet the Cossacks still preserve many Asiatic features
in their garb and their wildly courageous mounted fighting techniques. During the
Napoleonic Wars, frightened Europeans who saw Cossack troops marching down the
boulevards of Paris gave rise to legends of their military prowess. While their teachers
(the steppe Tatars) increasingly allied themselves with Isamic powers, Slav Cossacks
(superficially Orthodox) had a growing sense of affinity with Russia. But they also
saw themselves as independent people superior to Russian farmers, whom they called
“muzhiks” (peasants) and despised as obsequious. The subjugation of the Cossacks to
the Russian crown was a drawn out stick-and-carrot process of converting them from
rebellious anarchists into privileged frontier troops. Conflicting views about Cossacks
reflect their ambiguous role: they are either praised as the heroic defenders of Russia
or scolded as defectors from the hardships of building the Russian state. While often
viewed as the expression of the independent and rebellious side to the Russian character
and as Robin Hoods for the common people, they also were self-serving anarchists who
plundered Russian villages without qualm up until the 17th century.
Once the Russian monarchy drew the Cossacks to its side, they mutated into the elite
corps of Russian army. The entire male Cossack population lived in military status as
a permanent standing reserve for the army, but in exchange it was awarded with many
privileges. Thus the lands of the largest group, the Don Cossack Host, received a special
administrative status with a wide internal autonomy, and ownership of land within the

the horses that were the unintended gifts of early Spanish colonists in the southwest,
and became expert mounted hunters. The buffalo that roamed the prairies by the
millions became their primary source of sustenance, and nomadic tribes scattered
themselves across the grasslands west of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.
Just as human beings altered natural conditions, the region’s environment required
major adjustments from the people who entered it. White settlers who entered
eastern parts of the region in the first half of the 19th century saw its opportunities
and challenges differently from Native Americans and ushered in a new stage of
transformation. Many early pioneers moving into the Breadbasket from their
accustomed forest environments found the paucity of trees disconcerting, while the
densely intertwined roots of prairie grasses made plowing difficult. Yet they quickly
discovered that those dense grasses provided the humus that made the region’s soils
fertile. The invention of the steel plow (able to cut through the roots) by John Deere in
1838 spurred rapid settlement in the region.
The expansion of settlement onto the Great Plains after the Civil War did not proceed
as smoothly, however. The horses that made tribes like the Dakota, Comanche,
Cheyenne, and Arapaho skilled hunters also permitted them to be mobile warriors.
And having watched numerous violations of treaties, they were not willing to acquiesce
to the relentless onslaught of white settlers. A series of bloody fights resulted, but
during the 1870s, the rapid destruction of huge herds of bison and the advanced
weapons of U.S. military forces doomed the Native Americans to lives on reservations
in remote locales. The belatedly opened prairies were settled with amazing speed thanks
to inventions like barbed wire and the rapid expansion of railroad networks from the
Heartland which provided access to rapidly growing markets in the east. By the 1890s,
the Great Plains were occupied with at least two people per square mile, and historian
Frederick Jackson Turner decreed that the frontier had ceased to exist in the United
States.

Again, the engine's drone, the
scrape
of stone on steel. You can feel
your back relax, the tingle in your
feet, can smell
dark earth and remember a day
you prepared the field for growth,
the rolling sod streaming back and
scouring
shares to a shine, the poetry
of straight lines across a flat field.
Orval Lund, "Plowing", in Mark
Vinz and Thom Tammaro, Inheriting the Land, Contemporary
Voices from the Midwest, University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p.
16.
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territory was denied to non-Cossacks. To preserve their warlike character, Cossacks were
even once prohibited to farm, but as the frontier bypassed them many were forced into
agriculture. With liberal land allotments and no landlords, Cossack farming thrived.
After the 1860s when imperial boundaries moved beyond the Caucasus and into
Central Asia, agriculture in the region decisively gained the upper hand. With the
influx of non-Cossack settlers released by the Emancipation, the virgin lands were
rapidly transformed into an area of large-scale grain farming. But as the region acquired
purely Slav character, its southern boundary became a sharp divide between the
world of the Slav farmer and that of the Asiatic cattle rancher. A step south from the
Breadbasket, Russian speech is drowned in the sea of Caucasian or Turkic languages. In
Eurasia, East and West are divided along a latitude, not a longitude, line.
With European occupation of the Breadbasket the steppe frontier was not yet closed;
our region does not include all of the steppe granary, as the chernozem belt continues
beyond the Urals into the Virgin Lands of northern Kazakhstan. That area was opened
to European settlement only in 1889, when a flood of homesteaders was brought by
the Transiberian railroad. The decisive supremacy of farming and people of European
stock arrived only in the 1950s during the Virgin Lands campaign, when the area was
transformed into a spring wheat belt. Cossacks played little role in opening up this
eastern wing of the steppe belt, but that’s not the only reason for excluding it from our
region. Although impressive in terms of output, grain farming in this area is extensive.
Siberia-like winters and dry desert winds make it less predictable than anywhere else.
The taming of the one-time range only seems to be complete.
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Despite Turner’s assertion, struggles between the range and the field never ended along
the western margin of the Breadbasket. In reality, the boundary is not a line but rather
a brushstroke on coarse paper that follows the whims of the climate with its dramatic
periodic fluctuations in precipitation. As an approximation, the boundary can be drawn
at roughly the 100th meridian, with farms predominating to the east and ranches to the
west. Although grain farming occurs well to the west of this meridian, including much
of the northern wheat belt in Dakotas and Montana and part of the southern wheat
belt in Kansas and Texas, its extensive and largely marginal nature disqualifies those
areas from inclusion in the Breadbasket. The fragility of farming there may be seen in
the history of the Dust Bowl which effectively ended local farming in the 1930s. It has
since revived only with heavy reliance on groundwater from the Ogallala aquifer. The
rapid development of the aquifer after the Second World War pulled the winter wheat
belt far to the south and west, but this water-induced expansion is strictly temporary.
The rapid depletion of the Ogallala aquifer will eventually bring back the cattle. Thus
the exclusion of areas west of the 100th meridian is true to the principle of defining our
regions as entities with longer life spans, which means unearthing deeper boundaries
that may be hidden beneath the “dust” of fleeting change.
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THEME 1: AGRICULTURAL LANDSCAPES OF THE GRANARIES

THEME 1: AGRICULTURAL LANDSCAPES OF THE GRANARIES

The Mosaic of Fields

The Mosaic of Fields

With their bold step into the unfamiliar grassland environments of the Eurasian steppes
(simultaneous with penetration into the American prairies and pampas), Europeans
claimed the few large areas of the world ideally suited for mechanized farming. The
whole landscape of the region is dominated by huge geometrically laid-out fields. The
Breadbasket leads the former USSR in the per capita extent of arable land, and the
proportion of lands under plow reaches 80 to 90 percent. In the USSR the Breadbasket
accounted for about a half of all grain production, as well as a major meat industry.

As its name emphasizes, the American Breadbasket is a region where grain production
is the focal economic activity. The eight states (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota) that occupy the bulk of the
region comprise 17 percent of the nation’s area, but they produce 29 percent of its
crops and 38 percent of its livestock products. Unlike other regions where feed for
livestock must be imported, the Breadbasket’s hogs and cattle consume corn and other
crops produced locally, often on the same farm where they are fattened. Crops are
harvested on nearly 60 percent of Iowa’s land and more than 55 percent of the land in
Illinois, shares that are much larger than for any other states in the union.

The Breadbasket was the land of exemplary socialist agriculture, touted as a model
of the efficiency possible in kolkhozes (collective farms arranged as cooperatives) and
sovkhozes (Soviet farms run by the state). This was probably the only region where
the economy of scale allowed by collectivized agriculture outweighed the inherent
inefficiencies of the non-market agricultural economy. The development of the Sal
steppes of Stavropol’ territory in the 1930’s provides a good example. The government
created Socialist farms in the place of scattered homesteads and established centralized
farm machinery stations for optimal use throughout a large area. Plowing and
irrigation of virgin lands was undertaken on a large scale, as on the appropriately
named sovkhoz “Giant” which incorporated 125,000 acres.
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In terms of grain harvests per acre the Russian Breadbasket was quite on par with
its American sibling. Even such a generic illness of Soviet agriculture as the loss of
harvested produce due to inadequate transport, storage and processing, was far less
acute here. The region pioneered the Soviet version of integrated agribusiness where
farms formed joint concerns with processing and storage operators and even obtained
their own wholesale and retail outlets to control the entire chain from the field to the

Iowa and Illinois are at the core of the Corn Belt, the quintessential part of the
Breadbasket. Climatic conditions enable corn to thrive in the fertile soils of the gently
rolling glaciated plains. Because of its myriad uses ranging from livestock feed to a
cheaply processed liquid sweetener, corn has remained a more reliable source of
revenue than many other crops. The development of new uses for soybeans in recent
decades has buttressed the market for this crop as well. Because corn and soybeans have
complementary nutritional requirements, many farmers now grow both, alternating
annual production depending on soil and market conditions. Wheat and other small
grains are more common in cooler or drier areas like the western margins of the
Breadbasket. Throughout the region, however, farmers have become more specialized.
Long gone are the days when farmers raised a variety of crops and animals, using small
machines and relying heavily on the labor of a relatively large family.
Evidence of specialization abounds on the landscape. The Breadbasket has a large
livestock production, but fences have become an endangered species in many parts of
the region, because crop farmers often have given up animals completely. Traditional
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market. In stark contrast to the rest of the country, most Breadbasket collective farms
were solidly in the black (the expression “millionaire-kolkhoz” for those with sevendigit bank accounts originated), and collective farmers were well off. In the rate of
private car ownership, the Breadbasket was well ahead of other regions in the Soviet
period. The rectangular grid of the fields lends the whole region a rather uniform
aspect, but a closer look actually reveals considerable diversity of farms. Ubiquitous
bread aside, the labels of Breadbasket producers dominated on the canned meat,
vegetable, and fruit shelves of Soviet grocery stores. Southern Ukraine and the northern
Caucasus had the most productive grain farming in the country, as well as productive
livestock breeding.
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barns are also less common. They frequently have been allowed to deteriorate, because
they are too expensive to maintain simply for the storage of machinery. In their place,
large metal “polebarns” have been erected. While much less stylish to those who want
traditional bucolic images, these utilitarian structures are far more functional. Where
hogs or beef cattle are raised, animals are often confined to barns and feedlots at
the core of the farmstead. Large cylindrical metal storage bins now hold dried corn
and other grains, used either to fatten livestock on site or simply stored until market
conditions warrant their sale and delivery to grain handling facilities.

The change as you move from west to east is very gradual. The appearance of irrigation
ditches and sheep flocks betrays the growing dryness and harshness of climate, and
beyond the Volga high soil fertility combined with a dry, sunny climate favors the
cultivation of some of the world’s best strains of hard wheat. Nature itself seems to have
suggested a balanced mix of crops for the Breadbasket: the growing cycles of corn and
wheat are complementary, and a year of a failed corn harvest is frequently a bumper
year for wheat. The discrepancy between cycles of drought in western and eastern parts
of the region also lends stability to its overall grain output.

Fields also provide ample evidence of the changing character of modern Breadbasket
agriculture. Although the number of farms in the region has declined by more than
one-half from 1930 to the present, the total area used for farming has remained almost
exactly the same. With farms averaging more than 440 acres (200 ha) in area, farmers
now make great use of machines to perform increasingly specialized functions. Large,
specialized equipment moves across fields at critical stages in the growing cycle. Rented
wheat combines move up and down the western margins of the Breadbasket, harvesting
different strains of wheat for hundreds of farmers. In contrast, farmers specializing in
corn and soybeans, the most important Breadbasket crops, usually possess their own
equipment.

The economy of smaller urban places of the region is rooted in agriculture. Some of
them are actually the so-called agri-cities-headquarters of huge collective farms and
the site for their processing industries. The local chemical fertilizer industry and major
agricultural machinery and tractor building factories meet the needs of farming. Yet
metropolises such as Tzaritzyn, Kharkov, and Rostov, where large agricultural plants are
located, do not quite belong: they are in, but not of, the region. The coastal cities along
the Black Sea from Odessa to Nikolaev to Mariupol’ were once major grain exporting
centers, but today their economies are geared to the all-Russian manufacturing complex
rather than local needs, while culturally they share the cosmopolitan mix of other Black

The imprint of agriculture is also present in the cities. Operations that handle and
process farm products long have functioned within communities both large and small.
Flour mills, vegetable canneries, meat packing plants, sugar beet refineries, and other
food processors stand at crucial points along rivers, railroads, and highways. In some
communities, the visual impact of these plants is accentuated by smells. Visitors to
Decatur, Illinois, for example, quickly learn that a soybean processor is the city’s largest
employer if they approach the city center from downwind. Other factories assemble
farm machinery, and most of the massive machines that churn over the Breadbasket’s
fields were manufactured within the region.
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Sea ports. The affiliation with other Volga cities is more important for Tzaritzyn and
Saratov. A major cluster of Ukrainian million-plus cities (Donetzk, Dnepropetrovsk,
Kharkiv and Zaporozh’ye) are all part of the Donetzk coal and metallurgical enclave.
Thus even if the Breadbasket has more large cities than other regions, its real face is seen
in villages or small towns, while the metropolises were long felt to be alien and viewed
with suspicion. Smokestacks of steel did not easily root in the fertile soil. Only Rostovon-Don (nicknamed the “the bread city”) can qualify as a truly regional metropolis. It is
revealing that during the Civil War in 1919 when the Don Cossacks were the backbone
of the White troops, industrial Rostov (located amidst Don Cossack lands) remained
the Bolshevik stronghold. Local xenophobia ripened as new settlers (not bound by
militaristic collectivism of the Cossacks) turned out to be much better entrepreneurs.
New tensions revived the old ambiguities of Cossack self-identity: on the one hand
these people saw themselves as Russia’s defenders and spoke Russian language, but on
the other the proud Cossack distanced himself from the land-bound Russian muzhik.
The fact that Cossack identity is not dependent on ethnicity alone bears witness to the
Breadbasket as a complex and thorough ethnic melting pot.
The Mixture of Peoples
Ever since colonization started in Catharine the Great’s time, a rich ethnic mix defined
the region, where peasant transplants from all over Europe easily sent down firm roots.
Because Russian peasants were tied to the land, the government issued an invitation
to settle the empty steppes of “New Russia” (today’s Southern Ukraine) to landhungry Europeans. The settlement began with “New Serbia,” when thousands of Serbs
occupied what today is roughly Kirovograd oblast. People as diverse as Swedes and
Armenians followed, but the ones who responded in great numbers were the Germans.
17

While many medium-sized cities dot the region, major metropolises are rare. The
economic character of the region fosters dispersed rather than concentrated activity, and
many major centers that serve the region are actually located outside its boundaries.
Chicago is effectively the region’s capital, but its status as a diversified industrial and
global service center functionally makes it part of the Heartland. Other major centers
serving the region Dallas-Fort Worth, St. Louis, and Minneapolis-St. Paul exist along
or beyond its margins. Kansas City is the only metropolitan area with more than one
million residents that sits squarely within the region.
The Breadbasket’s residents harbour a long-standing suspicion of large cities. Heavy
reliance on transportation and grain-handling companies, many of which were based
outside the region, fueled the discomfort of many Breadbasket residents with what
was perceived as excessive control by large external institutions. Because expenses
have a seasonal regularity while income fluctuates dramatically, most farmers have
to rely heavily on loans. In addition to providing funds for operating expenses and
the purchase of land, banks have furnished money enabling purchases of expensive
equipment. While acquiring land and equipment frequently was deemed prudent in
years with high yields and high prices, declines in farm income because of the vagaries
of weather or markets regularly placed many farmers in financial peril. Their difficulties
periodically led to sharp revisions in banking practices, much to the consternation of
farmers, whose longing for stability had brought diverse ethnic groups from all over
Europe into the region in the first place.
The Mixture of Peoples
Different ethnic groups dominate in various parts of the region depending on the
timing of that area’s initial settlement relative to the major waves of internal migration
and immigration from different nations. The ethnic pattern of the region changes from
north to south, related to differences in climate and agricultural production.
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With settlers promised religious freedom, towns and villages with names like Munich,
Stuttgart, or Strasbourg began to sprout in Novorossiya. By the early 20th century,
most Germans had moved farther east into the steppes beyond the Volga, where an
autonomous republic of Volga Germans existed between 1918 and 1941. The eastward
drift of German settlers along the chernozem belt was tragically continued during
World War II, when they were deported to northern Kazakhstan and the Altai territory.
Even in that new location, the majority of Germans prospered and their communities
became models of efficiency for Slav settlers. But while preserving compact
communities, most Germans are fully Russified and no longer speak German.
The Cossacks as well drifted to the East, following the movement of the steppe frontier.
Many “unemployed” Don Cossacks bypassed by the frontier moved farther east to
the Volga, Ural River, and Orenburg areas to guard the Kazakh frontier, while the
remainders of the Zaporozhian host were moved to the northern Caucasus.
The Ukrainian flow eastward was the most spectacular. It started in the 16th century
when Muscovite government opened its lands in the so-called Sloboda Ukraine
(present-day Kharkiv-DonBass area) for settlement by Ukrainians fleeing Polish
oppression. Since the earliest section of the Breadbasket, Novorossiya, was mostly
colonized by Ukrainians, they were the first to develop the technique of plowing
through the matted roots of the virgin steppe with heavy plows pulled by buffalo teams.
The Ukrainian sod-busters were among the pioneers throughout the steppe belt all the
way to its Siberian outcrops. In many parts of this belt, Ukrainians left a strong imprint
on landscapes and speech patterns, and initially outnumbered Russians; but by now the
two groups have almost completely blended and most Ukrainians claim Russian as a
mother-tongue.
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The industrial development of Novorossiya and the Northern Caucasus brought an
influx of Russians. Today the population of Southern Ukraine is split between Russians

Scandinavians were the largest group migrating into the northern part of the region,
while Germans were foremost among the complex mix that settled in the central states,
and descendants of immigrants from Great Britain were more common in the southern
tier. These broad generalizations mask the considerable complexity that abounded at
local levels, however. Ukrainians, Germans from the Volga region, French emigres, and
numerous Canadians also filtered into the region. Widespread communication required
multilingual approaches. For a short period in the 1870s, official documents of the state
of Nebraska were published in German, Swedish, and Czech as well as English.
The pattern of rural settlement in the Breadbasket facilitated the blending of this
conglomerate of immigrants. The region’s farmers were not concentrated into small
villages as was common in other parts of the world, so the inward-looking villages
could not serve as vehicles for perpetuation of cultural differences. The dispersed
pattern of family farmsteads encouraged uniformity both of the people and of the
landscape. Most immigrants and migrants from the eastern U.S. belonged to the same
“nordic” family of European culture or its American derivatives, and by the time other
ethnic groups started migrating in significant numbers around the start of the 20th
Century, almost all farmland had already been settled. As a result, the Breadbasket
emerged as one of the most homogenous parts of the nation with the greatest
prevalence of white Americans.
In some ways, this model melting pot emerged as the embodiment of the nation as a
whole. “See how it plays in Peoria”! long has been an expression anticipating that the
reactions of residents in that central Illinois city will foreshadow those elsewhere in the
U.S. More recently, Des Moines, Iowa, has become a favored site for market researchers
to test how new products and advertising strategies may be received by consumers in
other parts of the country. While changing demographics have significantly altered
the ways that other regions relate to each other, the Breadbasket remains as the middle
ground, the part of the United States against which all others areas can be measured.
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and Ukrainians in equal proportions, and Ukrainian nationalism there is rather
unpopular. On Cossack lands, the Cossacks were hopelessly outnumbered by Russians
proper even before the 1917 Revolution. The homogenizing environment of the
Breadbasket and the Slav ancestry of major settler groups allowed the region to become
Russia’s most efficient melting pot, more so than the Heartland, where the coexistence
of ethnic communities created an ethnic salad.
The blurred all-Slav identity of residents helped the region become something of a
spokesperson for the nation, the embodiment of things all-Soviet. Here sociologists
sought the “average Soviet man,” and the slogans of many national economic initiatives
were born. From Brezhnev to Gorbachev, the rulers of the USSR came from the
Breadbasket, the region that always enjoyed a rather special relationship with the state.
THEME 2: THE CHECKERBOARD OF GOVERNMENT ACTION
In satellite imagery, the Breadbasket looks like a blueprint made with a ruler and
compass: rectangular fields, straight lines of irrigation canals, and protective tree belts
planted to block dry winds from the Asian interior. These flat expanses are like a clean
sheet of paper that almost invites a willing hand to draw geometric patterns. For the
Soviet state with its itch to regulate everything, the temptation was irresistible. The
region became a testing ground where simple two-dimensional “geometrical” solutions
were sought to solve complex problems, while ignoring the “verticals” of threedimensional human beings.
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No other region suffered so much by the forced collectivization of the 1930s. The
government believed that the fertile soils of the Breadbasket nurtured the dangerous
sprouts of capitalism exactly because the region was old Russia’s model of efficient
commercial farming. With much land and few people, the estates in the southern
steppe were the first in Russia to resort to the use of modern farm machinery and free

The Breadbasket maintains its traditional association with values that Shortridge felt
were central to the self image of the United States as a whole self reliance, democracy,
and moral decency.
THEME 2: THE CHECKERBOARD OF GOVERNMENT ACTION
Even the landscape of the region conveys the sense of immutable order. More than
in any other region in the nation, the Breadbasket’s landscape is one of right angles.
Observers of the region invariably use the term “checkerboard” to describe the regular
pattern of square and rectangular fields separated by straight roads that intersect at
regular intervals. The origin of this landscape rests in part with the gentle topography
of most parts of the region, as flat land permits people to establish fields and lay roads
wherever they wish.
As independent Americans breached the Appalachians, however, Thomas Jefferson and
other leaders of the new federal government established a more direct means of dividing
new territories into units that could be sold. Starting in 1796, the General Land Office
of the U.S. commissioned surveyors to divide land owned by the federal government
into square townships measuring six miles on a side. Townships were divided into 36
one square mile sections, which in turn could be partitioned by halving and quartering
into tracts as small as 40 acres. Large scale subdivision and sale of public lands reached
its apogee as the wave of settlement rolled into the Breadbasket.
Use of the rectangular survey system instituted a new form of order upon the land of
the Breadbasket. The creation of square and rectangular subdivisions of land established
the framework for fields whose patterns have been altered only through expansion
when adjacent farms have been consolidated. Also significant was the placement of
roads along sectional boundaries at one mile intervals throughout the Breadbasket.
This regular lattice of roads is evident on photographs taken by satellites.
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hired labor. The boom was such that prior to the 1917 Revolution, Russia remained
the world’s largest exporter of grain. In this region that did not really know serfdom,
most farmers were the serednyaks (literally “middle” farmers) - the well-to-do who were
Stalin’s prime target. Many serednyaks were Cossacks (since the Civil War regarded
as hidden enemies of the Soviet order) or Ukrainians (permanently suspected of
nationalism).
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Stalin carried out collectivization with a vengeance. About 7 million peasants died
in the terror of the campaign, while another 7 million died in its aftermath in the
unprecedented man-made famine of 1932-33. This tremendous loss of life took place
while the region was forced to provide grain exports to finance Soviet industrialization.
Although the socialist farming built on this brutally “cleaned” arena eventually became
the country’s most successful, Russia never returned to its old role as an agricultural
products exporter to the world. Artificially low state procurement prices supplied no
incentive to expand Breadbasket output, and what the shortsighted Kremlin economists
saved in the region was lost several times over as the USSR had to pay much higher
prices for foreign grain; since the 1960s the Soviet Union has been one of the world’s
major importers. It is ironic that Soviet grain imports were coming from what were in a
sense the overseas offspring of the Russian Breadbasket - the areas of the United States,
Canada, and Argentina with large proportions of Ukrainian, Russian, or RussianGerman transplants. Strangely for the region that so suffered from the Soviet state, it
preserved its special rapport with official Soviet culture and ideology. This could reflect
the tendency of its residents to reduce life’s complexities to simple two-dimensional
formulas. The regional culture is a mix of populism and self-righteous common sense
which seems to know simple answers to all questions. The traditional suspicion of big
cities and outsiders inculcated deep distrust of liberal ideas. The region’s population,
once decimated by collectivization, still actively opposed market-oriented economic
reforms. In Krasnodar, for example, privately run ventures were declared to be cancer
cells on the healthy body of the people.

The surveys that shaped the geometry of the region were but the first in an ongoing
series of official endeavors that affected the region. After 1862, land became available
free to homesteaders who occupied and improved the property for a period of at least
five years. Direct disbursement of land by the government was augmented by federal
donations of land to the states for the support of education. From the early 19th
Century, one section of every 36 was donated for public schools, and in the 1860s,
additional land was donated to states to support “land grant” universities. These public
institutions, which often specialized in the development of agricultural technology,
became the backbone of the higher educational system throughout the Breadbasket
states.
Over the last half century, the role of government in the lives of the region’s inhabitants
changed profoundly. As American agriculture matured and farm production increased
to the point that supplies far exceeded demands in the United States and abroad, the
federal government instituted a series of measures designed to reduce production and
increase prices. Widespread governmental intervention in farm production began in
the 1950s, including the manipulation of trade policies, such as the export of surplus
commodities to provide emergency relief for poorer nations. Other federal farm policies
have sought to inhibit soil erosion. These policies often succeeded in ending production
on marginal farmland, but they also had unintended consequences, including the
drastic reduction in equipment and fertilizer sales that resulted in the mid 1980s when
farmers were given surplus commodities from government stockpiles as replacements
for crops they would have grown themselves.
Ironically, such government programs are largely in response to the effects of unbridled
individualism characterizing the culture of the Breadbasket. More than anywhere else
what was happening in the region reflected the decisions of individuals each acting in
their own interests, while the bounty of mother nature tricked the local farmers into
believing that all their successes were due only to their superb skills and mastery of
nature. Such over-confidence and a certain short-sightedness helped produce the Dust

24

The history of relationship between the central power and Cossackdom is even
more paradoxical. On the one hand, the Cossacks long resisted state attempts at
regimentation of their lives; however, once won over they became the most faithful
and willing servants of the regime. In the Russian Empire, Cossacks were routinely
used to disperse anti-government demonstrations and perform punitive functions. The
protection of the Empire’s boundaries turned into the safeguarding of its “foundations”
and political conservatism. The Cossacks’ arrogant defiance of the state in the pursuit
of their collective privileges always coexisted with militaristic discipline and cruel
suppression of individual rights within the strata. Today, the emergence of selfappointed Cossack moral police makes public whipping of offenders a revived norm of
local life.
The movement for the restoration of Cossack autonomy is driven not by ethnic
sentiment, but by the desire to restore the coveted freedom of Cossackdom from the
binding laws obeyed by everyone else, to renew their special covenant with the state
as its well-rewarded defenders. The break-up of the Soviet Union was particularly
painful to a people who see themselves as builders of Imperial glory, and thus has
revived the traditional xenophobia of local culture. Even as Cossack movements seek
territorial autonomy, most Cossacks favor the reanimation of the Soviet Union in its
old boundaries. Now that the southern boundary of the Breadbasket has again become
Russia’s frontier with turbulent Asian neighbors, the new Russian state has to fight the
temptation to use the Cossacks as willing pawns in new games of geopolitical chess.
As the rural dreaminess of the Breadbasket alternates with the insomnia of Cossack
vigilance, the region seems to have reverted to the old fights between peaceful settlers
and professional warriors, only now they joust within the regional character. The region
of many a paradoxical about-face is again in uncertainty what to arm itself with: a
Cossack whip or a peasant’s plow.
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Bowl conditions in the 1930s or the depletion of Ogallala basin today, as well as
chronic crises of overproduction. At the same time, the farmers’ feeling of being
exploited from the outside and their traditional anti-urban bias frequently welled up
into support for political movements like populism, progressivism, and even socialism
that promised greater local control over major facets of economic activity -- traits most
paradoxical in a region of individualists well known as a bastion of the Republican
Party.
Another irony is that the region so distrustful of big government should have come
to rely so heavily on large-scale governmental activity, and that the traditional
xenophobia of the conservative farmer culture should tolerate such strong dependence
of the economy on the winds of international political change. During the 1970s, for
example, exports of American farm products to the Soviet Union increased tenfold,
only to be abruptly curtailed in the wake of American condemnation of the Soviet
incursion into Afghanistan.
While many observers feel that the ultimate resolution of America’s farm problems
calls for reduction of surpluses by requiring roughly a fifth to a quarter of the nation’s
farmers to cease production, no reasonable means of implementing such a policy
has been identified. The political costs of uprooting a half million or so households
from the nation’s farmsteads likely are too great for any group of national leaders to
bear, especially given the significant power wielded by congressmen from states in the
Breadbasket. On the other hand, the vast majority of the United States’ residents, who
live in metropolitan areas seemingly independent of the farms that surround them,
like the relatively low food prices that result from oversupply. As a result, they do not
favor drastic changes in national farm policies. The farmers of the Breadbasket and the
thousands of other residents whose lives depend significantly on what transpires in the
region’s fields and feedlots therefore stay bound in a Gordian knot, conscious of the
critical role they play in maintaining the nation’s vitality but limited in terms of their
abilities to control their own fates.
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THE OLD MOUNTAINS
Sergei Rogachev

THE OLD MOUNTAINS
Stanley D. Brunn

Low, monotonous, forest-covered mountains encircle the gloomy city, as if
sucking it into the treacherous vortex of their topography. Or perhaps this
place, which emerged for the sole purpose of digging into the stone innards
of the mountains, is really burying itself alive in them. When the infrequent
sunshine is followed by long stormy periods, gray mists of poison belched
forth by industrial smokestacks smother the basin. As the smoke mixes
with fog and snowdrifts, it seems as if the treacherous quagmire of this
mountain bog has swallowed up the city, its surrounding mines, sooty
blast furnaces, and screeching machinery. Suddenly the snowy gloom is
penetrated by shafts of light. But it is only searchlights on the perimeter of
the city’s famous labor camp, where the son-in-law of the once omnipotent
Brezhnev paces among other fallen men of power.

In the spring of its life, the valley in the Cumberland Plateau had a
hardwood forest so thick that light barely penetrated through to the ground.
Oak, laurel, walnut, and maple trees grew on the green slopes, while
rhododendron and wild flame azaleas colored the underbrush. Here and
there were dogwood and redbud trees. With summer came settlers from
the young nation’s east coast, most on their way somewhere else, but
some choosing to stay and try to farm the forest soils or cut the timber.
The town was founded in autumn times, self-reliant and isolated in its
valley, nestled amid the ridges of the smokey mountains. Log cabins gave
way to frame houses made of wood, laid out in a line along the valley floor.

These images are brush strokes for a portrait of Nizhniy Tagil - the city
which many hold to be the quintessence of the Urals. The writer MaminSibiryak, who was born in the Urals and loved the region, said that Nizhniy
Tagil is “the most dear child of the Urals, closest to its stone heart.” What
kind of region could give birth to such a child? What kind of place has a
heart of stone?

1

The coal companies came in early winter. They offered to buy rights to the
earth, and the people of the mountains sold their land cheaply. Soon, the
locals themselves were working for the companies, tunneling into the hills
and scraping out the black diamonds. But the pace was not fast enough,
and the companies began stripping away the very land to bring the coal
out more cheaply and rush it off to places outside. Tall, gray slag heaps
of coal and slate buried the forest, and the slopes became gashed and
decapitated.
The mountains and the people were old now, and in its late winter, the
town was winding down. Measured in miles, the plateau was smack in the
middle between the huge cities of the east and the rich central heartland;
and yet, was there any other place so alone or so far away?
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THE URAL MOUNTAINS: NOT MUCH OF A BARRIER

THE EASTERN MOUNTAINS: NO LONGER A BARRIER

The Urals may be the most elderly young mountains on earth. Although geologically
they are considered recent, a more accurate term is “rejuvenated.” Fresh tectonic uplift
uncovered the base of more ancient mountains, exposing mineral riches accumulated
over millennia. The region’s pioneers were startled with miraculous treasures that
seemed like easy pickings. In fact, they say that the first deposits were discovered when
the wind blew down trees and revealed precious minerals right there on the roots.
From those dead roots grew the quarries and ironworks which made the Urals famous
later in the 18th century.

The old mountains of a young continent are found in Appalachia. In geography books,
you may just as often see them called “plateaus” or “highlands,” reserving the term
“mountains” for the Rockies or Cascades. Yet in American history, the Appalachian
system represented a formidable barrier to westward migration. European-American
settlers, moving in from the coast, encountered the escarpment wall of the eastern side
of Appalachia, and it must have seemed that this region was the mountains indeed,
stretching from the Canadian Maritimes all the way to northeastern Mississippi.

While vernacular images of most Russian regions are somewhat vague, the Urals
provokes a definite, if somewhat unflattering response. When you ask someone “so,
what are these Urals?” the answer will be a prompt, “well, they’re mountains,” but the
word “mountains” would likely be blurted out with a hint of doubt - it’s not Mountains
with a capital “M” (the way people of the Russian flatlands speak of the Caucasus
and Pamirs with a combination of admiration and awe). The average elevation in the
Urals is only about 3,000 feet, with the highest point at 5600 feet - hardly a mountain
climber’s challenge. Strong river erosion has hacked up the mountains, making them
easily passable. Some rivers even defiantly flow westward, despite the fact that their
sources are on the eastern slopes. Just as the rivers do not “notice” the Urals, the
passengers of the Trans-Siberian railroad who stream across the mountains in numbers
barely know they’ve been over a range. The amount of actual climbing that the
trains have to do is only about 300 to 500 feet, a disappointingly easy victory for the
travellers, who then spread the disparaging image of mountains with a small “m.” And
yet, in modern spoken Russian, the very expression “beyond the Urals” is synonymous
with crossing a certain critical threshold. Stretching for about 2,000 miles almost
strictly north-south from the icefields of the northern Arctic Ocean to the deserts of
5

Appalachia consists of several distinct echelons; the Blue Ridge Mountains, a very old
range of granitic mountains mostly in Virginia and North Carolina; a series of parallel
ridges and valleys from Pennsylvania to Alabama; and two plateaus, the Alleghany in
the north and Cumberland in the south. Today, a traveler through the old mountain
regions will not find them much trouble to cross, but may be touched by the way the
areas hang on to their beauty, with small towns nestled in the valleys, some huge areas
of what looked to be heavily forested and mined lands, and small farms, often crawling
up the steep hillsides. It might be surprising to the motorist on the interstate highways
that now crisscross the mountains to realize how difficult an impediment they were in
the 18th century, a barrier that was both physical and psychological. It was not easy for
many early settlers on the eastern coast to consider migrating inland because there were
too few easy routes. Even those gaps that permitted access across the mountains still
required vast amounts of energy and skill.
When the settlement wave finally did breach the mountain passes, people flooded
through, and the mountains gave way like a broken dam. As the country grew and
expanded, the mountains did not seem so tough to conquer anymore - in fact they
seemed a little older every year. They seemed to get emptier too, like a shrunken shell of
their old self. Although in area the region is larger than California, its population pales
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Kazakhstan, the Urals stand in the way of all routes to the east. Traversing these
mountains is perceived as moving beyond a psychological frontier delimiting the Real
Russia. Until as late as the mid-twentieth century, the expression “from the Carpathians
to the Urals” or “from the Baltic to the Urals” was used in Russia to denote the idea of
the “tamed” and lived-in part of the state.
The Novgordians who first crossed the Urals in the 12th century in the quest for
Siberian furs called the mountains by the cold and cruel word “stone.” In doing so,
they defined the character of the Urals not by its topography, but by the nature of its
soil. This sterile land was too inhospitable for Russian peasants - the shoulders of the
Urals reach into the Arctic, and the harshness of the north barrels down the cold stony
backbone of the range far toward the south. The arriving Russians were accustomed to
the softness of the plain where sediments hid the rock, and found this alien, exposed
stone frightening. Maneuvering along river valleys, they hurried to reach the West
Siberian Plain, a place that evoked images of the more familiar Russian flatlands.
Therefore, although on a geologic map the Urals are a mountain range thrust between
two great plains, they have actually long been a type of trench on the map of Russian
colonization: western Siberia on the other side of the mountains was settled before
the Urals themselves. Two well-settled and urbanized belts of piedmont preceded the
development of the mountains proper. Defining the boundaries of the Old Mountains
is therefore no easy task.
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Today, western approaches to the Urals are controlled by two major administrative
centers - Perm in the north and Ufa in the south, each of them gripping its respective
section of the Urals with a double-pronged fork of arterial railways. In prerevolutionary Russia the Urals region was governed from Perm and Ufa. Both cities
grew beyond the narrow mining core of the Urals, as factories for the further processing
of Uralian mineral resources emerged along the transport routes. It was as if the mining
industry rolled off the slopes westward in a kind of economic debris flow, following the

by comparison, as about half of Appalachians live in scattered rural areas. Where are all
the cities here? Why does the region seem “empty?”
For early Americans who wanted to venture westward into the anticipated rich
agricultural interior, the Appalachians were viewed as a place to go through in order to
get somewhere else. Early European frontier settlement in the late eighteenth century
was confined to a few select roads, passes, and rivers. Three main routes through the
mountain barrier were used: the forks of the Ohio River, the Cumberland Gap along
the southern edge of the Virginia/Kentucky border (what became the “Wilderness
Road”), and the valley of East Tennessee. By 1800 the National Road went up the
Potomac to the Ohio. Many who traversed the mountains realized the opportunities
were few for large numbers, so most stopped briefly and went farther west into central
Tennessee, the Kentucky Bluegrass, and Ohio, all places with better agricultural lands
that could support higher population densities. Those few who remained fashioned an
economy and livelihood strongly tied to timber and mining rather than agriculture.
They also became increasingly bypassed by larger numbers of people moving into the
continent’s interior. In a sense they became isolated by choice from the major currents
of economic change that were sweeping the country.
Traversing any physical barrier is difficult, especially in times of slow transportation.
There was also fear of the strong Natuve American nations (Cherokee, Chickasaw,
and Choctaw) of southern Appalachia. Finally, the Appalachian system was a
psychological barrier. Early explorers and veterans of military campaigns against the
Native Americans returned home with tales that there were few easy passages in and
around this thousand- mile mountain system. Probably more than one settler was also
fearful of the forested mountains; these were unfamiliar terrains to those who grew up
in northern Europe and in the flat coastal plains. Few African-Americans settled in the
region, leaving it to become a stronghold of white Protestants. Despite the hazards,
people from the east ventured into the mountains: Scots-Irish, English, French
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stream of raw materials drawn from the Urals toward the main areas of consumption.
As a result, the Urals as an industrial region is considerably tilted to the west with
respect to its mountain backbone.

GHOSTS IN THE MOUNTAINS
Russians who entered the Urals found ample
reason to be scared of the unfamiliar rocky
environment. Placenames left over from indigenous people even warned them about local dangers: don't sit on the Devil's Stool or Satan's
Armchair; don't settle the Devil's Campsite;
don't climb the Evil Mountain; don't trust
the ghostly light of darkness from the Moon's
Pillar; and finally, a simple - "Yurma!" - Stay
Away!.

The contours of the Old Mountains as a social and cultural region were defined by the
pattern of Russian settlement. Gradually widening its stream, population movement
crossed the Urals as a continuation of the original basis of the Russian eastward
colonization - the Volga Basin. The eastern tributaries of the Volga (between the Kama
and Samara Rivers) are like two beams of a slide projector which highlight the Russianpopulated middle section. The overlap of this well-populated mid-section with the
narrow Uralian backbone (beyond which the wormholes of mines and quarries seldom
go) defines the quintessential Urals. Perm and Ufa have their counterparts within this
ultimate Urals in the large cities of Ekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk.
THEME 1: AN ECONOMY AS WORN DOWN AS THE MOUNTAINS
A Region Used Up
What magnet drew people into these gloomy mountains that had so long remained
empty? The question itself holds the answer - magnetic iron ore, abundant in the
Urals but absent among the sediments of the Russian plains. The mineral riches were
fabulous: the city of Magnitogorsk derives its name from the mountain Magnitnaya
(Magnetic) which was one huge mass of rich iron ore. Today the mountain is mere
memory preserved in a local pun that neatly sums up the whole fate of the Urals: “It
once was a Mountain Steep, now it’s a pit deep” [it sounds better in Russian - “Byla
gora vysokaya - stala yama glubokaya”]. The effects of eroding action of milennia of
geologic time pale in comparison with what economic time has wrought in a wink, as
iron mining pitilessly chewed away the mountains.
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Huguenots, Dutch, and Germans. They carried with them the independence of the
frontier and a disdain for authority.
THEME 1: AN ECONOMY AS WORN DOWN AS THE MOUNTAINS
A Region Used Up
If the Old Mountains seemed a region off the beaten path - an area to be traversed and
forgotten - they became a place of interest with the discovery of the rich coal resources
of Appalachia. The people of the region were often all too willing to sell their land for
existing or speculative mineral value. Very quickly, outside companies obtained mineral
rights to lands in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky. These were available
at cheap prices as much of the land was unused and had little value for agriculture.
The beginnings of regional exploitation had arrived, in the sense that control of the
properties and mines was by outsiders with little concern for the general welfare
of the population or for the environments they were destroying to obtain fuel for
industrial America. It is small wonder that Appalachians felt maltreated by outsiders.
A list of offenders would include those who made much money mining a product
from the region, but took it out and invested little in Appalachia, those outsiders who
have a much higher standard of living because they burn cheap energy produced in
Appalachia, and those who continue to see the region as beset with pressing economic
and social problems, but steadfastly refuse to solve the root causes of the problems
identified by government reports and scholars during the 1930s and again in the 1960s.
These include high unemployment and underemployment (sometimes reaching 40
percent), acute rural poverty, dated industrial infrastructures, marginal agricultural
economies, low education levels and inferior quality schools, poor job skills, an aging
population, poor health standards, and inaccessibility to vital human services.

A FOREBODING LANDSCAPE
Americans in Appalachia found their own
ways to express the harsh and foreboding
mountain landscape in placenames which
reflected hardships: "Needmore", trials:
"Shooting Creek", or the eerie supernatural
atmosphere of the mountains: "Devil's Courthouse", "Talkin Rock", "Bone Valley".
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Before the Urals were tapped for resources, the Russian ferrous metals industry relied
on deposits of bog ores with low iron content. The deposits of the Urals were far
superior and were combined with an abundance of forests for burninig charcoal -- a
true technological paradise for ironworking of that day. In the 18th-19th centuries, the
technological advantages for the industry in the Urals clearly outweighed the locational
disadvantage of great distance from consuming areas. Even British industry at the time
of Industrial Revolution heavily relied on imported Uralian pig iron. The industrial
development of the Urals took place simultaneously with the militarization of Russia’s
economy that started with Peter the Great’s wars. By gearing Uralian industry to
military needs the centralized Russian state reforged the region’s mineral wealth into its
territorial acquisitions.
Yet for all its importance, the Old Mountains region has always been a loser with
respect to the interregional balance of national income. Both before and after the
revolution, it sent out more wealth than it took in, and the economic history of the
region is one of exploitation for the benefit of people from the outside. Industrial
magnates turned pig iron, gold, and precious stones into a means for satisfying their
own desires, regardless of the interests of the region: building mansions in St Petersburg
or buying castles in Europe. “Be grateful at last: turn your attention to this part of
the world which has adorned the whole world with the best amethysts on earth!”
passionately implored artist Denisov-Ural’skiy at the end of the 19th century, but in
vain. Repelled by the stone heart of the Urals, entrepreneurs who made their fortunes
in the region could hardly resist the temptation to become absentee-magnates.
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State intervention also revived the military role of the region. Many defense industries
were evacuated from the central regions of the country during the Second World War.
Just as in Peter the Great’s day, the Urals became the second echelon of defense for the
country, a line of “industrial trenches” running parallel to the German front. A third of
the country’s arms were produced here, including tanks (Nizhniy Tagil and

Coal mining remains the major industry in Appalachia. Kentucky, West Virginia,
and Pennsylvania still produce about 40 percent of the bituminous coal of the United
States. Other minerals mined in the region include limestone, feldspar, and oil. Coal
was discovered in Appalachia in the 18th century, but became important when the
industrial revolution started in earnest during the latter part of the last century and
steel industries required vast amounts of coal. Engineering and geology teams from
major steel companies in the Northeast ferreted out the sites of rich coal seams in
Appalachia. But coal is a cyclical industry: times of high industrial demand give way
to dips when unemployment rises. During hard times young and middle-aged miners
and their families may migrate to nearby Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Knoxville hoping
to find work. When the mines re-open, the workers often return home to work in the
mines once again.
The human face of coal mining is partly reflected in the story of coal miners and
their strikes and stoppages, sometimes violent and bloody. The story is also seen in
the places where miners lived, coal mining towns which had a familiar appearance:
rows of shotgun houses at the bottom of valleys (houses laid out straight from front
to back, where it is said you could fire a shotgun into the living room and the shell
would go through every room and out the back door), an occasional church (often of a
European ethnic group brought in to mine the coal), and the most ostentatious houses
of mine owners and officials on hillsides overlooking the settlement. Despite the early
unionization of miners that helped improve labor conditions and incomes, glaring
contrasts of wealth and poverty persist. An explosive example of class tensions in the
area can be seen in Harlan County, Kentucky; one of the richest in the United States in
terms of mineral profits, yet so poor in terms of per capita incomes that it went down
in history as “Bloody Harlan” of miners’ revolts in the 1930s.
Many a coal mining town is indeed dismal, depressing, and an unhealthy place to live.
Temperature inversions were not unusual in these valley settlements, and the dust
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Chelyabinsk), military transport equipment (Miass), and chemical weapons.
After the war, the region began to produce nuclear warheads (near Chelyabinsk)
and bacteriological weapons (Ekaterinburg). Far from the prying eyes of western
intelligence-gathering, the Urals became an area of absolute secrecy.
The Soviet galvanization of the nearly stiffened corpse of the antiquated industrial
region had considerably worsened the unattractive features of the Urals, that repelled
people even when the region was young. Mounds of tailings, unusable by-products
from mining, pockmarked the face of the region, the stagnant air of intermontane
basins filled with pollutants, and the shallow rivers lost the struggle to flush out
polluted water. Such then was the fate of the Urals - from lofty heights to the abysses
of worked out quarries; from the modest flames of early furnaces to the endless fire of
radioactivity. Ernst Neizvestniy, a Urals-born sculptor, has designed a monument in
Ekaterinburg to victims of the Stalin repression. It features two sobbing faces: Europe,
shedding tears in the direction of Asia, and Asia in turn crying for Europe. There is a
real grief in this heart of stone - this is the region that sacrificed itself at the altar of the
Motherland.
A Region Propped Up
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It would not be enough to say of the industrial Urals that it is merely an old region - it
is an area of downright antiques. With a mixture of historian’s pride and economist’s
sadness, guides will show a visitor industrial buildings constructed in the 18th century
that still perform their original function. In almost any settlement people remember
seeing the demolition of the last blast furnace or mechanical press built at the time
of the 18th century Demidov magnates. Uralian cities look like the untidy and
disorganized display cases of a regional museum of technology, where antedeluvial
factory buildings rub shoulders with industrial giants hastily built in the fever of the
pre-war years and scattered specimens from the piecemeal modernization of the post-

from the mines was in the air one breathed, in the food one grew and ate, in the clean
clothes one wore, and even inside the house. In the mines themselves, health and safety
problems lurked. Machinery was dangerous, roof supports were unstable, dynamiting
was reckless, and the all-pervasive coal stifled the lungs of workers through ten- and
twelve-hour shifts. It was not unusual to have explosions, roof support collapses,
and machinery accidents that resulted in loss of limbs. More silent were the deaths
attributed to those who worked forty or fifty years or more in the mines and developed
black lung disease. Those victims represent part of the social and health costs associated
with years of working to produce energy for the nation’s factories and utilities.
Equally as destructive as the toll of human life has been what the coal economies have
done to the environment. People welcomed early coal mining in Appalachia because
it provided a dependable source of income, certainly much more than timber industry
or eking out a survival existence from marginal and submarginal agricultural lands.
Mining was seen as beneficial, and jobs and environmental quality were considered
separately. Hillsides were being eaten away by huge machines, mountain tops were
being removed and flattened to provide easier access to minable seams of quality coal,
rivers and streams were turning ugly shades of yellows and browns, and the air was
unfit to breathe. Land reclamation is now required after strip mining, but accusations
of inefficient and half-hearted efforts still abound.
A Region Propped Up
The Old Mountains have been identified as a problem region far back in American
history, when even Abraham Lincoln called for economic assistance to Appalachia.
Numerous federal and state policies and programs have been implemented to try to end
some of these problems, but the issues seem to persist.
14

war period. The Old Mountains were never able to accumulate enough capital to afford
the luxury of rejuvenation. Big investment was directed there only during turning
points of history: Peter the Great’s perestroika of Russia in the early 18th century,
Russia’s European wars in the late 18th century, the war with Nazi Germany, and
later the peak of the Cold War. Investment was always limited to the barest minimum
necessary for immediate returns on capital, and was exclusively concentrated in the
material sphere of production.
If in the past the mountains tolerated the plunder of their seemingly endless
treasurehouse, now the steamshovels no longer dig into thick layers of minerals, but
scrape the very bones of the exposed mountain skeleton. When mining development
started, ores with about 66 percent iron content were worked, but now even 17percent
content ore is regarded as a lucky find. The metallurgical industry in the region is no
longer a link in the technological chain converting Asian raw materials into European
products.
The industrial structure of the Urals, with a preponderance of the obsolete smokestack
industry, will continue to handicap its future development. The conversion of military
industries has already dealt the region an extremely painful blow. This poorly planned
process cut to the quick the very foundations of the economy in many major cities.
There is little doubt that complete victory of the free-market economy in Russia
will again spell death for the Urals, already suffering from the shift of investment
from heavy industry to the consumer products sector. But the Urals is not an empty
backwater that could weather the storm by living on social security. Today, the region
ranks second only to the Core in terms of industrial output. The size of the region’s
population (about 13 million people) rules out a hands-off approach to its problems.
As in no other region, the future of the Uralian economy, which had been saved by
state intervention in the past, depends on the political course of the country.
15

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was created to resolve a host of rural problems in
the southern Appalachians. In May of 1933 the authority was established by federal law
“to improve navigation and provide flood control of the Tennessee River,” as well as to
deal with reforestation, encourage use of marginal lands, and help develop agriculture
and industry in the Tennessee Valley. The people of the area at the time had incomes
less than 45 percent of the national average. The 1940s was a big growth period for
the TVA as dam construction and electricity generation became the cornerstones of its
various projects. In 1933, only 3 percent of the farms in the valley had electric power;
by 1950, the number approached 80 percent.
The TVA, however, was a top-down project, a child of the Roosevelt era designed to
show what big government was capable of achieving. In a later attempt to improve the
region’s economy through more local approaches, the American government created
the Appalachian Regional Commission in the 1960s across the thirteen states that
contained portions of Appalachia. A host of programs were carried out with federal
and state cooperation. Local and civic groups benefitted from the almost $6 billion of
investment. Improved housing, job training, health services, transportation networks
(in the early years of the program most money went into roads), and educational
programs were but a few of the efforts to raise the region’s standard of living and quality
of life.
Government efforts to resolve the nagging human problems of Appalachia have met
with some successes. New schools, clinics, libraries, bridges, small town airports,
industrial parks and shopping centers represent part of the newly built landscape in the
region. Programs for job retraining, training local health professionals, small business
development, and environmental cleanup abound. These projects, small or large, visible
or invisible, are funded not only with government money, but also by churches, unions,
and philanthropic organizations, many of the same groups that invested in human
welfare last century. Volunteers from outside Appalachia continue to contribute time
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THEME 2: A CULTURE WALLED UP IN THE MOUNTAINS
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The pioneers who entered the mountains filled in the void left behind by more
enterprising migrants en route to Siberia. The oldest Russian inhabitants of the
mountains are Old Believers, who fled from governmental and Church persecution and
intolerance in European Russia and found in the narrow river valleys of the Urals their
burrow for hiding. Later, the population was largely formed from the ranks of “called
up” people: destitutes unable to control their own fate who surrendered themselves to
government agents recruiting for the factories of the Urals. The agents would “call up”
these unfortunate souls at the bazaars - volunteers, yes, but then locked into a kind of
industrial serfdom. The construction of factories in the Urals went hand-in-hand with
the importation of serf peasants and the use of free settlers, who were “attached” to
factories, fully dependent on the mining administration. This industrial serfdom was
accompanied by other forms of forced settlement: exile and imprisonment. The region
had no shortage of prisons, among them some of the best known in Russia: the Nizhniy
Tagil labor camp, designed for formerly high ranking state officials, and Perm Camp,
with the dubious distinction of being the most feared in the country. In the Soviet
period, new migration flows into the Urals followed the age-old model of the “called
up” people: contract laborers and the idealistic Komsomol youth, lured into sacrificing
their best years “building Communism” out in the hinterland. Thus the settling of the
Old Mountains took place in the passive mode: strong personalities with enough will to
act independently seemed to avoid the area. How vastly different this type of settlement
is from the pattern of the Russian Breadbasket steppes and even Siberia, where free
pioneer settlements preceded government efforts. While self-reliant personalities bravely
ventured into new frontiers, the more passive or outcasts allowed themselves to be
squeezed into the stony dungeons of the Urals’ canyons, mines, and sweatshops. If you
want to call someone a hick in Russia, you may say “What is it with you? Are you from
the Urals?”

and money to try and correct local problems. But in spite of these visible changes and
successes in alleviating pressing human problems, the region remains poor, worn out,
and neglected. Perhaps Appalachia has little political clout because it has few people
scattered in rural areas in a dozen states; in a predominantly urban nation, where most
voters live in cities, it is difficult to obtain federal and state funding and support for
problematic rural regions. The “neglected” and “bypassed” nature of the region two
hundred years ago still seems applicable today.
THEME 2: A CULTURE WALLED UP IN THE MOUNTAINS
The isolation of the people of the Old Mountains created a culture that became a
living museum of American traditions. But while people who know how to build a
wooden spinning wheel and construct a log cabin from scratch may still be found
here, the uniqueness of the culture came at the price of education levels lower than
national averages, poor access to ideas from the “outside,” and a kind of siege mentality
of regional pride. Jack Weller (who wrote about the region in Yesterday’s People:
Life in Contemporary Appalachia) noted that such characteristics as traditionalism,
independence, and fatalism seem to imbue the culture of the mountains.
It is little wonder that fatalism and fatalistic religions have support in coal-dependent
economies, as many a mining community has experienced the human toll of coal
mining; a walk through a local cemetery would show numbers who died the same
day, many at very early ages. The number of families without fathers and husbands in
mining towns shows the human tragedy of coal mining. The people of the region also
had good reason to fear the outside world. Although the outsiders brought in capital
to invest in the coal industry, they also took advantage of the local peoples’ lack of
sophistication to win mining rights cheaply. The federal government told them that
their stills, representing years of traditional conversion of corn to “white lightin’” were
suddenly illegal. The outsiders brought or lured in many miners. The immigration
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And as the children looked, the
man was no more; what had been
the upper part of his body turned
into an enormous head, and the
lower part, from the waist down,
became a neck...and the neck was a
snake's neck. And out of the earth
coiled the body of an enormous
snake, so large that the head reared
higher than the tallest trees of the
forest...Semyonich said to the
boys, 'That was Poloz the Great
Snake. He has all the gold in his
power. Wherever he goes, the gold
follows. He can go on the surface
of the earth or under it, whichever
he likes.'
~Pavel Bazhov, The Malachite
Casket: Tales from the Urals
(translation by Alan Moray Williams), Hutchinson & Co., Ltd.,
London, NY, Melbourne, Sydney, pp. 110-111 "The Great
Snake"
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Russians did not feel quite at home in the Urals, and they felt that hostile forces still
lurked in the land beneath their feet, as if they lived on the back of a huge, sleeping
dragon. Reptilian images were always associated with the Urals. Even in ancient
Russian folklore, the monster dragon “Zmey Gorynych” was thought to have his lair
in the Urals. (“Gorynych” in Russian can relate to both the terms “gora” for mountains
and “gorye” for grief ). The best-known writer of the Urals, Paul Bazhov, who drew
from local folklore, peopled his mountain tales with myriads of tiny gorynyches magical lizards who formed the retinue of the Queen of Copper Mountain (the most
purely Uralian personage of Russian literature). Many young gem-seekers were lured by
the cruel flirtation of this ice queen of the mountain and driven to death.
Warmth seeped out of the people held in the stony embrace of the Urals, until even
their souls seemed cold as the stone. The folk tales of the Urals shock the reader who
has been steeped in the tradition of mainstream Russian folklore. What is jarring is
the blurred lines between good and evil and the sense that people’s lives are controlled
by fatal and heartless forces. Another tragic theme, forming common threads in many
Uralian tales, is the deficit of inspiration. “Worn out” is the regional dialect term best
describing the physical and moral condition of workers in leading industries of the area.
Nationally-significant culture could not have bloomed from the cold stone of the
Urals. Throughout their history, the Ural Mountains have not given Russian culture a
single passionate poet, deep thinker, painter or composer of national fame; it did not
nurture great examples of monastic ascetism or saintliness. Instead, it generated a whole
constellation of technicians and inventors, representatives of professions demanding
cold, calculating, reasoning minds. The Urals were home to innovators in various
branches of technology: railroad builders, the inventor of the Russian steam engine, the
inventor of radio, and the mastermind of Soviet nuclear programs (Kurchatov). Even
the better known cultural figures of the region, who seem to have overcome the tenets
of pragmatism, find the dubious titles “Uralian writer” or “Uralian artist” hanging over

histories of the 1880s and thereafter reveal large numbers from central and eastern
Europe who were enticed to America to work in coal mines. Some African Americans
were also brought into coal mines, for example, in southeastern Kentucky.
For Americans who do not know the region well, its image is mostly negative as they
associate the area with prolonged poverty, acute social problems, problems with the
law, and a hostility to strangers born of historical isolation from events on the more
dynamic east coast and Middle West. Popular television programs poking fun at
Appalachians (“Beverly Hillbillies”) have contributed to the stereotypes, which survived
in part because of the “bypassed” nature of the region. But to the insider of the Old
Mountains, isolation and inaccessibility represent a positive part of their heritage. The
same streak of self-reliance that led their ancestors to tackle the harsh environment of
the hills may have created a certain shyness and conscious withdrawal from exterior
influences. It was almost as if the region became an island surrounded by seas that were
constantly experiencing changes.
The mountain people were devising their own ways to entertain, to express themselves,
and to survive in a harsh environment. Isolation helped preserve the cultural traditions.
Balladeers traveled the mountains and celebrated folk stories in song. Dulcimers,
banjos, and fiddles were made of locally available materials such as oak, creating fine
instruments which may survive to this day. Many of the country’s major musical
developments of this century, from blues to country to jazz, had southern origins.
Country music emerged mostly from the southern Appalachian highlands but has
become perhaps the standard music of the South and, increasingly, of the entire
country. Since the 1920s, radio dispersed the knowledge of Appalachian music outside
the region, introduced the term “mountain barndance” into the American vocabulary,
and publicized the songs, humor, and dialogue associated with the region. Many well
known Country and Bluegrass musicians can trace their personal roots and origins of
their music to the region, especially to the central and southern Appalachians.

"...there came a big old giant steppin' right up the mountain. Had him
a pipe about four foot long, and he
had a long blue beard that dragged
on the ground. When Will saw
the old giant was headed right for
the house, he ran and got behind
the door, pulled it back on him and
scrouged back against the wall ashakin' like a leaf...Old Fire Dragaman came on up, eat ever'thing
there was on the table, sopped the
plates, and licked out all the pots.
Lit his old pipe and pulled down
the holler, the black smoke a-rollin'
like comin' out a chimley. Hit was a
sight to look at."
~Richard Chase, ed., The Jack
Tales, Houghton Mifflin Co.,
Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1943,
pp. 107-108 "Old Fire Dragaman"
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their heads. These labels implicitly deny them the “All-Russian-ness” of full-fledged
national fame. Whereas the focus of truly Russian writers has always been on the
eternal Faustian dilemmas of humanity, those in the Urals were more parochial,
limiting their work to purely regional topics such as the daily life of factories, the
folklore of prospectors, or descriptions of mountain landscapes. Only in sculpture did
artists of the Urals breach the confines of purely regional fame and achieve renown all
over Russia, perhaps inspired by the three-dimensionality of the mountains.
The Old Mountains has always been a region out of sync with time and surrounding
space: a mountain barrier between Europe and Asia which was really no barrier at all,
a forgotten place jumped over by voluntary settlers, but later populated by people not
wanted elsewhere, a place impoverished despite its own riches, looking only inward-still
held captive by the monster Gorynych, but safe in the isolation of its mountain box.

Popular forms of entertainment even among early settlers were music and story
telling, both of which required little or no formal schooling. Legends and ghost stories
were spun in the tradition of the Scots-Irish; this was not only a way for parents and
grandparents to convey personal and family histories, but also to regale children. It
has only been during the past several decades that these so-called “jack tales,” often
humorous stories about politicians, lawyers, and favorite town drunkards, have
been collected from older generations. Valuable information has been gathered in
recent years through a project known as “Foxfire,” founded by Elliot Wigginton,
a school teacher in northern Georgia. He started a magazine with his students in
the 1960s which encouraged them to mine the hills, but not for coal this time: the
children interviewed members of their community and tapped into a treasure-trove
of information on local culture: stories, instructions on cooking wild plants, and
building log cabins, and a wealth of crafts from the Old Mountains. The Appalachian
region has long been associated with “home made” items, be they pottery, tables,
chairs, music instruments, dolls, toys, or quilts. Today, members of a new generation
of Appalachian craftspeople have arisen, often living in artisans’ communities (such as
Berea, Kentucky), and traveling to a series of crafts and antique fairs and exhibitions
throughout America. The crafts industry thus represents a mix of “old and new”
Appalachia. And while not employing large numbers of employees or generating huge
sums of income for the region, these low-technology ventures are an integral part of the
Appalachian cultural landscape.
Tradition is an appropriate term to describe the peoples of Appalachia. It is not difficult
to understand the strong sense of pride and identity the residents have to their region,
nor to understand why many people believe that the region has changed little for the
better in recent decades.

21

22

1

THE TROPICAL SOUTH
Raymond Krishchyunas

THE TROPICAL SOUTH
Wilbur Zelinsky

Flying into the seaside city of Batumi from Moscow in January may be
a shock. With ice-bound Moscow only two hours behind, disembarking
passengers are enveloped with warm air and a sea of greenery that seem
to defy winter. The road to town runs past plantations of fragrant tangerine
trees laden with bright orange fruit. Sprawling two-story private houses
with surrounding verandas, grand staircases, and fancy cast iron gates sit
amidst orchards and flower gardens. For a visitor from Russia these are real
villas. The streets are jammed with disorderly hosts of private cars and lined
with stately and exotic trees.

What a difference a few centuries can make or the vagaries of weather! If
the wind had shifted just a bit in direction in October 1492, Mr. Columbus
might well have waded ashore somewhere near Daytona Beach instead
of onto one of the least impressive isles in the Bahamas. Such a brush
with the North American continent would not have been too encouraging
for someone with the mercenary appetites of the Great Navigator. Beyond
a coastline blocked by a succession of sandbars and having virtually no
decent natural harbors, he would have seen endlessly flat, steamy, mucky
terrain of questionable fertility and few resources.

It is off-season, and crowds milling in the streets and city bazaars
are blessedly free of tourists. The colorful look and sound of the
people instantly evoke the image of cosmopolitan ports of the eastern
Mediterranean: Here Georgians, Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and Turks all
mix together. Even a newcomer unable to distinguish between most nonEuropean peoples will soon notice that many Georgians speak Georgian
curiously intermingled with Russian words, and many who speak Georgian
are not of dark Mediterranean complexion, but blue-eyed redheads native Muslim Adzharians from the mountains towering above the city.
Wearing skullcaps and fingering amber prayer beads, old Adzharians linger
in smoke-filled coffee houses that cluster in the port area amidst quaint
blocks of turn-of-the century modern art townhouse, relics of Batumi’s
glorious past as a booming free port.

Yet five hundred years later, nowhere else in the world is there anything like
the seemingly endless East Florida conurbation, a narrow, uninterrupted
strip of grandiose urban tissue reaching all the way from Miami’s southern
suburbs northward to Jacksonville for a distance of nearly 400 miles.
Where Federal or state regulations or the physical limitations of the
coastal zone do not discourage it, the same sort of hodgepodge of hotels,
condominiums, resorts, marinas, fast food outlets, shopping centers,
and parking lots that make up the modern American city seems to be
materializing along Florida’s west coast.
The transformation of peninsular Florida and so much of the Gulf Coast
in the 20th Century has been amazing, a Cinderella story verging upon a
geographic miracle.
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FROM BACKWATER TO NOUVEAUX RICHES

A LATE BLOOMER

For the most part the Tropical South consists of a narrow strip of the coast squeezed
between the sea and the mountains. Though tiny on the map, the region can
rightfully boast of an ancient history and a role far out of proportion to its small
area. Almost completely enclosed, the Black Sea is in many ways an appendage and a
smaller version of the Mediterranean. Since the seventh century B.C., Greek colonies
dotted the shores of the Pontus Ekvsinos - the Hospitable Sea - making the straits of
Bosporus and Daradanelles one of the world’s busiest waterways. The Mediterranean
connection was maintained as the coasts became part of consecutive empires focused on
Constantinople: Roman, Byzantine, and finally, Ottoman. All of them embraced the
Black Sea with two narrow arms of coastal footholds. Until a century or two ago, the
political and ethnic history of this coastal ring was quite separate from the hinterland,
making it a beachhead of the Mediterranean-Balkan realm. Under Ottoman rule, the
coasts were strongly Islamized and faced off against Christian Georgia and Russia.
In the words of the famous Prince Potyomkin, Crimea was “a wart on Russia’s nose.”
The Hospitable sea of the Greeks was the ominously Black sea of Muslim threat for
the Russians. The Islamic beachhead proved to be precarious, though, as Russia took
over the coasts in late 18th to early 19th century, turning the region that had been the
periphery of Mediterranean empires into the “South” from a Russian perspective.

For a surprisingly long time, Florida remained one of the orphan regions of the
Western World. Even in 1892, anyone surveying the area would have noted remarkably
little change from the time of Columbus, especially in comparison with the rest of the
bustling republic farther north. The Gulf Coast fared somewhat better. Control of the
mouth of the immense Mississippi, and thus of the wealth and commerce of its vast
drainage basin, excited interest among the French in the early 1700s, the Spanish a
little later, and subsequently the Anglos. From its earliest days, New Orleans became a
prize worth jousting over.

And yet, the region until the twentieth century was a sleepy and nearly unpopulated
backwater. Surrounding states were uninterested in the Black Sea except in terms of
strategic value. The accounts of travelers who moved through western Georgia a mere
hundred years ago speak of the unimaginable poverty and primitive lifestyle of the
peasants: in a sense, the tradition of slavery continued in Western Georgia until 1912.

5

In an amazing turn of fortune, the region that in the past epitomized poverty has been
miraculously transformed in modern times. Dense forests and swamps with a scattering

Lacking any hinterland worth bothering about, coastal Florida was neglected; aside
from a token, poorly provisioned garrison at St. Augustine, a few small, ineffective
coastal and inland church missions, and a scattering of place names, the Spanish
impress was negligible. The only perceived value was geopolitical: as a staging area for
naval and military efforts to keep marauders out of West Indian waters, the source
of so much European wealth, the region where all the real action was taking place.
Simply because of its location, the French and British intermittently challenged Spanish
sovereignty over Florida, and when the United States finally scooped up the state from
an enfeebled Spain around 1819, the transaction was almost absentminded and stirred
little political interest among the American populace. Furthermore, over the next
several decades settlement and development remained minimal in the southern two
thirds of the state. During the same period, the only notable growth in activity along
the Gulf Coast was in New Orleans and a few other port towns. Elsewhere, populations
were sparse and economic enterprise was stunted and desultory. As for the indigenous
inhabitants, which probably numbered in the hundreds of thousands, most had
perished during the first century of direct and indirect contact with Europeans, chiefly
because of susceptibility to Old World diseases.
6

of cornfields have given way to vineyards, citrus and tea gardens, and huge sprawling
villages of two or three storied private houses. Cars replaced the recently ubiquitous
water buffalos; and in the rate of private car ownership, the coastal strip from Crimea to
Georgia ranked at the top during the Soviet period. Waterfronts have been transformed
into almost uninterrupted lines of resorts. The children and grandchildren of poor
docile peasants now ostentatiously display their wealth in the expensive restaurants of
Moscow or Petersburg inaccessible to most Russians. Ironically, the Russians, who have
good reason to believe that much of this prosperity is at their expense, still perceive
the region through a distorting veil. The condescending romanticization of colorful
(“Italian”) southern poverty has been replaced with envious admiration of the region’s
loud prosperity. The dramatic about-face in the prosperity of the Tropical South came
about through social and economic changes that occurred in what might be called the
Soviet Frost Belt (which pretty much coincided with all of Russia). Improved standards
of living in the North resulted in a greater appreciation of leisure and “tropical”
amenities, creating a uniquely Soviet variety of Sunbelt. The environment closest to
tropical could be found along the rim of the Black Sea, and what the region lacked in
genuine “tropicalness” could be added by manipulating popular perception.
Tropiki
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Strictly speaking, the “Tropical” South is really only subtropical, but even that is
amazing so far to the north. In fact, the region embraces the world’s northernmost
point of subtropical climate. Moldova lies at the same latitude as Newfoundland, and
Batumi (in the southernmost extremity of the region) corresponds to New York City,
though its climate is that of northern Florida. This anomaly is due to the protective
mountain wall which screens the coastal rim from invasions of cold air. The Greater
Caucasus Range and the Crimean mountains provide a sharp divide between the
Tropical South and the steppes of the Breadbasket with their harsh winters. Weather
forecasts and tourist brochures always treat the region as a separate entity, calling it

Other factors account for the prolonged somnolence of the American Tropical South:
until the 20th Century, such places were not readily accessible nor environmentally
appealing to Europeans who tended to gravitate to habitats that were reasonably
homelike, and the Tropical South was emphatically not like Europe. Even the
Spaniards, who did colonize various tracts within the American low latitudes, kept
to the temperate uplands and shunned the hot and wet coastal plains. Americans
considered southern Florida to be a wild and dangerous place, definitely not worth
visiting, much less living in. At the time of Census of 1830, Florida ranked 25th
among the 27 states and territories, having only 34,730 inhabitants, and nearly all of
them living outside our region within the northern quarter of the state, an area that, in
terms of economy and culture, was little more than an extension of Georgia. Even as
late as 1876, the entire voting population of what are now Dade, Broward, and Palm
Beach counties was only 73. In an incredible change, the statewide population tally
for Florida by 1990 had reached 12,938,000, a figure surpassed only by California,
New York, and Texas; and the great bulk of these people were located in the peninsular
section of the state.
How did this neglected region achieve such an amazing transformation in popularity?
Miami, Orlando, Tampa St. Petersburg, and New Orleans have experienced a localized
expression of much broader trends operating among highly advanced modern societies
everywhere: millions of middle-class people now enjoy a surplus of leisure time. But
also relevant is what might be called the Tropicalization of American Life. For most
persons, the summer season has become the emotional climax of the year. And, of
course, the best way to accommodate the lure of the tropics is to move southward for a
few days - or better yet, for a lifetime.
Tropic-ana
Climate is a key consideration in explaining the metamorphosis of the Tropical South.
Year round warmth and abundant sunshine have been powerful enticements for
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At Oreanda they sat on a seat not
far from the church, looked down at
the sea, and were silent. Yalta was
hardly visible through the morning
mist; white clouds stood motionless
on the mountain-tops. The leaves
did not stir on the trees, grasshoppers chirruped, and the monotonous hollow sound of the sea rising
up from below, spoke of the peace,
of the eternal sleep awaiting us.
So it must have sounded when
there was no Yalta, no Oreanda
here.
~ Anton Chekhov, "The Lady
With The Dog", translation by
Constance Garnett, the Ecco
Press, p. 12

9

“The Black Sea Coast of Crimea and Caucasus.” The part of the region that fits closest
to the stereotypical images of the tropics, is Adzharia, a small area blessed with a
second line of mountain defenses against northern air. The Lesser Caucasus Mountains
trap moisture-laden winds coming over the Black Sea, showering Batumi with well
over 80 inches of rain per year. Such a greenhouse climate gives this unique area lush
flora resembling southern Japan or China. From Adzharia, the zone of humid climate
continues into the triangle of the once nearly impassable and desolate swamps of
Colchida, and these are the only parts of the former USSR where the cultivation of
such “exotic” crops as tea and citrus fruits was possible. From Abkhazia to the Crimea,
the climate is much drier, and the landscapes with their Italian pines, cypress trees, and
dry-leafed bushes evoke images of the French Riviera and Italy, while the major crops
are grapes and tobacco.
The subtropics are a rather conjured-up tropics. Although all of the region has January
temperatures above the freezing point, on occasion winter frosts are strong enough to
harm citrus trees. Snow occurs almost every year, though it seldom lasts for more than
a few days. More importantly, the Tropical South is a bit contrived with respect to its
image. No other region of the USSR had a portrait that was so recently and consciously
manufactured by agents ranging from Russian literature to Soviet media and
mass-culture.
In earlier days, the “tropiki” had been ignored: Russian nobility’s quest for the exotic
was satisfied by trips to the Mediterranean, and Russian writers’ thirst for the romantic
was quenched by the mountains of the Caucasus, where gallant montagnards resisted
the Empire for nearly a century. Only in the 20th century did the growing middle
class of capitalist Russia discover the Black Sea as an affordable Russian Mediterranean.
Villas, health resorts (sanitoriums), and hotels for sun-deprived Petersburgians began to
dot the coast. A new infatuation by Russian writers with the romantic South began to
focus on the sea. Later the group of early Soviet writers hailing from Odessa portrayed

Americans. But warmth is only a relative thing in a region for which the term “tropical”
is something of a misnomer. True enough, the mean daily maximum temperature may
range near or above 90oF in the summer over virtually the entire region and is in the
neighborhood of 70oF in January. On the other hand, there is no mountain barrier
between the Canadian Arctic and the Gulf of Mexico to block the bursts of intensely
refrigerated winter air masses that do occasionally invade the region.
Consequently, killing frosts occur along the entirety of the Gulf Coast in many winters,
and every few years all of Florida as far south as Miami endures freezing weather.
This phenomenon is no small matter for a region that banks on the influx of visitors
during the cold months, where central heating is almost unknown, and so much of
the agricultural economy depends on frost sensitive crops such as citrus, tomatoes, and
sugar cane. Even the very warmth that draws people can also cause problems. Relative
humidity is often so high as to cause “super tropical” discomfort.
If this is a relatively warm corner of the North American continent, it is even more
emphatically one of its moistest, with mean annual precipitation up to 60 inches per
year. It would seem that drought could not be an issue, but serious rainfall deficits may
occur over periods of several months in just about any portion of the region; and in
recent times, drought has been particularly troublesome in southern Florida. Such dry
spells have meant near disaster for aquatic and other wildlife as well as for farmers and
municipal water supplies. On the other hand, numerous floods have punctuated the
history of the region, especially along the Gulf.
To add to this meteorological stew, the Tropical South experiences the most
thunderstorms of anyplace in North America, more than 100 days of such showers
in an average year in southern Florida. With alarming frequency, settlements and
farmlands have been inundated in southern Louisiana, Texas, and Alabama. The
situation is particularly worrisome along the lower Mississippi, and it has been only

Her mind had bound me round. The
palms were hot
As if I lived in ashen ground, as if
The leaves in which the wind kept up its
sound
From my North of cold whistled in a
sepulchral South,
Her South of pine and coral and coraline
sea,
Her home, not mine, in the ever-freshened
Keys,
Her days, her oceanic nights, calling
For music, for whispering from the reefs.
~ Wallace Stevens, "Farewell to Florida",
collected poems 1955 from Ideas of
Order
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the Black Sea as an invented world of romanticized tropics, with bright colors and
noble characters with strong passions. This conscious desire to find a bright makebelieve world amidst bleak Soviet realities explains much of the willing self-deception
about the “Russian Tropics.”
Under Stalin, an ethnic Georgian, the image of the Tropical South was particularly
enhanced by official propaganda keen to accommodate the dictator’s tastes. In
Soviet “factory of dreams” movies, the region became the locale for the “all-union
health station” (offered as a boon to the best workers) and the land of romance and
chivalry. Some former dachas of the nobility were indeed turned into sanatoriums and
resthouses for the workers, but more importantly, Stalin added to the old royal villas in
the Crimea a whole network of dachas for the new communist rulers of the country,
and the region continued to be a playground for the elite.
By the 1960s, the mythological foundations were laid and the stage was set for the real
opening of the Tropical South, which occurred with major changes in post-Stalinist
Soviet society. Considerably improved standards of living produced a new urban middle
class of educated professionals who valued leisure and were eager to fulfill the socially
prestigious aspirations earlier denied to everybody but the elite. The floodgates opened,
and the avalanche of tourists and vacationers quickly followed.
The Tangerine Invasion Of Moscow
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The integration of the Tropical South into the Russian mainstream fully transformed
the region’s agriculture. Even before the revolution, the first tea gardens were laid out
around Batumi, and the famous Botanical Gardens were established north of the town
to promote acclimatization of citrus trees, avocados, and other tropical species or fruit
trees or medicinal plants. The pressure to develop “tropical” agriculture grew with the
Soviet economic policy of self-sufficiency, and the scheme was overall a success. The
region largely met domestic demand for tea and tobacco, but transport constraints long

after herculean exploits and vast expense that the U.S. Corps of Engineers has been able
to safeguard New Orleans and other riverside towns from calamity. Another distinctive
regional weather characteristic is a most unhappy one - tropical hurricanes. During the
summer and autumn of almost any year, at least one of these potentially devastating
storms sweeps in from the lower latitudes of the Atlantic Ocean to lash the Gulf or
South Atlantic coast. It is not only the ferociously destructive winds that make these
visitors so unwelcome. The accompanying vast surges of sea water that can rush over
low lying coastal tracts may cause even greater havoc. As construction and population
buildup continues at a merry pace (especially in Florida) in close proximity to the
shore, it is all too likely that the worst of hurricane disasters is still to come on that
fateful day when a storm of exceptional viciousness hits a densely settled area lacking
adequate evacuation plans or facilities. Something close to such an ultimate disaster
came to pass in 1992, when Hurricane Andrew laid waste to much of Miami’s southern
periphery.
How did this bundle of atmospheric contradictions come to attract one of the biggest
population flows in recent history? Perhaps the answer lies within the realm of social
psychology. During the past several decades, there has been a remarkable shift in our
collective and individual mind sets. Work has become little more than the prelude
to play, so that many of us spend our hours in shop or office daydreaming about
weekends, vacations, or retirement. Everywhere one turns it seems that hedonism is
rearing its lovely head, and the doctrines of pleasure and fun have begun to mold our
destinies. What has emerged is a type of social Tropic-ana, born out of the key role that
the advertising industry played in forging the region’s image: not too coincidentally,
advertising came of age at the same time that modern Florida did.
Taking Over The American Breakfast Table
As it happens, a desire to enjoy the country’s very own tropics has been mated with
technologically enhanced opportunity, especially in terms of accessibility. Although
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impeded the production of citrus fruits. Although the coastal railway to Georgia
was finally completed in the 1920s, the transport of perishable fruits was impossible
without then-scarce refrigerated boxcars. As a result, never easily obtainable tangerines
and oranges (the only fresh fruits available to Russia in winter) acquired the prestige of
rare delicacies.
Citrus fruit revolutionized the agricultural scene in the 1960s. While the Frost Belt
was discovering Tropical South through exploding tourism, the natives of the Tropical
South were discovering the bonanza of northern markets, which the inefficient state
sector could never satiate with products of the “Lush South.” The belated spread of
affordable air transport and private autos put the European regions of the USSR within
easy reach of the Tropical South for the first time. Meanwhile, the increasingly laissezfaire Soviet regime was relaxing its vigilant control over local affairs. All of these factors
explain the rapid expansion of private (rather than collectivized) agriculture and the
eventual triumph of the shadow economy in the region.
The private plots of collective farmers were rapidly converted into intensively cultivated
citrus orchards, flower, and early vegetable gardens, while production in the collective
sector was neglected. In the balance, “tropical” produce was kept below demand with
monopolistically high prices. Private farming became an extremely lucrative activity,
open only to the native rural population. Ironically, it could be such a source of wealth
only within the Soviet socialist economy, where a closed domestic market ruled out
foreign competition, laws prevented outsiders from buying land in the Tropical South,
and the absence of free market prices and realistic taxation boosted the profits made on
exotic crops. A shipment of tangerines or flowers delivered to Moscow or Donetsk in
the midst of winter could command almost any price, and little wonder that an average
annual crop of tangerines from a family lot in Adzharia produced a household income
50 to 100 times higher than a private plot of equal area in European Russia.
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most of the Gulf Coast had been approachable by ship or rail by the mid 19th
Century, nearly all of peninsular Florida lay beyond the reach of any but the most
fanatic of travelers until the 1890s. Shrewdly anticipating the eventual economic and
demographic payoff of the region, Henry M. Plant plunged into the wilderness and
began to develop a rail system into southwest Florida, while Henry M. Flagler extended
his Florida East Coast Railway into Palm Beach by 1893 and Miami by 1896. Modern
Florida had been born. People could come in; oranges could go out, both in great
volume and at reasonable cost.
As the years passed, Florida’s rail network grew, and the transformation of the
environment set in with it. With the availability of power machinery for earth-moving,
much of the shoreline of the region has undergone radical change as urban developers
have filled in or reshaped wetlands to create new waterfront lots. Inland, there has been
the inevitable suburbanization and sprawl of such metropolises as Orlando, Winter
Haven, and Lakeland, despite problems in drainage. Wetlands were also transformed
into prime orchards and vegetable gardens, and specialized agriculture and horticulture
created a family resemblance between the economies of the Gulf and Florida sections
of the Tropical South. Their climates enable them to grow a variety of tropical and
subtropical fruits, vegetables, and ornamental plants not otherwise available cheaply in
the eastern United States and to penetrate northern markets with fresh produce all year.
Thus Florida and Gulf coast growers find it profitable to rush the first lettuce, green
peppers, corn, and tomatoes of the season northward every spring while the Midwest
and Northeast are still frost bound; and, similarly, mid latitude consumers will pay
premium prices for the earliest cantaloupes and watermelons of the year. Here is also
the only part of the United States outside Hawaii where sugar cane can be grown and
harvested, though at considerable risk of frost every few years. The development of
frozen juice concentrate in the 1940s allowed the Tropical South to surpass California
in output of oranges, tangerines, and grapefruit; and few people in America can
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Such easy wealth in agriculture set off a chain reaction throughout the economy as a
whole. The great inflow of money into Georgia pushed up demand and black market
prices for consumer goods that could not be produced by weak local industry, thus
luring many people into profitable speculative trade. Merchandise purchased at fixed
low prices in state shops in cities “up north” was taken south to be resold at several
times the original price. Thus, overpriced agricultural produce from the “shadow”
private sector went North, just as state-subsidized consumer goods from the north
traveled south, creating immense profits in both directions; and in a uniquely Soviet
reversal of scenarios common elsewhere, the agricultural South in fact benefitted at the
expense of the developed North.

sit down to their breakfast juice today without feeling the influence of the region.
Despite these successes, two principal problems for the area’s agriculture remain:
the recruitment of a transient labor force from domestic and foreign sources and
increasingly effective competition from Mexico and the West Indies. But in the case of
at least one major (though climatically marginal) crop in Louisiana and Florida sugar
cane governmental support has come to the rescue in the form of subsidies and quotas
on foreign imports.

THEME 1: THE SUN-AND-SIN ECONOMY

Probably more than any other state, Florida has benefitted from the building of the
Interstate Highway System from the mid 1950s onward. It has brought this subtropical
wonderland within one or two day driving time for a considerable majority of
Americans. By the thousands and hundreds of thousands they came: the permanently
transplanted, the tourists, conventioneers, snowbirds, retirees, refugees, migrant
workers, and college students on their spring break, all in search of their version of
the latterday American Dream. During every single decade since 1900 (with the
exception of the 1910s and 1930s, with World War I and the Great Depression), the
total population of the state has grown by at least 30 percent and in the 1950s at the
astonishing rate of 78.7 percent. The peninsular segment of Florida claimed the lion’s
share of the increment, with a demographic explosion taking place largely in the major
cities. Smaller urban centers also welcomed their share of the new arrivals, as did much
of the nominally rural countryside. To a degree probably unmatched elsewhere in
North America, this region holds many scattered residential developments seemingly in
the middle of nowhere. Much of the western component of the Tropical South has not
been able to match southern Florida’s feverish growth pattern, a fact that raises some
provocative questions. The Mobile and Baton Rouge metropolitan areas have registered

Manufacturing A Sunbelt
Over half of all Soviets who left their immediate home areas for vacation went to
the Black Sea coasts. Moreover, most of them crowded into the central stretch, from
the southern tip of the Crimea roughly to Sukhumi, which over the years became
something of a linear recreational metropolis. The names of Yalta, Sochi, or Gagra were
known to every Soviet as resorts symbolizing middle class prestige.
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The developed resort strip is very narrow and even frequently interrupted by mountain
spurs falling abruptly into the sea. The mountains prevent physical expansion into
the hinterland, putting demand pressure on existing facilities and creating an overall
impression of severe crowding. Yet such overpopulated built-up areas are interspersed
with undeveloped stretches of the coast or populous villages. The curious combination
of densely packed resorts and generally extensive land use could only be possible in
the absence of a true market for land. Health resorts were operated like any socialist
enterprise, in a strictly planned and “organized” way. There were no readily available

THEME 1: THE SUN-AND-SIN ECONOMY
Populating A Sunbelt
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drop-in motels or hotels on the coast. Reservations for state-operated resorts were at
a premium and normally obtained through one’s trade union, frequently involving
several years’ wait for a turn to go to a more desirable location. As a result, skyrocketing
numbers of so-called “wild” visitors rented a room or even just a bunk in a private
residence. The incredible congestion of cheaper accommodations and prohibitive prices
for better ones explained the high seasonal incomes of those who were lucky enough
to be permanent local residents. Always tolerated, this was a rare sphere of officially
allowed private enterprise in the USSR. Not surprisingly, since 1897 the pull of the sun
and lucrative occupations produced a more than seven-fold increase in the population
of the “resort” segment of the coast, making it the fastest-growing region of the former
Soviet Union.
In contrast to the resort economy of the Crimean and Russian parts of the Tropical
South, it was more lucrative to spend solar energy in Georgia on plants than on human
sunbathers. Western Georgia is an endless village that sprawls along all major roads
and blankets hillsides. While the line between urban and rural was so sharp in most of
the former USSR, it was blurred in Georgia, which remains an essentially rural society
with urban population barely exceeding half of the total. The towns are for the most
part local commercial and food industry centers, and even in cities much of the income
comes from the countryside: either through family channels or by exploiting positions
of power.
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The lackluster performance of the official economy of Georgia stands in stark contrast
to its visible prosperity. If one excludes the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia (which ranked first in the USSR in both well-being and economic
performance), then Georgia emerged first in the rate of private car ownership, but only
seventh in terms of national product per capita. This discrepancy is eloquent proof
of the pre-eminence of “shadow” sources of wealth in a generally underdeveloped
economy. According to 1980s data, Georgia, endowed as it was with the best

only slight gains, the population of Greater New Orleans seems to be at a standstill,
and several counties located between southeast Texas and the Florida Alabama line
along the Gulf Coast suffered population decline over the same period. What is the
explanation for these two quite different trajectories of growth?
Part of the answer lies in the contrasting situations of the two areas at the start of
the boom period. Peninsular Florida was almost a clean slate, especially after the
elimination of much of the indigenous population. In contrast, the Gulf Coast was
already rather well developed; in particular, the banks of the lower Mississippi were
taken up by all manner of economic enterprises, and a well entrenched population had
preempted all the relatively dry or accessible portions of the bayou country within the
Delta. Expansion of the venerable, regionally dominant metropolis of New Orleans,
which had consistently ranked among the top half dozen cities of antebellum America,
was becoming problematic. In part this has been a matter of the sheer physical
constraints of a difficult site, but at a more fundamental level the city is afflicted by the
same syndrome of social ills bedeviling the older metropolises of the so called Rust Belt.
The Texas and Louisiana portions of the region are abundantly endowed with
petroleum and natural gas both on land and under water and also blessed with some
of the world’s richest reserves of salt and sulfur. The mineral wealth of the Gulf Coast
makes it much more heavily industrialized in the conventional sense than is Florida,
but Florida is well ahead in attracting the newer high tech and information based
industries thanks to the siren call of amenities the living conditions that enable the area
to bid successfully for skilled technicians, professionals, managers, and executives. As a
region so largely devoted to the production and sale of pleasure, the Tropical South is
peculiarly sensitive to the crests and troughs in the national and international economy.
Overbuilding and excessive expansion followed by temporary collapse has become a
familiar cycle. But even more troublesome is the fact that here there is a zone poised
between the wealth and glitter of the United States and the poverty of more than a
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agricultural lands in the former USSR, ranked only seventh in the value of agricultural
product per unit of sown area. Such dismal performance of the state sector stemmed
from its degradation into little more than a smokescreen for lucrative underground or
“second economy” activities. Carefully cultivated private lots stand in striking contrast
to the deplorable state of collective farm fields.
If the Soviet Sunbelt is measured in terms of in-migration or economic power, it would
appear to be a failure. Its population has barely reached 5 million (6 million with
Odessa) and market reforms now mean that the polluted beaches and expensive fruits
of the region will face competition from Bulgaria and the Mediterranean. The palatial
houses of the village nouveaux-riches are a facade, with their tasteless decorations trying
to imitate marble but still unmistakably stucco. The whole prosperity of the region was
based on using the anomalies of the Soviet system. Without this system, each grand
villa of the Tropical South may prove to be only a house of cards.
Playing the Black Market
Many people are taken in by the gaudy displays and believe that Georgia’s prosperity is
due to an entrepreneurial streak in its population, but reality suggests otherwise. Rather
than modernizing the region and helping to develop the western-style work ethic, the
massive infusion of unearned wealth into rural areas helped to preserve or revive many
traditionalist cultural codes of society, including the leisurely attitudes of a oncenumerous petty gentry. The stress on ritual display of goods, on the expenditure of
huge sums on elaborate feasts with show-off hospitality and on expensively decorated
cemetery plots only reinforces the desperate quest for wealth.
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The question of whether to consider the shadow economy of the Tropical South
(especially Georgia) as criminal is highly ambiguous. It certainly seemed illegal from
the viewpoint of Frost Belt populations who felt exploited; for the local population it

dozen countries just over the horizon. The moral and material tensions between the two
worlds are stark and insistent.
Smugglers’ Coves
One of the basic facts of international life is that there is inevitably a lively illegal trade
in all sorts of things wherever two countries at very different levels of development
are within striking distance of each other. Nowhere in the developed world is there
stronger proof of this axiom than in the American Tropical South. It may be impossible
to determine precisely the volume of contraband being smuggled, but the indirect
evidence is convincing enough. It is likely that the flow of illegal aliens and goods into
Louisiana, Florida, and other parts of the region had materialized as early as the 1800’s.
The authorities have always been hard put to patrol so long a coastline with its myriad
coves and beaches, and it was especially difficult back when so much of the region was
thinly settled. But the action became really hot and heavy during the Prohibition Era
(1920 1933), when parched Americans were eager customers for the bottled goods
carried by rum runners in speedboats and other vessels from the Bahamas, Cuba, and
other points.
If this illegal trade has become much more diversified of late, one category of freight
strongly dominates the scene: narcotics. This commerce, only a small fraction of which
is intercepted and confiscated by government agents, certainly runs into the billions of
dollars each year. It relies on all sorts of transport from baggage and clothing of travelers
to camouflaged cargo on scheduled airliners and freighters, light planes landing at
isolated airstrips, and small ocean craft seeking out obscure inlets. The proceeds from
this and other outlaw enterprises generate much of the prosperity of a booming
regional banking industry by means of various money laundering schemes.
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was simply the clever use of loopholes in the socialist system. Obviously, the second
economy existed throughout the Soviet Union, but in Georgia it might well have
been larger than the official or “first” economy. Corruption, black marketeering,
speculation, and bribe-taking were carried out on an unprecedented scale and with
unrivalled daring. The reasons for this were largely in Georgia’s uniquely privileged
position in the former USSR.
Open favoritism by Moscow started with Stalin and gave the ruling ethnic elite a
free hand within the republic. The combination of local political autonomy with the
Caucasian reliance on familial and clan ties in all aspects of life led to the creation of a
nearly impenetrable network of mutual aid and protection that clearly excluded those
who were not part of the system. Illegal economic operations and exchanges produced
great personal wealth for many Georgians, while the official economy of the republic
grew only insignificantly. In the sunlit Tropical South, many people prospered by
staying in the shadows.
THEME 2: STORMS ALONG THE BLACK SEA
The newly acquired wealth of the region has increased the stakes for control of this
valuable prize. Since the coast had almost no tradition of statehood and its rise from
poverty was so recent, the political arenas of the states that carve up the coast were
traditionally dominated by inland areas, and the rapid ascendancy of the coasts has
introduced a peculiar dichotomy between the centers of “money power” and traditional
power seats. The newly independent states of Georgia and Ukraine have tried to
strengthen their grip on the rich coasts, reviving the deep, ancient cultural divide
between coast and hinterland.
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Ethnic separateness from the “mainland” is about the only unifying thread in the
bewildering ethnic mosaic of the Tropical South. The region’s geographic isolation and

In addition to drugs, the Tropical South is the entry zone for such other commodities
as prohibited animal pelts and feathers, live birds and other endangered creatures,
archeological articles, and art objects. But far surpassing all these in importance is illicit
traffic in human beings. As already dismal living conditions continue to deteriorate for
much of the rapidly growing populations of the Caribbean and Latin America, many
desperate persons have opted for northern flight. Florida has been the principal target
for the newcomers, the great majority of whom in recent times have arrived from Cuba
and Haiti (the former group for the most part legally), but Bahamians, Dominicans,
and many other folks have managed to filter into most regions of the Tropical South.
THEME 2: AMERICAN SHORE OF THE TURBULENT CARIBBEAN
The Tropical South contains a striking internal ethnic diversity that makes it distinct
from the rest of the United States. Intra regional patterns show that the mix of people
living along the Gulf Coast is decidedly unlike that in peninsular Florida. In fact, the
ethnic personality of southern Louisiana is about as different from mainstream America
as any sizeable chunk of the country can be. Most of the Black population originated as
transferred slaves from the French West Indies. Some residents of New Orleans arrived
directly from France, the rest by way of the West Indies or as dispossessed Acadians
(Cajuns) from Nova Scotia. Until recently, the back country of southern Louisiana
remained one of America’s most isolated regions, and the dwellers in its bayous and
prairies preserved and enjoyed their own quite special brand of culture. The “discovery”
of the Cajun/Creole enclave has resulted in efforts to maintain the local French patois
and to celebrate other elements of the cultural heritage, especially the local cuisine
(indeed, many regard New Orleans as the gastronomic capital of North America) and
dance music (zydeco).
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historic obscurity allowed it to preserve populations ethnically separate from those in
adjoining parts of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Thus coastal Georgia is populated
with Adzharians, Mengrelians, and Abkhazians. Adzharians speak Georgian, but
centuries of Ottoman rule (until 1878) resulted in a strong sense of Muslim identity.
Abkhazians are largely Muslim and have a language and political history quite separate
from Georgia. Between Abkhazia and Adzharia live Mengrelians, who speak their own
language and have an identity separate from Georgian, while the traditional Georgian
perception of them has been a pejorative one of rural hicks, the target of ethnic
jokes. Coastal Bessarabia is part of Ukraine claimed by Moldova, yet the majority
of its population are neither Ukrainian nor Moldovan, but Bulgarian, Russian, and
Gagauz (Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians). Finally, in the Ukrainian Crimea, the
population is over 80 percent Russian.
The region’s history is filled with dramas of voluntary and forced exiles of whole
peoples. Before the Russo-Turkish wars, the coast of present-day Krasnodar territory
was populated by Circassians, people related to Abkhazians. Circassians long valiantly
resisted the Russian advent, and the impressed victors, eager to vacate the coast from
Ottoman subjects, offered them the option of emigrating to Turkey. The majority left,
and today Circassians and Abkhazians number about one million in Turkey, more
than in Russia and Georgia combined. At the same time, many Crimean Tatars left the
Crimea, giving Russians a decisive majority which was later finalized by the deportation
of Crimean Tatars in 1944. Today, there are some five million Crimean Tatars in
Turkey, while only one million in all of the former USSR.
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This gruesome burden of unsettled ethnic accounts was exacerbated by administrative
changes during the Soviet period, with the creation of ethnically-based states in which
the peoples of the coastal areas were small minorities. Discrimination and nationalism
have slowly diluted the ethnic diversity of the coastal strip. Thus, Abkhazia was
originally a separate union republic, but in 1932 it was made an autonomous part of

In the sharpest of contrasts to the Gulf Coast, the peopling of southern Florida
has been a recent affair, with only a small minority of the people in question not
themselves migrants. The newcomers to Florida’s east coast have originated mostly
in the Northeastern states, so much so that the area has begun to mimic New York,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania in many of its social and cultural characteristics, while
along the west coast, the new Floridians have largely originated from the Midwestern
states. The popular image of Florida as a haven for the elderly is not illusory. Retirees
are definitely over represented statistically in the population, most notably in Tampa
St. Petersburg, the metropolitan area that leads all others in the nation in terms of
percentage of persons aged 65 and older. But the biggest story in terms of population
may be the influx of Spanish-speaking peoples. In 1950, only 4 percent of Dade
County’s population was Hispanic; in 1990 the value was 47.5 percent and still
rising, with two thirds Cuban in origin. The Miami area now contains the greatest
concentration of Cubans anywhere outside the homeland. Yet all has not been smooth
in the flow of peoples into the the Tropical South. The influx of Hispanics into the
Tropical South has accelerated the suburban flight of Anglos and other white European
groups from Miami and other cities. And within those cities tensions have run
particularly high between Hispanics and the African American residents who resent
the competition for jobs and housing. Language is another issue yet to be resolved.
Although the newcomers are learning English quickly, Spanish remains the preferred
language for most. In effect, much of southern Florida is becoming bilingual.
In geopolitical terms, the Caribbean has been virtually an American lake since the
1820s, when the Monroe Doctrine claimed the Americas as the exclusive arena of the
United States. Military incursions into Panama, Grenada, the Dominican Republic,
and, by proxy, Nicaragua, are only the most recent of a series of such U.S. interventions
that have involved every country in the Caribbean region. The American flag still flies
over Puerto Rico, the American Virgin Islands, and Guantanamo, Cuba; and for all
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Georgia (the state which the leading Soviet freedom-fighter, the late academician Andre
Sakharov, called a mini-empire for aggressive ethnocentrism and discrimination).
But the Abkhaz and Adzhar units existed mostly in name, and even the very title
“Adzharian” has been struck from the population census lists. An official campaign was
undertaken to replace Muslim names with typically Georgian ones, and not a single
mosque remains in Batumi. In the 1970s Abkhazians began to agitate openly for greater
influence in the affairs of their own region and to favor secession into Russia, until in
1992, the Georgian versus Abkhazian struggle erupted again into all-out war.
In a similarly complex circumstance, the Crimea was part of Russia until 1954, when
it was transferred to Ukraine as a “gift.” Not surprisingly, Ukrainian independence
prompts strong Crimean sentiment for secession into Russia. Throughout the Tropical
South, loyalty to Georgian, Ukranian, or Moldovan states comes only third after
local ethnic identities and pro-Russian sentiment (largely the product of the desire to
preserve the fragile prosperity that depend on the North). These coastal beachheads are
precarious though. For example, like Crimea’s previous attempt to become independent
in 1917, a new effort can be easily foiled by a Ukrainian blockade of the peninsula
(which receives three-quarters of its food and fresh water from mainland Ukraine).
The devolution of the USSR demonstrated how shaky is the very existence of the
Tropical South. The region failed to become a true Sunbelt, while Russia became one
more empire that failed to keep the Black Sea ring. Ancient Russians called the sea
“Black” for its frequent and violent storms, and the conflict-torn region still seems to be
perched on the edge of deep and turbulent waters.
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practical purposes, Cuba was an American possession until the Castro regime took
over in 1959. At the time of the annexation of Spanish Florida, the justification was
that it was a “blunt dagger” pointed at the United States; but the dagger really points
southward.
In terms of economy, the Caribbean has long been an American lake as well. The
Gulf ports and New Orleans in particular have served as the principal gateways for
the receipt of tropical produce and other exports from Central America, Mexico, the
Antilles, Venezuela, and Colombia, while money has flowed freely back and forth.
The economies of Jamaica, the Bahamas, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and many of the
Lesser Antilles might well collapse without North American tourism. In some ways,
Miami has become the capital of the Caribbean.
There is a certain delicious irony in the fact that so many hundreds of thousands of
Spanish speaking immigrants have been flocking to a former corner of an empire the
Spanish Crown so systematically ignored back in the time of Columbus. The Tropical
South is fast becoming the hot spot of America in many ways: in the growth and
ethnic mixture of its population, in the economic explosion associated with pleasure
enterprises from Miami resorts to baseball spring training camps to Disney World, and
in the geopolitical tempest of its connections to the Caribbean Sea.
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The fragrance of the spring steppe near Dzhezkazgan is inebriating. In
the area where the grasslands are not yet plowed under or overgrazed to
become a desert, where the land blooms blood red with poppies and the
wild tulips grow, the memories brought back by that smell may drive a
native Kazakh or Russian alike to sense the hidden strength and vanished
glory of this land. In the restlessly nomadic Russian spirit it awakens the
subdued urge to move into open spaces; in the hearts of yesterday’s
nomads, the Kazakh people, it may stir the image of the pastoralists’
happiness, expressed in the poem of Kazakh 19th century poet Abai
Kunanbaev:

Could this place be in the United States? The plaza in Santa Fe, New
Mexico does not seem to be standard American. The architecture suits the
southwest desert and the merchandise offered by the sidewalk vendors is
unfamiliar, but appealing in its own way - pottery and weavings, SpanishAmerican food, leatherwork, mementos of the Old Anglo West. Even the
skies are bluer, the air more transparent, and the smells different. People
may expect something exotic in border towns like Mexicali, but this place
is more than 200 miles from Mexico, and no foreign flags are flapping in the
breeze.

On springtime pasture my people gather;
Kinsmen embrace and rejoice together.
Joking and laughing, they stand and chat,
About everything -from their herds to the weather.
But the pleasant reverie set off by the spring grasses may end abruptly
with the roar and blast-off of a rocket from nearby Baikonur, for this ancient
steppe was turned into the launching site for all Soviet manned missions
into space. The faces of this region could not be in greater contrast, yet is it
any wonder in this place where two worlds meet?
1

But at a second look the city begins to feel less alien, even to East Coast
Americans. The “southwestern” furniture and jewelry displayed in the shop
windows look similar to ones sold in fashionable establishments back
east, and the more adventurous suburbs throughout the United States are
copying these Pueblo or Spanish motif buildings.
Santa Fe turns out to be not an exotic place at all, but rather something
both uniquely influential and peculiarly emblematic of a special region and
a new way of thinking about places in the United States. This is the land of
intertwined peoples, a place clearly rooted in times long past, but a place
that speaks to Americans of an altogether possible postmodern future,
where cultures and lifestyles hybridize into new, unpredictable forms.
2
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A GRASSLAND COMMONS WHICH DOESN’T QUITE UNIFY

AN INTERNATIONAL BORDER WHICH DOESN’T QUITE DIVIDE

Almost all of the region is a wide belt of dry grasslands and semi-deserts. To the
north lie the steppes and forest; to the south, the mountains of Central Asia with
their intricate lace of piedmont oases. From ancient times this sea of grass was home
to a succession of nomadic peoples who navigated it on camel and horseback. For
the nomads the grasslands, extending from China to the very doorstep of Europe,
were a highway of expansion and a base of operations for plundering richer sedentary
neighbors to the north and south. The Kalmyk people in the extreme west who speak
a Mongol-related language and profess Buddhism are an exotic reminder of the past
unity of the huge nomadic sea.

The international boundary between Mexico and the United States bisects two halves
which are certainly distinct, yet are intimately intertwined. It is this line that gives
vitality and substance to the entire region, acting as the spine or central organizing
mechanism. “Mexistan” is the place where two streams of people and their cultures have
entered, met head-on, and intersected, one arriving from the south, the other from the
east and north, and both superimposing themselves upon various earlier, stubbornly
surviving Native American societies.

The heirs to the latest wave of nomads, the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, are a product of the
blending of various local Turkic peoples with Mongol invaders. Their languages are
Turkic, while in racial type they are distinctly Mongoloid. Among the Kazakhs, Kirgiz
and Turkmens, the nomadic way of life prevailed until the 20th century, and nomadic
traits are still a visible element of their culture. The origins of the ethnic name “Kazakh”
are probably the same as of “Kazak” (the Russian for Cossack) and are often traced to
the Turkic “qaz” (to wander).
Being a nomad is practically defined through cattle ownership. Abai Kunanbaev wrote,
“Honor, reason, science, all for them is less than the herds. They think that by the
gift of livestock they receive the good opinion even of God. For them religion, the
people and influence is all livestock.” Even the souls of dead ancestors were believed to
occupy animal bodies. The Kirgiz, with their annual migrations from alpine pastures to
lower valleys, were nomadic as well and are closely related to Kazakhs, although their
mountain environment is quite different from dry grasslands.
5

The border is a crucible for intense interaction and some remarkable international
chemistry, an interface that has sprayed its effects far into the interiors of the U.S. and
Mexico alike. It is difficult to think of any other border that jostles together two such
utterly different ways of life. More than 1500 miles in length, it has much in common
with many other international boundaries established by the imperial European powers
and their settler colonies during the 19th Century. Generally, there was little thought
given to historical or cultural realities, but maximum attention to national power,
profit, and convenience. The outcome is the legacy of a one-sided conflict and US
invasion in the 1840s and the subsequent diplomatic armtwisting, and has never made
a great deal of sense in terms of either physical or human geography.
The Rio Grande is a flimsy, porous barrier since its waters are only waist-deep or even
lower much of the time. Elsewhere the boundary is a sequence of straight segments
that blithely ignore the lay of the land and seldom impede the determined wanderer.
In fact, the whole U.S.-Mexican boundary has always been a rather permeable sort of
membrane, so much so that the social and cultural presence of the foreign neighbor is
readily detectable some hundreds of miles beyond the border checkpoints.
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Both the Kazakhs and Kirgizs became distinctly separate people around the year
1500, about the same time as the emergence of their future adversaries, Russians
and Uzbeks. Ever since, the region has been either a buffer or a bridge between two
mutually opposed worlds: European-Christian Russia to the north and Islamic Central
Asia (where the Uzbeks dominated) to the south. Maneuvering between these two
expansionist forces, the Kazakhs managed to preserve the independence of their tribal
federations until the mid-19th century, when Central Asia was annexed by the Russian
Empire in the worldwide scramble for colonies. The native population found itself
within the same state with Russia and Islamic Asia and was heavily influenced by both.
But even if the two once opposed worlds overlapped here, they have as yet hardly
blended. The grassland commons are vast enough to be shared by both Europe and
Asia, presenting the two faces of the dual society of the region.
Where Russia and Islam Converge
Even a hundred years ago the nomadic corridor was much wider. But for the sedentary
neighbors of the nomads, the grasslands were an open frontier. By the late 18th century,
Southern Ukraine and lands on the Volga were lost to the nomad and gained by the
Slav farmer. What remained was no longer the commons for the nomads’ wandering,
but rather their besieged refuge. Already by the 17th century, Russian and Kazakh
expansion clashed in the zone between the Siberian forests and the grasslands - the zone
that was summer pastures to the Kazakhs, but virgin lands waiting for the plow from
the European viewpoint.
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The cliche of official Soviet history about the peaceful incorporation of Kazakhstan
into the Empire was not entirely hypocritical. Acting as an arbiter in the perpetual
squabblings of the khans (local leaders, considered the direct political successors of the
Mongol Genghiz Khan) for about a 150 years Russia did not move beyond its fortified
boundary which stretched almost exactly along the present-day northern boundary of

The least “Mexican” segment of Mexico may be the northern Mexican states along the
border - places in which the imprint of North American culture is inescapable - and
likewise, in terms of U.S. territory, New Mexico, roughly half of Arizona and Texas,
and small slivers of Colorado and California are the least standard region within the
U.S based on the traditional Anglo definition of what is American. But perhaps these
terms are already out-of-date, and here in Mexistan, a new idea of “American” is being
born.
Where Mexico Meets Anglo-America
The initial European thrust into the region came in the 1540s, not long after the
conquest of Mexico. Motivated by rumors of opulent cities to the north, Spanish
explorers marched through New Mexico and as far as Kansas before turning back with
empty hands. So great was their disillusionment that it was not until 1598 that the
Spanish regime founded the first church missions and settler colonies in the upper Rio
Grande valley. The settlers were few because the economic potential of the area was so
meager and the supply lines and communications to the well-settled core area of New
Spain were so slow and hazardous. Nevertheless this remote outpost has somehow
persisted, and the descendants of the pioneer generations still cling proudly to their
Spanish (rather than simply Mexican) heritage. The introduction of European cultural
items, most notably livestock, metal-working, and an assortment of grains, fruits,
vegetables, and other domesticated plants, meant considerable change in the economy
and lifestyles of the surviving Native American groups.
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Kazakhstan. One after another the khans of major groups accepted the Russian
protectorate, but Russian presence became a reality only after the 1840s when the line
of forts encircled Kazakh territory. The subjugation of the grasslands was made easier
by the nomads’ lack of unity. Until they were brought together by the Russian rule, the
three major groups of Kazakhs were quite separate and each was caught in a personal
vice between Russia and Asia. The term for their social and political organization was
“horde,” and the Kazakhs were divided into three of these federations, believed to
date back to the sixteenth century, and translated as “Great, Middle, and Small.” The
Small (or Junior) Horde was under pressure from the special Russian government in
Orenburg and from the oasis Khanate (or kingdom under the khan leadership) of
Khiva. The Middle Horde was controlled by the Russian governor in Petropavlovsk on
the one side and lost territory to the Khanate of Kokand on the other. The Great, or
“Senior,” Horde was gripped between a third Russian headquarters in Semipalatinsk
and Chinese pressure. The Turkmens were caught between traditional dependency
to Persia and the Russian conquest, which arrived across the sea and spread from the
coastal base in Krasnovodsk. These separate corridors of conquest were later revived in
the configuration of railways that crossed the region en route to Central Asia. Historic
disunity persists in the economic disunity of the region today.
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By the 1870s when the conquest of Central Asia was complete, the nomads discovered
themselves living in the midst of Russian possessions. The long process of the shrinking
of the nomadic sea culminated with the opening of the Kazakh grasslands to Russian
homesteaders in 1889. By 1917, the northern zone of more fertile steppe (the Virgin
Lands) was settled by a flood of Slavs, and the range became Russia’s latest granary.
The boundaries of what remained to become our region can be easily drawn as ethnic
and cultural ones. To the north, Russian-speaking population strongly dominates and
large-scale grain farming prevails over livestock breeding. In the south, the boundary is
drawn where the ancient tradition of oasis-based irrigated farming and the heritage of
Islam become prevalent over nomadic patterns.

While this Rio Grande corridor was the least unsuccessful Hispanic venture into
Mexistan, there were two other paths of colonization inot the region. Missionaries and
settlers managed to create a foothold in the Santa Cruz Valley in southern Arizona. To
the east, the Spanish had explored parts of Texas, but it was not until 1690 that the
first church missions were attempted, and gradually handfuls of colonists and soldiers
set up small outposts in central Texas. But the Texas strategy was a halfhearted one,
and the newcomers had barely begun to set down serious roots in the region before
bands of Anglo-Americans started to arrive in the 1820s to dispute ownership of the
land. At that time, this was as remote and obscure a section of the Greater European
World as could be imagined--almost totally out of sight and out of mind, an area of the
most marginal economic value and of concern only because of potential geopolitical
conflicts.
The coming of the Americans heralded the beginning of the modern Mexistan. The
movement of an expanding United States started with the incursion into the Mexistan
periphery, the fertile, well-watered woodlands and prairies of central Texas by landhungry folks from the American South who were quickly to evolve into Texans. At
the same time, the central segment of “MexAmerica” became a player on the North
American stage by virtue of its location. Merchants from the United States rushed to
exploit the lucrative trade of transporting goods in pack trains via the so-called Santa Fe
Trail, one of the principal land routes to California. The Gold Rush and the subsequent
population and economic developments in California shortly after the U.S. annexation
of “MexAmerica” made it imperative to have reliable overland connections with the
East. Wagon trails and steam railroad systems were promptly created. Burgeoning
commerce breathed considerable life into both older and newer towns situated at
strategic nodes along the routes: El Paso, Albuquerque, Tucson, and Yuma.
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Islamic Asia was winning the nomads’ hearts at the same time that Russia was
gaining their lands. Although in their numerous treaties with the Steppe rulers Russia
consistently referred to the natives as Moslems, that was an overstatement. Kazakhs and
Kirgiz embraced Islam only superficially, retaining nearly unchanged the old totemistic
cults dating back to the times of Tamerlane (sometimes called “Timur”, Tamerlane
centered his empire of the late 14th century in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, and conquered
an area from Iran through India). In fact, the devout Moslems of the oases of Central
Asia proper treated them as infidels. Following Russian conquest, Islam became the
natural rallying point in seeking a resistant cultural image, reinforced by the fact that
the nomads were united within the same Empire that incorporated the Islamic centers
of Bukhara and Samarkand. Ironically, Russian conquest thus actually promoted the
recent Islamization of the steppe.
Exactly one hundred years after Russian colonization began, the 1989 population
estimate of this vast region found a sparse 12 million inhabitants, 48 percent of whom
were indigenous Muslim peoples, while the Slavic population (mostly Russians and
russified Ukrainians) accounted for 35 percent. Yet this ethnic duality developed only
recently. Even immediately before the Second World War, the region’s population was
only 4 million and was heavily dominated by natives. The attraction of mineral wealth
brought about swift and sweeping change. Strategically located far from troublesome
western boundaries, the mineral resources of the former nomadic range became
especially important during the Second World War and Cold War years. As the native
population remained in the countryside, Russians mostly carried out development.
New industrial cities have become ethnic islands, and the gap between the modernity
of urban areas and the traditionalism of countryside coincides with the divide between
the European and native populations.
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The end of the Mexican War in 1848 removed all doubt as to who would be the
controlling population in Texas, with Anglos subduing the Hispanic population. Yet
in a sense Mexico responded with a steadily growing migration of its residents into
the United States. Today, the outer boundary of American Mexistan is that of the area
where important Hispanic presence is clearly evident. This boundary may partially
reflect the environmental tastes of Mexican migrants gravitating to places that look and
feel familiar. With its several rugged, north-south-trending mountain ranges, various
plateaus and basins, a multitude of dry stream beds and short supply of rivers, and an
abundance of deserts, nearly all of Mexistan would look like home to any citizen from
the upland sections of Mexico.
By 1900 the total number of persons inhabiting the core of Mexistan (i.e. without
Texas) was only approximately 200,000. But by the 1990 count, Mexistan was
home to some 12 million persons. The older string of cities along the Santa Fe trail
was supplemented by a new string of twin cities that have grown like crystals along
the string that is the international border: from San Diego/Tijuana to Brownsville/
Matamoros. The presence of these paired cities indicates confluence of two social
streams that cannot quite be kept apart, even by such a significant line on the map.
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Soviet Union’s Testing Ground

The Market’s Testing Ground

With the advent of Soviet control, the region became a huge testing ground in the
experiment of planting socialism on Asiatic soil. Stalin’s collectivization drive revived
the tsarist attempt to settle the nomads and completely uprooted the traditional way
of life. While the Kazakhs had no conception of private land ownership, livestock
was always owned privately and was the single most important measure of one’s social
status. Loath to give their animals to the collective, Kazakhs preferred to slaughter
their herds. In the famine that followed, the population decreased by a quarter - a
loss of life unprecedented even in Stalinist USSR, and the blow that sealed Kazakh
submission to whatever system the Russians imported. It is sadly ironic that the shocks
to the native way of life here were particularly heavy exactly because the region was
never perceived or treated by Russians as a mere colony, but rather as a land of people
who could be taught to accept mainstream Russian/Soviet civilization for their own
benefit. As early as the 18th century, Catherine the Great sent wheat seeds and advisers
to teach the Kazakhs to grow grain, and Kazakh youths began to receive Russian
education. The far-sightedness of such policies became apparent later: in an about-face,
many Kazakh nationalist intellectuals who proclaimed independence during Russia’s
Civil War became early Kazakh Bolsheviks. Even one of the leaders of the 1916 antiRussian rebellion became a pro-Bolshevik field commander in the Civil War and
later the communist leader of Kazakhstan. Altogether, the republics of Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan had the unofficial reputation of being the more quiescent parts of the
former USSR.

These dramatic changes reflect major post-war developments in Mexamerica, which
became a sort of testing ground for the latest permutations of a hi-tech driven economy
and sun-driven urbanization.

The fanciful name for the region, “Mexistan,” provides a unifying idea of cultural
blending, but certainly would not appear on any map of real places; therefore, the
notion of a “Rossistan” (joining the Persian “stan” or “country” and the Russian
influence) may be more appropriate here. While the Empire-builders saw this region
13

Entrepreneurs have set up a multitude of “Maquiladoras” or “maquilas” south of the
international border that cuts through Mexistan. These inventions are factories owned
by non-Mexicans and usually run by foreign-supplied machinery, but with a largely
Mexican female work force. Products manufactured or assembled here are exported
to the United States and elsewhere. The Maquiladora phenomenon has changed the
character of the border and with it, of Mexistan. Almost half a million people are
employed in these factories which have become the second highest source of revenue
for the Mexican economy, surpassed only by the oil industry. Boomtowns are growing
along the border, attracting migrants by the tens and hundreds of thousands, person in
search of jobs and a better life. And the opportunities are there, at least for those with
modest expectations.
The arterial heart of Mexistan, the international border, has attracted more than two
thousand Maquiladoras now, all within a few miles of the boundary. Productivity
in these factories is reputed to be close to that of U.S. workers, despite much lower
wages (which, from the viewpoint of the Mexicans, are still higher than those available
elsewhere in their country). The desirability of the Maquiladoras is debated in both
the U.S. and Mexico, but one conclusion is clear: two “L” factors have come together
in a formula that is changing the character of the region: Labor and the Line. A new
twist on the economics of the region is sure to be The North American Free Trade
Agreement, taking effect in 1994 and promising to eliminate all trade barriers between
Canada, the United States, and Mexico within fifteen years. Thanks to NAFTA, the
international boundary may become even less relevant over time.
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as a hinge between Russia-in-Europe and Russia-in-Asia, and as an intermediary for
the further expansion of the Euro-Asian Empire, the non-imperial Russian approach
to Asia was represented by the so-called Eurasionists. The latter believed that RussiaEurasia constituted an independent civilization, equally separate from both Europe
and true Asia, but organically blending elements of both. For them “Rossistan” was
a model for the future grandiose synthesis of Europe and Asia, facilitated by certain
common qualities of Russians and natives that made mutual rapport possible. Russian
culture contains such elements linking it to the East as the penchant for contemplation,
the devotion to ritual, and the quality of udal (extravagant daring or audacity), a
purely steppe value which Turkic people understood and appreciated. The Russians’
spiritual proximity to the steppe is matched by the relative adaptability of the nomads.
The Kazakh open-mindedness and near-paganism (so contrasting with religious
fundamentalism of Central Asia) seemed to make them more receptive to Russian
influence. From the Tatars, the original mediators between East and West, the relay
baton could be passed on to the Kazakhs.
The new political configuration emerging in place of the former USSR may finally
fulfill the Eurasionist expectations. Symbolically, Alma Ata (now Almaty) was the site
for the signing of the 1991 agreement that created the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) out of eleven former republics of the USSR. Along with Belarus,
Kazakhstan as an independent state has become the most ardent advocate of closer
integration among the republics of the CIS. This emerging axis of states favoring strong
ties, Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan, includes the traditional geographic go-betweens who
have bridged West and East. And just as Belarus of the Crossroads region served as a
model case of Soviet socialism in its westernized version, so Kazakhstan was the only
case of its relatively successful application in Asia.
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In New Mexico and Arizona, the nature of the region’s lure for the outsider tends to be
quite different. If the international border has lent the region its focal identity, it is the
sun that has helped spur the recent enormous growth of Phoenix and other Mexistan
metropolises not clinging to the boundary. In terms of climate, natural scenery, and
the human landscape, here is a region absolutely unlike anything in the eastern United
States. This is the sunniest part of the country and the warmest as well, an area with
precipitation well below the national average. The simple pleasures of sun and warmth
have been enough to satisfy many newcomers and visitors, especially during the winter
months. The availability of air-conditioning has been a critical factor in making the
region livable.
Arizona can claim the championship in a novel North American activity: as the leading
roosting place for snowbirds. From December through March by the tens of thousands
these seasonal visitors arrive, either pulling their own trailers or motor homes or renting
some at the scores of trailer parks. They are mostly middle-aged or elderly couples,
coming from the Mid-West and Canada. For a large percentage of these persons, the
seasonal stayover leads gradually to full-time retirement in Mexistan. The region has
begun to rival Florida and California as a retirement mecca. Added to many other
enticements is the presence of a large number of residential complexes specifically
designed for the elderly, exclusive colonies with thousands of well-to-do residents all
over the age of 50.
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City vs. Countryside

The Cities: Mosaic of Barrios

In a truly Eurasian synthesizing manner, the region developed a working model of
“Asiatic Socialism.” Soviet institutions in the region were in fact a thin veneer hiding
a largely traditional society, based on the system of extended family and kinship
relationships. Thus high profits earned by the illegal grazing of unaccounted for flocks
on socialist pastures were used to milk the benefits of the urban power system. The
natives’ comfortable make-believe Socialism contrasted sharply with the exacting
mainstream Soviet system in which Russians were enmeshed. The system of clan
cooperation with accepted forms of official corruption clearly excluded the Russians,
who perceived it all as a kind of collective Kazakh conspiracy. But from the Kazakh
viewpoint, the superfluous adoption of communist rituals was a clever attempt to
outwit the dominating Russians at their own game. In contrast to Central Asia,
which attempted a defensive withdrawal into Islamic identity, the Kazakhs accepted
Russian challenges. Characteristically, the Kazakhs display by far the highest level of
bilingualism of all the Asian republics (63% of Kazakhs are fluent in Russian).

For all the permeability of the international boundary, American and Mexican
societies stand in rather sharp contrast across the border. In addition to economic
and political differences, there are sharp distinctions in the way houses, churches, and
other buildings are designed and built, rural land parcels bounded, and towns laid
out. And, despite a good deal of hybridizing and other forms of give-and-take, one is
struck immediately by the differences in foodways, dress, music, sport, and all manner
of artistic expression. Also standing in stark contrast are two dissimilar demographic
regimes that in a real sense clash at the international line. Levels of fertility, age
structures, forms of mobility, and education and occupational profiles are worlds apart
whenever you compare the numbers for the American and Mexican states that share a
common boundary.

The main line of divide between Russians and Kazakhs is that between the city and
countryside. Notwithstanding the recent influx of native population into the cities,
they are still by majority Russian, and natives are seldom encountered in the industrial
sector of the economy. Thus in 1989, Kazakhs accounted for 40 percent of population
of Kazakhstan (in its political boundaries) but made up only 27 percent of its urban
population and 20 percent of its industrial workforce. At the same time, over 80
percent of the rural population were natives. And yet, a vigorous policy of “nativization
of the cadres” has brought important changes in the comparative employment profiles
for the two communities. Key positions were normally held by Kazakhs “sandwiched”
with Russian deputies to maintain the Russian-Kazakh balance of power, but by

On the American side of the international boundary, Mexistan is definitely a zone
where a variety of cultures meet. A predominantly Protestant and English-speaking
society coexists with one in which patterns of speech and the Roman Catholic faith
have been implanted from Spain via Mexico. In this region, the predominant Anglo
culture is Texan, with its famous reputation for enjoying bigness and wealth. But
other cultures enter in as well, from German to Native American, creating a study in
contrasting cultures.
All the metropolises of Mexistan have something essential in common: located in a
region that failed to become a melting pot, they are conglomerates of barrios. In a
narrow sense barrios are the ghettos of newly arrived Hispanics. But in cities made up
of cells of mutual social exclusion, the term can be equally applied to the segregation of
newly arrived African-American immigrants or to the self segregated communities of
haughty old Spanish elites and affluent sunbelters and snowbirds. The fragmented
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now the balance has clearly shifted. Russians are still strongly overrepresented in the
essentially blue-collar sectors of industry, transport, and construction - occupations
shunned by the Kazakhs, who now dominate the white-collar sectors (with the
exception of science). Although it may be premature to talk about a complete reversal
of social roles, in such cities as Almaty, the main social divide is already that between
the more proletarian Russians and the new white-collar Kazakh elite.
As educated Kazakhs and Russians compete for the same professional positions in the
cities, the friction between the divided populations of the region grows. Increasing
instances of pressure and discrimination force many Russians to leave. In the 1980s the
migrational balance of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated a complete reversal of
earlier patterns as Russian exodus began. But most important of all, Russians have long
been losing the battle of the cradles. The much higher birth rate among the Muslims is
fast tipping the population scale back toward native predominance. While in the 1960s
Slavs outnumbered native people in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, by the year 1990
the situation was reversed.
The duality of the region has a geographic expression as well. In the past, the relative
strength of Russian versus Islamic influence was markedly different in the north and
south of the region. The southern tier rather resembled Central Asia. It was within
easy reach of renowned centers of Islamic thought in Bukhara and Samarkand and
embraced the fundamentalist and mystical Islam propagated from there, as well as
irrigated farming techniques. But just as Quranic schools were opening in the south,
more progressive schools were opened in the north where missionary activity was
mostly carried out by the Tatars, who by that time had already experienced strong
European impact.
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Today, the North-South split persists with the symbolic juxtaposition between official
and “shadow” capitals of the region’s states. In Kyrgyzstan, the predominantly Russian

fabric of city landscapes corresponds to the social hierarchy of Mexistan, where the
top rungs of the occupational ladder are much more likely to be occupied by Anglos.
The modern high-tech industries of Phoenix or Houston are overwhelmingly Anglo
in terms of financing, management, and work force, with only minimal involvement
on the part of the Hispanic and African-American communities. One rung down
economically from Anglos are the “old Spanish,” who may be poor but are politically
active, the proud aristocracy of a land bound together by traditions of patronage. In
contrast, recent arrivals from Mexico share with African-Americans the lowest rungs of
the social ladder and thus the least desirable occupations.
The demographic seesaw of Mexistan answers the influx of each new batch of sunseeking Anglos with the importation of equal or greater number of Hispanics to serve
the needs created by new Anglo arrivals. With its growing numbers, the Hispanic
community has achieved considerable political power and recognition at levels from
local to national. New Mexico, where the proportion of Spanish-speakers is more than
35 percent of the population, has even become the only officially bilingual state of the
country. But does a coherent Hispanic identity exist?
Many internal divisions split Hispanics along lines of location, ideology, and even time
of arrival. In fact, there is no general consensus even as to what name best applies to
the entire community. Such terms as Tejanos, Californios, Chicanos, MexAmericans,
and La Raza all have some popularity. According to the 1993 Latino National Political
Survey, few of those surveyed actually call themselves Latinos or Hispanics. Eighty
percent supported bilingual education, but as a means of learning English, not as a way
of maintaining separate identity. More than two thirds of American-born Hispanics
speak English better than Spanish. The more ardent ethnic champions use “Aztlan,”
the name of a mythical pre-Columbian kingdom, as the name for Mexistan, but no
irredentist movement exists, no effort to reattach their homeland to the Mexican
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and industrial capital of Bishkek faces off with the city of Osh in the south, which
became notorious for the first calls for an anti-Russian religious crusade. The
industrial and Russian Krasnovodsk is warily watched by Ashgabat, the cultural center
for indigenous Turkmens. In Kazakhstan, Almaty is the essentially administrative
capital and the home to white-collar Kazakhs, nationalist intellectuals, and educated
youths agitating for Islamic and national revival. By contrast, the economic capital,
Karaganda, is a grim proletarian city exemplifying the worst aspects of hasty socialist
industrialization. The city is largely a memorial to the World War II effort to provide
the USSR with a new source of coal and steel, and its development was mostly carried
out by political prisoners’ labor in prisons of the GULAG, an acronym standing for
Chief Adminstration of Corrective Labor. (Solzhenitzyn’s GULAG Archipelago is based
on his personal experience in the camps in that area). Yet both Almaty and Karaganda
are predominantly Russian (over 75 percent), and the interspersed pattern of settlement
will doom any plans to carve separate ethnic states. The future of the region depends on
whether it will learn to live with this dual nature; otherwise, it may be forced to make
an impossible choice between Russia and Asia, its two estranged parents.
Escaping Dualism
Today’s independent states of the region are again caught in a vise, this time a dilemma
of choice between the imperial frying pan and the fire of Islamic fundamentalism. To
remain faithful to Moscow in an attempt to forge a new Eurasian Empire or to side
with pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists from Central Asia? Understandably, many see
the answer in reviving an identity independent from both neighbors. After all, the
distinctiveness of the indigenous Kazakh culture clearly makes the grasslands a world of
its own, not merely a transition zone between Russia and Asia.
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republic. In fact, the barrier separating the Hispanic community from their “poor
cousins” in Mexico may be higher than the one between them and Anglos.
Overcoming Dualism
From the Hispanic vantage point, the annexation of Mexistan by the United States
has had the most tremendous consequences. The new arrangement placed the large,
politically stranded Hispanic component of Mexistan’s population in a rather confusing
psychological situation: they must adjust and submit as best they can to a basically alien
set of laws, regulations, and cultural intrusions, annoyances that may be alleviated by
the material benefits that flow from allegiance to the most prosperous state in North
America.
While in parts of Texas, the Anglo-Latino relationships may still look like a caste
system, the duality of Mexamerica seems to be partially overcome in the vibrant mix
and interpretation of cultures in the region. Norteno music, born of Hispanic and
German origins, is heard in Texas, and rock songs sung in Spanish are infiltrating
“Anglo” radio stations. Even such limited fusion (or rather sharing of traits) as has
occurred has created something special in the way of a generalized regional culture.
Thus the Anglos have borrowed much from the Native Americans, especially in terms
of architectural and artistic motifs, while the latter group has born the impact of
European civilization. In similar fashion, the Hispanics, including the fresh arrivals as
well as those whose ancestors came centuries ago, have been obliged to absorb great
gobs of the Anglos’ material culture as well as at least a smattering of English. Of more
than passing interest is the appearance of a bastardized “Spanglish” usage (to the horror
of linguistic purists), or the conversion of many Hispanics to the Protestant faith. But
for evidence of the continuing vitality of the Hispanic culture you need only look at the
growing swarm of colorful outdoor mural paintings, so much in the modern Mexican
vein.
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Some of the region’s intellectuals advocate the return to pre-Islamic “pure” Turkic values
related to the old totemistic religion - a cult of nature harmoniously blended with the
world of humans, a combination of materialism with spirituality. Quite possibly, the
greatest asset of this Oz-Turk heritage is the innate liberalism of basic clan people,
combining individualism with deep-rooted pragmatism. Representative of such an
outlook is the local folklore figure of Akylman, a man of wisdom who derives his
skill from respect for past traditions. The contrast with Russian cast of mind is very
profound: where Russians restlessly pursue change, the natives value continuity. The
difference may be seen in Kazakhstan’s conservatively pragmatic approach to reforms
resembling the Chinese way: gradual economic liberalization without the complicating
upheavals of a political one. In the final analysis, the Kazakhs’ pragmatic individualism
may pave an easier road to a market economy and steer the former nomads away from
the collectivist myths of both pan-islamism and communism.

But what is particularly thought-provoking is the partial Hispanicization of a still
economically and politically dominant Anglo community. Although most of its
members may be quite reluctant to learn more than a few words of Spanish, many have
taken warmly to Mexican themes in architecture, furniture, clothing and jewelry, and
have adopted Spanish names for new residential developments and shopping centers.
Desert landscaping with its strong regional roots has become fashionable among Anglos
in Tucson, Phoenix, and elsewhere. Mexican cuisine may have recently diffused to
restaurants and supermarkets all over the United States, but nowhere is it more firmly
entrenched among non-Hispanics than in Mexistan; and one of the glories of Texas
life is the invention of Tex-Mex food, a culinary complex that differs from, but richly
honors, its obvious parents. From food styles to political power, all that embodies the
various peoples of the region mingles, argues, and coexists.

Another valuable part of the Kazakh heritage is their open-mindedness and tolerance.
In the past, the steppe corridor was the caravan road, the Great Silk route that carried
both trade and ideas. Past exposure to Christianity and Buddhism that spread along
the Route might have influenced Kazakh’s receptiveness to new ideas and their gift for
synthesis. This gift may be seen in the way in which earlier Kazakh intellectuals tried
to build the Kazakh state on the combination of Islam and secular ideology borrowed
from Kemalist Turkey, or their later idea of Islamic communism. Modern Turkey is
Kazakhstan’s likeliest model in the attempt to reconcile Islamic roots with freemarket
ideology through the cultivation of secular nationalism. The region also hopes to revert
to its ancient role as the Silk Route, the great corridor between the West and the Far
East, a dramatic realignment that would mean escape from the dilemma of choosing
between Russia and Central Asia.
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In attempting such an escape maneuver the region may rely on its mineral wealth. The
pillar of the region’s economic strength is its energy resources: oil and natural gas along
the Caspian coasts of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, coal in Karaganda, and uranium
ore in the Mangyshlak Peninsula. For Kazakhstan, wealth in hydrocarbons combined
with other mineral resources and low population pressure promises some chance for
evolving into a new Asian industrial dragon. Even now Kazakhstan is far ahead of
Central Asia in terms of industrial development, urbanization, and income levels. As
to its economic prospects as an independent state, Kazakhstan is second only to Russia,
and its economic clout enables the republic to be something of a second power-broker
in post-Soviet space.

As geological fate would have it, Mexistan contains little of gold, silver, or other
precious metals or gems. The dominant item within the region’s mining industry is
copper, particularly in southern Arizona, which ranks as one of the world’s leading
producers. A rich, remarkably productive zone of petroleum and natural gas exists in
the Texas coastal plain to the east and south of San Antonio, and the Houston and
Galveston areas have acquired major oil-refining and petrochemical facilities.

The down side of the success of resource-led development in the region is its new
vulnerabilities, especially thirst for water. Karaganda only receives water via a 300 mile
canal from the Irtysh river, and the oil and uranium area on the Mangyshlak Peninsula
has to be supplied by a unique, nuclear-powered desalination plant. The Volga and
Irtysh rivers are peripheral to the region, and the major sources of water are the narrow
lifelines of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers, which begin in the mountains of
Central Asia and flow into the land-locked Aral Sea. Because the rivers are drawn so
heavily for irrigation, the Aral Sea is evaporating from the face of the earth in a global
environmental catastrophe. Between 1960 and the late 1980s, the Aral Sea fell about
40 feet and the surface area shrank by 40 percent. The sea has split into several basins,
where the salinity of water is so high that marine life is impossible, thus eliminating
the local fishing industry and leaving ports high and dry. The exposed sea bottom is a
massive saltpan where winds pick up over 100 million tons of salt annually and deposit
it over the already saline agricultural lands of Central Asia. The very survival of the local
Kara-Kalpak people is in question, as severe shortages of drinking water and
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Leaving aside the easternmost fringe of the region, agriculture accounts for only a
tiny fraction of the land surface. Traditional crop and irrigation systems are still pretty
much intact in those sections of the Rio Grande Valley and southwestern Arizona
that have been cultivated for many generations. Using much more elaborate, modern
forms of engineering and irrigation, the Salt and Santa Cruz valleys now contain
some intensively worked “agribusinesses,” serving national markets. Much of the
vast remainder of Mexistan does not bring in profits in the usual sense. Some of the
region is used for low-intensity cattle and sheep ranching, and pine forests that thrive
in the higher, wetter uplands of New Mexico and Arizona also provide employment.
Mexistan is a popular destination for tourists thanks to spectacular natural features.
But the greatest source of Mexamerica’s rising power is the rapid increase of its
population. Smack in the middle of the legendary “Sunbelt”, it is one of the fastest
growing regions of the United States, a change reflected in its burgeoning political
power.
The population and economic boom in the Sunbelt and expanding irrigation make
the arid region severely thirsty. The ground water and rivers are eagerly sucked up, and
the Colorado River is a major victim. So great is the drawdown on the river by various
dams and irrigation projects that little of its water actually travels the whole way along
its 1,450 mile length to empty into the Gulf of Mexico. In 1922 a compact was created
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contamination with salts and pesticides in the Kara-Kalpak republic cause an infant
mortality rate on par with the poorer countries of Africa.
Unfortunately, plans to save the Aral resemble other grandiose but poorly thought-out
experiments that have colored the region’s history. The so-called Siberia-Aral water
diversion project was to transfer fresh water from Arctic-bound Siberian rivers to
Central Asia, initially via a 1300-mile navigable canal from the Irtysh. The water of
other Siberian rivers was to be tapped later and brought as far south as Turkmenistan.
Dropped because of potential environmental consequences only in late 1980s, the
project is still being pushed by the governments of the Central Asian republics.
These environmental challenges are set against an already vulnerable economy.
The agricultural sector remains crucial, but its productivity is extremely low. The
region is still more than half rural, and between 1959 and 1989 the proportion of
urban population increased very slowly (in Kyrgyzstan only from 34 to 38 percent).
Furthermore, the dominance of primary industries means that economies are at the
mercy of volatile international prices. Equally serious is the dependence on the presence
of skilled Russian specialists (likely to be the first to emigrate). The impressive mineral
potential of the state of Kazakhstan lies largely in the predominantly Russian area north
of our region’s boundary. Any government of a more assertively ethnocentric Kazakh
state would find control of those areas problematic.
Regardless of whether the region chooses to be a bridge or a buffer between increasingly
divergent Russia and Central Asia, it cannot afford to dispose of its Russian affiliation
altogether. Ardent Oz-Turk nationalists like to point out the relation of the Turkic word
“toru” (mode of government) to the old word for “marriage.” The future may depend
on whether its marriage with Russians will be a truly equal alliance or just a twist on
the ancient nomadic custom of wife abduction.
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to share the waters of the Colorado among seven U.S. states, but arguments over its
use have increased with the population boom. The Colorado also belongs in part to
Mexico, and a dam has been built at Morelos to drain off the last bit of water for
Mexican farm fields. In addition to its disappearing act, the Colorado is also suffering
from water quality problems as salts build up from both natural and human-aggravated
sources, making it the most saline river in North America.
Mexistan shares this problem with neighboring southern California, and water transfer
schemes from as far away as the Pacific Northwest have been suggested. Everyone
argues about water in Mexistan. Cotton farmers are at odds with urban dwellers;
environmental concerns compete with golf courses and lawns in areas that once held
only cactus; states are rivals for new projects and discuss exchanging water rights in fear
that once leased out, the water will not be available for return should future growth
demand it; and Mexico and the United States face off for water along the booming
border.
Thirst may be one of the few truly unifying characteristics along both sides of the
Mexistan spine. Another overwhelming distinction that promises to keep Mexistan a
unique corner of North America is that whatever may happen elsewhere, this is not
a melting pot. Substantial though the seepage of cultural traits may be, there is little
prospect that the divide among them will ever dissolve or become meaningless. The
cultural traditions and social stamina are simply too stubborn and deep to tolerate
extinction. Whatever the future may hold in store for the region, one characteristic will
remain as a constant: the enduring importance of that long border that both separates
and stitches together two such fundamentally unmixable worlds.
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Krasnoyarsk is the place that always seems to be in the middle of Russia.
To the left is western Siberia and European Russia; to the right, eastern
Siberia and the Far East. Krasnoyarsk is also in the middle of Siberia itself,
wedged between the oil and gas province of the West Siberian swamps
and the gold and diamond-rich plateaus of Eastern Siberia.

If you pull off US-93 in south-central Idaho into Craters of the Moon
National Monument, park at the bottom of Inferno Cone, and hike to the
summit, you have climbed into a 6000-foot high crow’s nest at the top of
the world. Around you is a sea of lava, desert soil, buttes, sagebrush, pine,
and juniper, stretching for what seems to be a thousand Idahos. The only
sign of settlement is the town of Arco on the distant horizon, a long-time
gathering point for “seekers.” It began as a junction for miners heading
north to Montana and the Idaho Panhandle, seeking mineral wealth from
the land; then it worked as an agricultural center when people took up the
fight against the arid western soil, trying to turn the desert brown into green
with Snake River waters. In the 1950s, Arco became a boom town again
when the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission sought an isolated place to build
the nation’s first nuclear power reactor; and finally, the town found its niche
serving the tourists and hunters who seek out the Great American West,
hoping to bring the frontier myth to life.

The horizontal east-west stretch that dominates the outline of the country is
diversified in this place by the mighty perpendicular of the Yenisey River, going in
a straight line up to the Arctic Ocean. Here the TransSiberian railway crosses the
Yenisey, and as if admitting the particular centrality of Krasnoyarsk, the express
stops here for twelve hours. The central location breathed life into the city less
than a 100 years ago, and here one almost senses that each place in Siberia is not
a locality, but rather a location, a dot in the navigational chart for the immense
ocean of land. The rather bleak city has little history and few attractions except
views of the Yenisey from its only bridge and a memorial called the “Siberian
Road to Exile.” The middle of the road seems to be the most logical place for a
memorial to a way that leads from everywhere to nowhere.
After Krasnoyarsk the traveler’s only companions on the boring and
relentless journey across this stretch of Russia would be the staccato of
rails, the stately trees of the taiga, and the mileposts that seem to celebrate
the triumph of distance over human efforts in this endless expanse.
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There are few signs of travelers today, and below you from Inferno Cone,
the Land Ocean undulates in waves of grass and mountains. Your eyes can
find no borders here. On this vast sea, there is only frontier.
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SIBERIA

THE AMERICAN WEST

The train takes almost a week to traverse this immense Land Ocean, and little wonder
that the notion of “Siberian distances” has become idiomatic in Russian. Spanning
eight time belts, Siberia has an area far larger than Australia. Most of land area is the
wilderness of the taiga, the northern coniferous forest dominated by fir and larch, the
monotonous ocean of trees where human settlement is a scattered archipelago of small
islands. A line from a popular 1960s song, when the romantization of the Siberian
frontier was at its peak, conveys a rather accurate image: “the green seas of taiga are
humming under the wings of the airplane.”

Big Sky Country, Great Plains, Grand Canyon, Great American Desert - there is
nothing small about the Land Ocean. Perhaps no other region of the United States
inspires such clearly defined imagery, both at home and abroad. Mention the American
West, and immediately people see cowboys, covered wagons, and cattle drives. It is a
place that lends itself to legend, hyperbole, and promotionals; in fact, the West was
opened up to a large degree by developers selling mythology to the American public.

The surface of the Land Ocean is not smooth: the southern and eastern perimeter of
the region consists of rugged mountains and plateaus separating it from China and
the Pacific. The overall build is that of a bowl open to the Arctic, offering the cold
air an unimpeded road into the interior. The image of the great frozen wilderness
is of course the biggest part of the popular perception of Siberia both in Russia and
abroad. The Land Ocean is indeed a continuation of the Arctic Ocean, part of the
great northern realm of the cold. Not surprisingly most of the region is underlain by an
ocean of frozen water in permanently frozen subsoil, the “permafrost” that is the blight
of Siberia. It not only severely constrains opportunity for agriculture, but makes the
construction and maintenance of permanent roads extremely costly, as roadbeds begin
“to flow” with each spring thaw. One-third of Siberia’s land area lies north of the Arctic
Circle in the tundra zone of Arctic grasslands, which in the extreme north becomes
almost an arctic desert with only sparse mosses and lichens for the reindeer to browse.
Even the official designation of this area as the “Extreme North” or the “Far North”
evokes a feeling of the edge of the world, where life give way to the reign of ice and
people huddle in layers of fur to survive.
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The initial element of that myth was a picture of an “empty” land, waiting for a
growing population to flex its muscle and spread from sea to sea. In the first of a series
of historic contradictions, what turned out to be the truth was that the land was hardly
empty, and the indigenous people who used it for millennia were reduced through a
series of wars and betrayals to tenancy on the most meager parcels of the Land Ocean.
The cowboy cattle drives that were to become one of the most enduring legends of
the Old West turned out in reality to represent a relatively brief period before rail
connections and roads integrated the West into the national economy. Perhaps in the
most ironic twist of truth, the rugged individualists who are supposed to have built the
West by their own stamina and tenacity have been supported all along by a generous
federal system of subsidies.
But what exactly is the West? The topography of the region is strikingly diverse. The
rolling high plains of western Kansas are joined with the peaks of the Rockies of
central Colorado, the stark flatness of Utah’s Salt Flats with the dramatic gorges of the
canyonlands of northern Arizona and southern Utah. A key element of the West is
the region’s general aridity. The land from the mountains of Colorado, Wyoming, and
Montana eastward to the Middle West are distinguished primarily on the basis of a
climate too dry to support the fields of grains that characterize the “heart of America.”
To the west, only the Pacific-facing higher elevations are moist. Lowlands everywhere

6

Green waves without end
stretched to the north, collided,
and blocked each other's path
and in the grey smoke of the horizon, it was hard to make out where
the mountains ended and the
sky began...No matter how fine
nature was in and of itself, no matter how easily it breathes on this
green expanse, under this blue,
fathomless sky - the eye involuntarily searches for signs of human
existence on this green wasteland.
- D.N. Mamin-Sibiryak, Gold,
Minsk, Nauka i tekhnika publ.,
1984, p. 282

Humans are scattered far and wide in this unlimited region. The Yamal Peninsula has
one person per 2.5 square miles - islanders lost in the ocean of land. In the tundra
blizzards can strike in July; the last snowstorm of spring can be easily confused with the
first one of Fall, the clock may show noon in utter darkness, while the sun may shine at
midnight. Even the areas that lie south of the Arctic Circle have climates far more harsh
than the equivalent latitudes for European Russia. The four directions of the compass
rose reduce to just two here, as north blends and becomes synonymous with east; while
everything located to the west of the Urals seems a benign south.
Siberia is the realm of endless winters, but the image hardly applies to the southern
fringe of the region. The extreme southwest of Russian Siberia and the Virgin Lands
area of Northern Kazakhstan are a wedge of the steppes, with cruel Siberian climate but
fertile soil. In functional terms, this area is the latest extension of the national granary,
but the very low productivity of its wheat farming does not qualify it for inclusion
into the Breadbasket region. With the effects of continentality increasing eastward,
this wedge of farmland gradually degenerates into disconnected pockets of agriculture.
The southern fringe concentrates most cities and industry, as well as three-quarters of
Siberia’s population, and is in many ways a narrow eastern offshoot of European Russia.
In the east, it ends with the jewel of Lake Baikal, the deepest lake in the world, with a
unique ecosystem and remarkably clean water. It is also the largest body of fresh water
on the planet - a resource that one day may become more important than Siberia’s
legendary mineral wealth.
The Gift of Destiny
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Russia began its cross-navigation of the Land Ocean with the expedition of Yermak
(1581), when Moscow extended its authority to the basins of the Ob and Irtysh rivers.
A mere sixty years later, Russian explorers reached the Pacific. It was in the late 16thearly 17th century that most of the fortresses and stockades that later became the nuclei

are dry, intensified in some places by either a more southerly location or a leeward
location in the shadow of especially tall mountains. It is no surprise that one of the
driest places in the country, Death Valley in eastern California, is a lowland at the
eastern foot of the highest U.S. mountains outside Alaska.
Finally, aridity and an often rugged topography contribute to a distinctive pattern of
population distribution. After Alaska the most sparsely populated states in the United
States are Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and then Nevada, all
with 12 or fewer people per square mile, compared with an average for the “lower
48” of over 80. Throughout much of the region, people are concentrated in islands
of special opportunity - areas of irrigated agriculture, mineral extraction and refining,
tourist development, or transportation services. The popular image of the Land Ocean
remains that of wide open spaces where deer and buffalo roam. A drive across the
region may easily reinforce that image, for indeed the impression is often that of an
overwhelming emptiness. To the easterner especially, used to seldom being far from the
clear evidence of human occupation, this emptiness can be almost unnerving: there
just aren’t any people here! The truth, of course, is something quite different, since the
population of the region is strongly concentrated in a relatively few urban areas. But
then reality rarely enters into images of the Land Ocean.
Manifest Destiny
A popular conception in the United States of the 19th century was that the ownership
and settlement of much of the North American continent was part of America’s
“manifest destiny,” that the country and its people had a special right to continental
occupation. Beginning with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, which placed all of the
vast drainage basin of the Mississippi River under United States ownership, the country
seemed to have a limitless supply of new western land just as settlers began to push
against the western margins of the existing national territory. In 1845 the recently

Those plains were like the
ocean, a region of magnificent
distances, of desolate and
barren wastes, strange, solitary, unexplored. Sometimes
that ocean was a sea of grassy
hillocks, sometimes level with
the flatness of dead calm, oftener rolling in long swells to the
far-off horizon, green, tumultuous, tossing its waves of grass
under the driving winds, changing
shape and color as swift cloud
shadows sped over the uneven
surface. - Stanley Vestal,
“Windwagon”, in: William Targ,
ed., The American West: A
Treasury of Stories, Legends,
Narratives, Songs & Ballads of
Western America, The World
Publishing Company, Cleveland
& NYC, 1946, p. 393.
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of major cities of modern Siberia were founded. The amazing swiftness of annexation
of this huge chunk of the world’s land surface was not due to cunning state enterprise
and foresight. It was rather a combination of adventurism (as seen in the expedition
of Yermak, a plundering cossack leader of a privately hired and outfitted band
who “conquered” West Siberia by defeating a small Tatar khanate called Sibir) and
serendipity (Russians entered a geopolitical vacuum: China and the Kazakh hordes were
far to the south, and the native tribes were no match for Russians armed with firearms).
This swift and easy annexation established a long tradition of carelessly taking Siberia
for granted as an asset somehow destined to become Russian.
The goal of the initial advance into Siberia was the quest for the “hard currency” of
those times, furs, which were collected as Russia’s tribute from the subjugated native
population. Fur trade alone could not lead to any firm settlement, however, and the
real annexation of Siberia occurred only with Peter the Great’s attempts to harness its
wealth and to integrate Siberia into the Russian Empire. Numerous expeditions were
outfitted by Peter and his successors to prospect for minerals and map Siberia, and
mining began. At the same time, the tightening of serfdom in European Russia sent
into Siberia growing numbers of fugitive peasants who formed the core of the so-called
“old settlers.” The substitution of deportation to Siberia for capital punishment (1753)
brought in a third element of population. If Russians were outnumbered by the native
peoples in 1700, by the 1730s they accounted for 70 percent of the population: Siberia
had become part of Russia in more than merely a political sense.
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independent country of Texas was annexed. A year later the Oregon Compromise with
Great Britain placed all of the land from what is now western Montana westward to the
Pacific Ocean under America’s expanding control. In 1848, after the Mexican-American
War, the Republic of Mexico ceded what is today essentially the southwestern quadrant
of the United States. The outline of the 48 United States was largely complete, and
most of those new territories had been added to the nation’s political map before
significant American settlement.
An explanation for the comparative ease with which the United States acquired its
western half has more to with a series of fortunate differences in political goals than
with any special destiny. At the beginning of the century France was involved in a
bitter struggle for control of Haiti, so the Louisiana Territory, recently acquired from
Spain, was just not that important to French interests. They were almost pleased with
the opportunity to sell the land to the United States, for it meant that they could focus
their effort on holding their sugar-producting Caribbean colony. Texas in 1845 was
largely controlled by American-born settlers who had been instrumental in defeating
Mexican forces in the War of Texan Independence (1836), and many of them had
sought the opportunity to unite with their home country immediately. It was barriers
created by the United States that largely slowed incorporation of Texas for nine years.
Great Britain agreed to the Oregon Cession largely because it feared that an eventual
flood of American settlers into the Northwest would overwhelm a relatively modest
British settlement based on the fur industry. And finally, Mexico, having lost its war
with the United States, had little choice but to sell its own northwest, the land that
became America’s southwest, for about 5 cents per acre - the same price that had been
paid for Louisiana Territory 45 years earlier.
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Submerging Native Siberians

Marginalizing Native Americans

The impressive ethnic diversity of the Land Ocean is reflected in the pattern of two
east-west belts of native peoples, one in the north and another in the south, separated
by a Russian wedge along the main penetration route. For the peoples of the northern
tier occupying the tundra and taiga zones, the traditional economy relied on fishing
and hunting; that of the much better endowed southern tier was based on nomadic
cattle and horse-breeding. The fate of the native peoples in these two belts under
Russian rule differed even more than their traditional lifestyles.

Perhaps 2.5 million Native Americans were spread rather thinly across what was to
become the United States at the time of first European contact. By 1900 the ravages
of contact with Europeans had reduced their number by 90 percent. The government
had followed a two-nation policy during its first century, with Native American groups
repeatedly moved westward beyond the areas of European settlement, creating a Euroafrican East and a Native American West. President Monroe had given expression to
this approach in 1825 when he wrote that the Native American “should yield to the
greater force of civilized population; and right it is to yield, for the earth was given to
mankind to support the greater number of which it is capable.” The native population,
its numbers ever decreasing, was pushed toward the margins, away from more
productive, more accessible areas.

The peoples of the northern tier are officially recognized as “the small peoples of
the north,” a reflection of their sparse numbers (on the average several thousand)
and special protected status. Some of these peoples belong to the Paleoasiatic group
(the Chukchi, Koryaks, Itel’mens, Yukagirs) and are extremely ancient, relics who
were pushed into the north by much later arrivals from the south. The societies of
shamanist native northeners had little incentive to change as the risk of discarding the
accumulated experience of generations was too great. The fragility of these “frozen”
cultures which were perfectly but rigidly acclimated to their equally fragile northern
ecosystems spelled doom under Russian impact. Although Russians were paternalistic
so long as the natives paid tribute, epidemics and the introduced addiction to alcohol
began to decimate their numbers. Over the last 300 years their populations remained
static or even dwindled, and added to this loss was the destruction of the natural
environment. It takes many years to heal a scar left in the tundra by the passage of a
single caterpillar tractor, or to restore spawning grounds in rivers maimed by mining.
The Soviet government created huge territorial autonomies for the peoples of the North
that account for 71 percent of Siberia’s area, but only 19 percent of its population. The
influx of Europeans to develop mineral resources has meant that now the proportion of
native population nowhere exceeds 15 percent. Native peoples are raising a demand for
smaller territories with exclusive rights to the use of land and resources, in fact almost
reservations.

For a time the Land Ocean, viewed as the least desirable portion of the West, was
bypassed by this expansion. The region’s native population - the Crow, Cheyenne,
Arapahoe, and Comanche hunting buffalo and antelope along the dry margins of the
grasslands; and the Utes, Paiutes, and Shoshone, living on a diet of deer, small game,
and wild edible plants - were briefly ignored. Eventually the open-range cattle industry,
dry farming, and minerals attracted American settlers and the process of removal
crept across the region. Huge blocks of land earlier set aside for Native Americans
were reduced to smaller and smaller parcels. The two-nation concept was abandoned,
replaced by a reservation policy that required the indigenous population to surrender
their general claim to the land and placed them on clearly defined and generally
rather small reserves. By the late 1890s nearly all Native Americans had been moved
to some 268 reserves, most of them in the most marginal portions of the West. In a
separate current, the 1887 Dawes Act encouraged Native Americans to opt out of the
communal lands of the reservation, claim what had been reservation land with the same
160 acres provided for Whites under the Homestead Act, and become farmers. Nearly
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Almighty Spirit, Noomy-Torum,
was busy creating the Earth...he
took off his precious girdle with
heavy buttons and girded it around
the Earth to fortify it. Where the
girdle touched the Earth there
appeared the Ural Mountains- just
in the middle of the Earth. Where
there were buttons - there appeared lakes. Live and be blessed
every man, every animal, every bird.
"Noomy-Torum's Girdle", Mansi
fairy tale (Native Siberian tribe)
in: Galina Smirnova, Fairy Tales
of Siberian Folks, translated by
Olga Myazina and Galina Shchitnikova, Krasnoyarsk, Vital Publishers, 1992, p. 138.

The scattered settlement pattern of the small northern peoples is the major cause
of their loss of culture, since the teaching of native languages becomes an almost
unsurmountable problem of logistics. Founding even a single school can ensure the
survival of a native language, but is not always possible. Young people often refuse to
learn their own language. Worlds of local culture are hidden on the bottom of the Land
Ocean beneath the tidal wave of modern “civilization.”
While the fate of the tribal societies in northern Siberia justly arouses public sympathy,
it is often overlooked how different was the course of history for the far more numerous
south Siberian peoples (Buryats, Altayans, Khakass, Tuvinians and Yakuts). These
Turkic and Mongol-speakers (Buddhist with the exception of the Orthodox Yakuts)
occupy the southern band of mountains and forest-steppes adjacent to Mongolia.
Their numbers grew from about 200,000 in the 17th century to 1.3 million in 1989.
Yakuts and Buryats learned the techniques of sedentary agriculture and the tricks of
trading from Russians. These people perfectly adapted to Russian rule and thrived
by exploiting the more primitive native groups. In fact, their role in driving out the
smaller peoples of the North was greater than that of Russians. Many were assimilated
by Yakuts, nomadic cattle-herders who began to migrate into the Lena basin not long
before the Russians. Under Russian rule they expanded their territory to the modern
boundaries of the Sakha (Yakut) republic, which is larger than India in area. Yet, due to
Slav immigration even these more resilient Siberian peoples account for only a quarter
to a third of the populations of their territorial autonomies, while Slavs account for 90
percent of the Land Ocean’s population.
THEME 1: THE FRONTIER AS MYTH AND SYMBOL
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The very name “Siberian” suggests to Russians a tough and independent character
shaped by the stern life of colonists. This image of the classic Siberian as a bearded
peasant, reliable, simple, and solid in his ways, was kept alive by the efforts of the Soviet

100 million acres were lost to reservations in this process, with perhaps a third of all
Native Americans seizing the opportunity for independence.
Unfortunately, most of their land was unsuited to agriculture, and they soon gave up
the attempt and sold the land if they could. Having rejected the reservation system,
they became a landless, poor population of ranch and farm workers or urban laborers.
Today many Native Americans in the West live either in relative deprivation on
reservations or in poverty in urban areas. Reservations, often inaccessible and lacking
resources, offer scant opportunity for improvement. Full integration into the society
and economy of urban American has also been difficult. Still, a very real Native
American renaissance is a part of this environment. It has taken many forms - a return
to communalism, a revival of the reservation as a main base of life and culture, a rise in
native-owned businesses, an increasing wish to preserve traditional institutions, and a
vibrant activism seeking broader recognition of Native Americans as a part of the fabric
of American life.
THEME 1: THE FRONTIER AS MYTH AND SYMBOL
The notion of the West as frontier central to the formation of American character
is perhaps the core myth of the United States. The West became the symbol of
the qualities that set Americans apart from those who had not the opportunity
to experience the frontier. Europeans might have their long history and ancient
institutions, but they could not match the self-reliance, the special quality and
importance of each individual American forged by the frontier experience.
The emergence of the idea of the West as the creative caldron of America began soon
after the American revolution. Crevecouer in Letters from an American Farmer wrote
in the 1780s of Americans as a new people, certainly not all good but vital nonetheless,
emerging from the experience with the wilderness. As the United States grew during

After a long time, Tsichtinako
spoke to them, "What are we going to do now concerns the earth.
We are going to make the mountains."...After all this was done,
Tsichtinako spoke again and told
them, "Now that you have all the
mountains around you with plains,
mesas, and canyons, you must
make the growing things of these
places...She said they would find
in their baskets cottontails, jack
rabbits, antelope, and water deer.
They were told to give life to these
animals.
"The Origin Myth of the Acoma"
(Puebla tribe of western New Mexico) in Alan R. Velie, ed., American
Indian Literature: An Anthology,
University of Oklahoma Press,
1979, pp. 21-22.
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“village prose” circle, whose best-known members were Valentin Rasputin from Irkutsk
and movie producer-actor-writer Vasiliy Shukshin from the Altai. One of the favorite
plot lines of Shukshin is that of a dashing young Siberian lad without a penny in his
pocket who “conquers” Moscow, a story in essence the expression of Siberian frontier
identity as opposed to corrupt and false Moscow. Portraying Siberia as a reliable rear
guard and frequent savior of ungrateful European Russia has a grain of truth. Such
writings have far wider than regional appeal, which may be explained by the desire of
non-Siberians to believe that somewhere out east there still is that land of pure rivers,
great wealth, and strong people who will never let them down.
The work of another known Siberian, the poet Yevtushenko, demonstrates a quite
different facet of the Siberian image. His Siberia is the “Wild East” of tramps,
vagabonds, and outlaws. Even at the height of Soviet totalitarianism, Siberia was the
place where a man without a passport could easily get lost and find work. Hobos
alternating chance jobs with petty crime and drinking sprees are familiar local figures
to this day. The Land Ocean has the dubious distinction of having record-high levels of
alcoholism and crime, and the rude mores of motley work crews in its logging camps
and mines are well known. Part of this spirit of frontier lawlessness stems from Siberia’s
past as the land of exiles, many of whom were deported for life or stayed by choice in
the rough and tumble Siberian scene when freed.
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The mixture of steady peasants and unruly outlaws accounts for the lack of a clear and
widely accepted image of the Land Ocean. Furthermore, until recently, the region never
was the country’s only or even most important frontier. In contrast to the southern
frontiers of Russia, it does not evoke the heroic mythology of colonial wars, Cossack
chivalry, or Christian triumphs over Islam. Beginning with Peter’s projects, most of the
region’s population were brought there to serve state interests: even Siberian Cossacks
were little different from the regular army. The region faithfully served and furthered
the strength of that same state whose dictates it instinctively opposed. In the Soviet

the 19th century, and especially as the East developed into a more urban and urbane
seaboard, interest in the West as a special place blossomed. Eastern writers almost
flooded the country with an endless series of Western stories and heros, some based
in fact but many pure fiction. From James Fennimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking tales
to Kit Carson and Buffalo Bill Cody, America’s fascination with the Frontier seemed
insatiable. Cody himself gained considerable additional fame and fortune by gathering
together a collection of his friends and acquaintances, plus a herd of animals, and
touring the East and Europe with his Wild West show. This obsession with the West
did not end with the passing of the century. Television and American movies have
mined the rich possibilities of stories about the West for decades, with John Wayne the
embodiment of the American hero.
The West of popular image is as much an experience as a place, moving with settlement
and allowing for a constant repetition of the western experience. The Land Ocean may
simply be the last West, the final place (outside Alaska) in the country where Americans
could be renewed and energized by the frontier experience and by meeting a series of
physical challenges: great distances, arid climate, rugged terrain, and an earth difficult
to subdue. As writer Tom Mathews described it: “you have to grasp the seductive power
of the Western landscape. Drive over the Big Horn Mountains in Wyoming or stand
at 7000 feet on Mesa Verde...look out and each mesa is an acropolis, each canyon a
cathedral.”
Even a tenacious shrub called artemisia tridentata (better known as sagebrush) has
come to symbolize the West, and the population of the United States is probably the
proud owner of more of it than any other plant. A single sagebrush may live 100 years,
surviving on winter snow waters and tapping water below with its extensive roots.
Perhaps in its lonely determination and individualism the tough plant has come to
represent the qualities of western life that permeate American mythology about the
region.
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period, the need to shift population eastward led to the manufacturing of a new
image of the region as the land of youth. Here was a wilderness that needed to be
“conquered,” the romantic lure of opening new lands and a test for one’s willpower and
physical strength ( and a great service to the motherland, of course). Land Ocean is
still the land of the young, and yet it is a strange frontier. Several times nearly forgotten
and then rejuvenated, Siberia seems trapped in “eternal youth” even though in terms
of Russian history it is 400 years old. It may now be losing population, and the scarred
look of its once pristine nature betrays an advanced age, but the region is still the everhopeful debutante with naive visions of a great and special future.
Although the prevailing image of the Land Ocean is that of a great wilderness, it is in
fact one of the most urbanized parts of the country. In Northern Siberia the cities (such
as Murmansk and Noril’sk, the world’s two largest cities located beyond the Arctic
circle) stand as solitary icebergs in the emptiness of the Land Ocean. The profiles of
cities in southern Siberia are more diverse, and bear testimony to the gradual southward
shift of the all-important east-west trunk road. The original administrative and cultural
capitals of Siberia (Tobol’sk, Tomsk, and Yakutsk) were beaded along the early “road
of chains” that went well north of the future course of the TransSiberian. Bypassed by
the railway, they afterwards grew little, preserving quaint old church-studded streets
and the atmosphere of Siberia’s first cultural centers, where refinement was brought
(somewhat paradoxically) by Russia’s early political exiles.
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In contrast, the cities along the Transiberian from Tyumen’ to Krasnoyarsk experienced
explosive growth in the 20th century. During the Second World War numerous
factories (evacuated into this deep rear) laid the foundations for diversified modern
industries, better linked to European Russia than to the resource frontier farther
north. The populations of focally located Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk grew from
about 60 thousand before the Revolution to respectively 1.4 and 0.9 million by 1989.
Novosibirsk with its famous Akademgorodok (a city of science, housing the Siberian

If sagebrush still thrives in the West, the buffalo has almost disappeared from what was
once the grasslands of the Great Plains. Early travelers could not have imagined that
extinction could even be a remote possibility; the buffalo population on the North
American continent was estimated at 45 to 60 million before European-Americans
began to eliminate the herds. More than one million per year were killed in the latter
half of the 19th century, and in 1883 the last great herd was wiped off the Land
Ocean. In the National Bison Range in Montana and other centers, the buffalo is now
protected, another symbol of the stubborn Western spirit.
However, in a blow against American myth, the people who inhabit this vast region
are hardly rural folks. Most people in the West are classed as urban by the U.S. census
and live in a series of scattered city dots on the map of the Land Ocean. For example,
the majority of people in Colorado live in a string of cities at the western edge of
the grasslands along the Front Range from Pueblo in the south through Colorado
Springs and Denver to Boulder and Greeley in the north. Similarly, the great majority
of Utahans live in cities in an irrigated lowland along the east side of Utah Lake and
the Great Salt Lake from Provo through Salt Lake City to Ogden in the north. Most
residents in Nevada live in the Las Vegas urban area, and many of the rest live in Reno.
Why should the land of “home-on-the-range” be actually quite urbanized? The answer
is essentially a list of many of the reasons why cities exist in the first place. Denver, the
Mile High City and easily the region’s largest urban area, has become a major service
and administration center for a large portion of the country’s western midsection.
The Denver Federal Center is said to be the largest single concentration of federal
government operations outside Washington. Like a number of other western cities
(Albuquerque and Ogden are examples), Denver has become a major service and
warehousing center for transcontinental shipping. Its airport is one the country’s
busiest. Like nearly every other state capital in the country, Denver has grown in
response to the increasing role of state government. Denver has also become a major
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branch of the Academy of Sciences) has developed into the new cultural capital of
Siberia.

regional retailing center, with some shoppers willing to travel hundreds of miles to sift
through the delights of the city’s stores and shopping malls.

Cities aside, some of the oldest islands in the Land Ocean are the villages and
homesteads of ancient settlers, many of them schismatic Old-Believers who retreated
from religious persecutions ever deeper into the taiga. (Symbolic of the remoteness
possible only in Siberia is the recent case of an Old-Believers family, discovered in the
taiga, who had still not heard the news of the 1917 Revolution). The youngest islands
are those of mining and industry, many of them small company towns grouped into
archipelagos of almost dictatorial rule by a Moscow ministry. The notorious GULAG
archipelago adds to this mix its own islands of penal colonies. The popular image of
the region features fettered convicts and political exiles, but like much of Siberia’s
portrait, this image weaves myth with reality. Truly enough, since the 17th century
it was the land of “damnation and chains” that culminated with Stalin’s forced labor
camps. But before the Stalinist terror, the proportion of convicts in Siberia seldom
exceeded 5 percent, only one-fifth of them political exiles. The stream of settlers was
always dominated by free people who came on their own will. Throughout the length
of Russia’s history, Siberia’s role was twofold: the voluntary refuge of non-conformists
who fled from the system and the forced destination of those who openly threatened it.
While Siberia served as a safety valve for the state, it also satisfied the quest for freedom
in the Russian soul. In Land Ocean there was room for all.

But it is ultimately our myths about western heroes which permeate national place
imagery of the Land Ocean. The image of an ability to deal with life’s problems without
the ever-present help of society, and certainly without government assistance, is popular
with many inhabitants of the West. Is the myth valid? In a real sense the answer must
be “of course not.” Westerners today are every bit as dependent on government support
as residents of any section of the country. Yet the myth persists. Not a few of the flood
of tourists so important to the regional economy are there in hopes of sharing the
western experience. Cowboy hats and boots are common Western garb, even for folks
who seldom see let alone ride a horse. The West has given America resources, space, and
always - a fresh start.

THEME 2: THE BAM AND BUSTS
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The wealth of the Land Ocean has long been perceived as a strategic reserve - a
safeguard of Russia’s future. Frenetic campaigns to tap the rich storehouse followed
whenever the geopolitical situation demanded. The tidal rhythm of active booms
interspersed with calm interludes punctuates the whole history of the Land Ocean.
One of the most recent booms of activity on a grandiose scale is the BAM: the Baikal-

THEME 2: THE BOOMS AND BUSTS
Near the headwaters of the Missouri River at Three Forks, a skeleton town called
Gallatin City remains as a monument to human foolishness and greed. This place in
Montana is not atypical of the hundreds of ghost towns which cobweb the western
landscape. Eastern land speculators created Gallatin in the 1860s, hoping to cash in on
service needs for prospectors. Unfortunately, no one thought to check the navigability
of the river until after thousands of dollars were invested in building the town. Only
then did the founders realize that the waterfall at Great Falls prevented boats from
reaching this far upstream. Gallatin was abandoned almost as soon as it was built, a
tangible example of the precarious nature of economic life on the Land Ocean.
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Amur Mainline, cutting across Siberia to the Far East and representing one of the most
ambitious railroad engineering challenges in history. Technical problems, setbacks, and
massive investment requirements for the BAM show that collecting the riches of the
Land Ocean does not come easily, and the region’s economy has been on a roller coaster
ride from the beginning.
A Resource-Based Economy
The fur bonanza that followed the initial conquest was the first high tide in Land
Ocean’s economic history. For a while this “soft gold” constituted the bulk of Muscovy’s
foreign trade and created the economic foundation on which the Romanov dynasty
forged a Russian state. However, the depletion of furs soon put the region backstage
until it was reawakened by Peter’s reforms which gave Siberia a new role as Russia’s
mineral treasure chest. The first silver and copper mines and smelters originated in the
Altai and served as a major source for coinage, and the lower Lena became the country’s
prime gold-producing area. This emphasis on precious metals highlights Siberia’s
longtime role as Moscow’s emergency hoard of resources.
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After this burst of development the Land Ocean experienced a century of calm. The
construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in the 1890s had momentous consequences,
but only for the southern fringe of Siberia, where a swelling tide of peasant settlers
claimed their homesteads, while in the rest of Land Ocean the population grew even
more slowly than in European Russia. The TransSiberian itself was largely built for
strategic reasons to secure a link with the Far Eastern provinces newly annexed in 185860. The intervening spaces of the Land Ocean were perceived as a mere obstacle to be
overcome. Remoteness, as well as European Russia’s wealth in resources essential to the
Industrial Revolution, again left Siberia forgotten, one of the least developed regions
of Imperial Russia. Reflecting this lack of interest, the region’s southern boundary
with China remained nearly unchanged from 1689 to the Soviet period, when Siberia
belatedly became Russia’s main frontier.

A Resource-Based Economy
The economic structure of the West for many years resembled that of any
underdeveloped region: raw materials were sent out; manufactured goods and
investment capital sent in. The Land Ocean at first held far less interest for the
westward drift of American settlement than did the new Pacific margins of the country.
The moister lands of the Willamette Valley in present-day Oregon, or the bountiful
opportunities of California after the discovery of gold in 1848, drew people westward.
Between 1845 and 1860 an estimated 200,000 Americans journeyed westward into the
region. Most were bound for California or the Oregon Territory. Only Mormon Utah
attracted a significant settlement within the Land Ocean. Trails in the region (such
as the famous Oregon Trail and its California Cutoff) were not routes to this dry and
often rugged land, but merely across it.
To our day, most major transport routes in the interior West still connect east with
west rather than north with south. Five major interstate highways lace the region in
a strikingly even series of east-west ribbons. The region’s railroads have an even more
dramatic east-west orientation. Lines of transport have integrated the Land Ocean with
the rest of the country better than they have joined the sections of the region itself.
Exploiting the resources of the West has always been a transportation challenge, and
a map of America’s interstate highway system, railroads, and air routes shows that the
Land Ocean is still an area sparsely served by all three.
While for those making their way to the gold fields of California or the Klondike the
Land Ocean was merely an obstacle, others later found riches by dipping into the
“waters.” Nevada was the site of the Comstock Lode, and Virginia City, Montana, soon
boomed to a population of 20,000. Gold, silver, lead, zinc, and copper drew miners to
the West, and in later years, tungsten, molybdenum, and uranium were added to the
list. Butte, Montana, became famous for sitting on “The Richest Hill in the World,”
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In the Soviet years, the depletion of resources in the European part of a quickly
industrializing Russia along with strategic concerns prompted the movement of the
economic center of gravity eastward, and in the period from the 1930s to 1970s, the
Land Ocean experienced its greatest boom ever. Even without the southern fringe, the
region’s population grew at twice the rate of the country as a whole and many new
cities emerged.
Thus, the new Kuznetzk coal basin (Kuzbas) was developed as an alternative to the
country’s old metallurgical bases in a mere ten years. Between 1926 and 1939 the
Kuzbas centers of Novokuznetzk and Kemerovo, grew from about 5 thousand to
150-200 thousand population. Today the Kuzbas accounts for 37 percent of coal
production in Russia and has three metallurgical plants, two of which are the largest
in the country, yet in another sense, this young industrial area already appears to be
worn-out. From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s the proportion of Siberian industrial
output turned out by Kuzbas shrank twofold, while thoroughly neglected amenities
and dismal atmospheric pollution caused an absolute loss of population. Novokuznetzk
and Kemerovo rank among least desired urban places in Russia.
Similar features of a failed utopia are evident in Tyumen’ oblast - Russia’s hopeful oil
emirate. The area’s development as the linchpin of a crash program to boost Soviet
oil and gas output began only in the late 1960s, and by the 1970s it appeared to be
a spectacular success as the area came to account for two-thirds of oil and more than
one-half of natural gas production in the former USSR. Oil and natural gas exports
from Land Ocean provided the bulk of Soviet hard currency earnings and brought the
country a modicum of prosperity. They propped up the senile Soviet regime, just as furs
had bolstered the early Romanov reign. But this bonanza was short-lived. In a hurry
to skim the cream off the best oilfields, the reserves were overtapped and the oil fields
damaged, to be abandoned for new ones beyond the Arctic Circle. Despite this
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as a wealth of metals were mined from the city for over a century. Copper came out of
the Bingham Mine near Salt Lake City, and vast oil shales were discovered in Utah and
Colorado. The gluttony was promoted by the Mining Law of 1872, which facilitated
easy and cheap rights to mining on public lands.
The mines created fortunes for some people, but also their share of headaches. Local
environments were wrecked by polluted runoff and topsoil torn off to create open pit
mines. Smelters smothered vegetation, buildings, and human lungs alike in arsenic and
other poisons. Mine tailings piled up on the landscape. The West and the United States
as a whole are still dealing with the cleanup cost of the mining bonanza of the Land
Ocean.
Timber extraction has played a large role in some local economies of the West, but
perhaps the tradition most branded into public folklore of the region is cattle raising.
Ranchers have in the past been in close competition with both farmers and sheep
graziers; more recently, battles are being fought between those who still favor federal
lands for cattle and those who believe the practice creates too much environmental
damage.
In the 1800s, millions of wild Texas longhorn cattle fed on the open ranges of Texas.
The tradition of rounding them up for the drive overland to railroads in Missouri and
Kansas began in 1866, spawning the era of the cowboy. But almost from the beginning,
cattle raising on the open country has been hazardous. Open warfare erupted between
cattle ranchers (mostly Mormon or Anglo-American) and sheep herders, who were
often of Mexican origin. The cattlemen accused the sheep of ruining the rangeland
by their habit of eating the grass right down to the roots. Other disputes arose over
ownership of unbranded cattle on the range and the desire of farmers to build fences.
But perhaps the greatest threat came from the cattlemen themselves, whose confidence
in the ability of the Land Ocean to support the herds was soon proven foolish. The
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extension, in the 1990s the production of oil in West Siberia has been declining, and
boom towns like Surgut or Urengoi are pondering their future.
Although industrial areas like Western Siberia received huge infusions of investment,
the race to open them up meant that creating decent amenities for migrants was always
neglected. Hastily built and lacking a lived-in feeling, the cities appear makeshift,
adding to a false image of the region’s eternal youth: everything seems to lie ahead. But
maturity is never reached, as neglected areas move directly into senility, and the wave of
new development rolls deeper into the wilderness.
The opening up of the Land Ocean required connecting it into the national economy,
but that has not been an easy task. Obviously, the most important linkages run eastwest. The backbone of the system and Siberia’s umbilical chord to the nation is still
the TransSiberian railway, easily the world’s record holder in terms of the bulk of cargo
moved. The second major east-west route into the region is the legendary Northern
Sea Route along the Arctic coast, dependent on powerful icebreakers accompanying
convoys of ships, and available only a few months of the year. Between these two great
routes the only links are those of the world’s longest domestic air-routes, now managed
by the sometimes-risky regional successors to Aeroflot.
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The preponderance of east-west routes accounts for the weak link between southern
and northern Siberia. While the southern fringe has a developed urban-industrial
economy, the rest is still a poorly attached appendage. The horizontal bands of Siberian
territory are stitched together by the vital seams of north-flowing rivers. Frozen for nine
months a year they become roadbeds. Mortally dangerous, the work of truckers on
Siberia’s famous highway to Yakutsk and Magadan has made them into folklore figures.
Overall, the map of Siberia seems to be as sketchy as its cities are makeshift: scattered
blots of cities or oilfields and disconnected traces of transport lines do not form a
cohesive entity.

early 1880s were a time of deceptively mild winters, and grazing pressures grew as more
and more cattle were released. In 1870 a steer could derive enough nourishment from
5 acres of grassland; by 1880, 50 acres were required. The animal population level was
already too high by 1885 when one of the worst winters known hit the plains, followed
by a second bad season in 1886. Up to one-third of the herds perished.
The precarious nature of the meat industry here continued up to the 1980s, when
a decline in domestic demand for beef occurred at the same time that exports to
foreign markets were constrained by rising exchange rates for American currency.
Debt problems for farmers and ranchers in the West increased as costly, capital- and
energy-intensive techniques drove many out of business. Land prices declined as well,
and communities whose economic base depended on their role as agricultural service
centers were hurt by spin-off effects. In a final “bust,” energy prices fell in the 1980s,
and plans for development of western oil shale reserves turned out to be not only
environmentally unpalatable, but also plain uneconomical.
The New West was now dependent on urban-dwelling service employees, ready and
willing to spend money in the countryside on weekends and for vacations, but firm
to demand that the same countryside not be deforested, strip mined, or overgrazed.
Meanwhile, the rural population of farmers, ranchers, and miners were aging and
becoming fewer in numbers as landholdings were consolidated, giving way to large
operations that could survive the financial crunch of the later 1980s. Tourism has
grown to be a major income source, not only in states such as Nevada which have
long sought tourist dollars in the form of gambling and legalized prostitution, but
also in places like Montana, only recently emerging as a prime travel destination
for people who enjoy the outdoors. Pressure from sightseers and outdoor sports
enthusiasts sometimes requires developments that are not always benign for the western
environment, and the culture imported by urbanite western tourists may not sit well
with local folks.

26

For all its vicissitudes, the Land Ocean remains the country’s economic mainstay and
hope. With 20 percent of Russia’s population, the region accounts for 40 percent of
its exports. Taking into account the crucial dependence of most ex-Soviet republics
on Siberian oil, the region is vital to the economic re-integration of the former USSR;
Tyumen’ wields more power as a defacto CIS capital than Minsk. Besides fuels, the
Land Ocean supplies the bulk of Russian diamond and gold production and exports.
Such areas as Noril’sk and the Kola peninsula provide the bulk of strategic non-ferrous
metals. Reserves of coal and natural gas in southern Siberia and Yakutia are among the
world’s greatest, and may acquire international importance in the future. But even if
the region becomes a resource semi-colony of the western world rather than of Russia,
it will hardly escape its boom-and-bust predicament.
Who Should Own Siberia?
The extreme remoteness of Siberia led to a sense of separateness and a desire for
autonomy. This notion was even given official support under Catherine the Great,
who instituted the “Siberian Kingdom” in the 1760s, envisioned as a self-supporting
dominion with separate currency. Siberian coinage stopped in 1781, but until the
Revolution there existed a movement of the so-called “regionalists,” who foresaw the
prosperity of Siberia in federal union or secession from Russia. Even ethnic differences
were cited in support of autonomy, as a large proportion of the old Siberian population
were of mixed Slav-native origin and felt little affinity with Russia proper. In recent
times, living literally on top of the rich mineral wealth combined with the strict control
of resources by the central authorities strengthened the local feeling of a victimized
region, from which resources and profits are unfairly taken.
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While Siberians quite justly feel that their region was historically neglected and used,
some also blindly accept the simplistic notion that Siberian oil belongs to those who
happen to live in Tyumen’ oblast or that Yakutian diamonds belong to residents of

An example of this employment-base shift is Kellogg, Idaho, a town whose original
name was “Noah Kellogg’s Jackass,” after an animal of the man who discovered the
lode that created the Bunker Hill Mine. Beginning operations in 1885, Bunker Hill
brought lead, silver, and zinc out of the mountains, but in 1981 economic change,
environmental concerns, and resource depletion called for closing down Bunker Hill,
throwing 2000 people out of work. Today, Kellogg is the site of the Silver Mountain
Resort, a destination ski resort. Tourist money is filling in the income gap for many
places in the Land Ocean, but even as the visitors come for an “authentic” experience,
they are by their very presence changing the face of the West.
Who Should Own the West?
An historic irony in the American West is that the federal government became the
biggest landlord in the region, despite the fact that no one seemed to want it that way
until Teddy Roosevelt’s era. Since the 19th century, many American citizens in the West
have complained about government interference in private ownership rights; but at
the same time, the U.S. government has been attempting to get rid of vast tracts of the
Land Ocean, a goal evidenced by various pieces of legislation giving away the rights to
farm, mine, and ranch public land.
A landlord-style government, especially one based in the East, was not the image of
America that most nineteenth century citizens held, and almost from the beginning
there was pressure to give over rights of utilizing the land to private interests. If
ownership is defined as use, then the federal government has been a give-away agent of
historic proportions. Land rights were ceded to the railroads, to land speculators, and
in perhaps the biggest gift of all, to agriculturalists. Congress passed the Homestead
Act in 1862, allowing any man or woman who applied to own 160 acres of public land
that had not yet been otherwise appropriated. Claims continued well into the twentieth
century until 1934 when the Bureau of Land Management took over stewardship of
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Yakutia. They would happily see themselves as oil or diamond “emirates” emerging
from the chaos of Soviet devolution. The Yamal-Nenets “republic” and Yakutia have
both declared sovereignty over land and resources. The stakes of such struggles for
resource ownership are quite high: Yakutia (which has reclaimed the old name “Sakha”)
provides 99 percent of Russia’s diamond output, about one-fourth of such gems mined
in the world. Since such a small proportion of the population is non-Slavic, ownership
claims may be more related to local managers and politicians’ ambitions than to the
rights held by indigenous peoples. In the case of Yamal-Nenets, only one pecent of the
population is native “northern people.”
In fact, most residents of northern Siberia are temporary drifters, modern nomads
attracted by the “long ruble” of northern wage differentials. Their tour of duty finished,
they leave the region to settle down with accumulated savings in a more welcoming
climate. The majority of oil workers in the north of Tyumen’ oblast are even flown there
for their workshifts from the European part of the country or Tyumen’ city (900 miles
away). Without a population attached to the land, the land is in turn poorly attached
to the nation; and the colonials are pressing to renegotiate relations with the mother
country.
The Land Ocean clearly gives the country more than it receives. But with its
insatiable need for infrastructure investment and state-subsidized transport and its
requirement for special salary incentives, it is also strongly dependent on the center.
The predominance of large-scale economic enterprise in strategically important sectors
means that Siberia will long lag behind other regions in privatization. What Siberia
seeks today is not so much fair treatment as special privileges, and to get that, Siberians
need a strong central government. The regional bravado about self-sufficiency and
isolationism have been born largely out of the Land Ocean’s self-promoted myth of a
perennial frontier.
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the remaining acres. As a result of the federal policies, land prices fell during much of
the last century, and land speculation was difficult to combat. The ideal of the small,
family homestead gradually gave way to the economic realities of corporate agriculture.
Farm size was not the only geographic myth that was perpetuated on the Land Ocean.
Despite the fact that the environment of the West demanded a different style of
land management, people continued to operate by rules learned in the humid East.
Arguments over rights to water, mineral resources, and grasslands occurred among
private citizens, sometimes with violent results. Multiple use management means
reconciling interests that may be irreconcilable, and battles between environmentalists
and ranchers over grazing rights on public lands erupted into the so-called “Sagebrush
Rebellion” in the 1970s. In Nevada alone, almost 90 percent of the land is under
federal ownership, and the state government began to argue for transfer of rights to the
local level, a call to arms soon taken up by other western states.
There is a fair amount of pretending going on in the traditional economy of the Land
Ocean. The image of the region pretends to rugged individualism and hard work, yet
the region receives constant subsidies from people in other parts of the United States.
Many local folks pretend that they want no interference from the federal government,
yet public ownership, federal spending, and management of lands have been a mainstay
for building much private wealth. The economic bases of the Old West seem to reflect
local identity, but the investment for creating these activities long depended on people
outside the region. And finally, folks historically have pretended that the resources and
territory of the West have been unlimited. Like most aspects of the West, there is a
bigness even in the boom and bust cycles of the economy. Some years have been good
ones, some miserable; few have been what one would call “average.” But then what
could ever be ordinary in a place made from myth?
30
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THE PACIFIC GATEWAY*
Aleksei Novikov and Raymond Krishchyunas

THE PACIFIC GATEWAY*
Kathleen Braden

To fishermen or who sail down Russia’s Pacific coast, the forests of wild
oak that line the mountains of the Lazovsky Nature Reserve must look like
a landscape painted on an ancient Chinese porcelain plate. The leaves
meet in an unbroken canopy over the slopes, and along the ground grow
mushrooms of unearthly size, shape, and color. Hiking through the reserve
is not easy because there are no paths and only carved marks on tree
trunks from previous travelers show the way. Lianas, or vines, twine around
the tall trees, and among the leaves on the forest floor, wild boar and
spotted deer still run, and black bear perch up in the branches, munching
acorns. Through the underbrush of this forest, the Siberian tiger roams, the
largest tiger in the world. But in recent years, this region has opened up to
the outside world and the tiger of Russia’s Pacific may not survive to see
the end of this century. Poachers have decimated it, eager to meet market
demands in China and throughout the Far East for tiger skin and bones
believed to have magic medicinal powers. Only a handful of tigers still hunt
deer and goral here, often trapping their prey in the Pacific waters with the
high cliffs of the mountains to their back.

Nature is so untamed on the Pacific beaches of Washington State that you
can get killed just by walking along the shore. Signs at the few areas of
coast that are accessible from land warn people about deadly logs of giant
cedar and Douglas fir which are hurled like missiles onto the beach by the
waves rolling in from the Gulf of Alaska. But the brave soul who dares to
walk the rocks and sand will be rewarded by the spectacle of the largest
ocean on earth, and will find on the shoreline scavenged fishing floats and
debris printed with strange Oriental characters, telling the tale of what lies
just beyond the sunset. If you could look far to the north to Cape Flattery
and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, or down to the ports of Puget Sound, you
might get a glimpse of container ships making their way from Korea and
Japan, or tugboats pulling barges up the Inside Passage to Alaska, or
perhaps even a huge Trident nuclear submarine going down Hood Canal
to the base at Bangor, for this region is the strategic “corner” of America.
Over your shoulder may be only the back door to the rest of the continent,
but in front lies a gateway to Asia and the Pacific.

Out along the shoreline, a naval vessel is sailing down to Vladivostok, and
there are ball-like floats washed ashore from Japanese fishing nets and
other tell-tale plastic signs of civilization encroaching from the Pacific Rim.
But today the sun is warm, the waves gently lap the shore, and along the
sand the prints of the tiger lead into the sea.

* This chapter was alternatively called “Pacific Gateway” & “Pacific
Edge” during the writing of Beyond Borders
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OUTPOST IN THE FAR EAST

UTOPIA IN THE NORTHWEST

The image of a precarious strategic outpost pervades the Russian perception of the
Pacific Edge, a region which opened up with a vengeance after the break-up of the
USSR. Once isolated by location and the strong presence of the Russian military, the
Far East of Russia now attracts foreign investors, as well as get-rich-quick hopefuls
and a sinister criminal element that has flourished in the post-Soviet period. Clinging
to the edge of the continent and facing the Pacific more than Moscow, the region
has exploded into the chaos, riskiness, and excitement of a real frontier. In the oncesealed military port of Vladivostok, Nissans and Toyotas now drive the potholed
streets alongside Russian-made Zhigulis; sailors walk the boardwalk next to visiting
businessmen from Taiwan; and local “entrepreneurs” talk joint ventures with foreigners
eager to cash in on the warehouse sale of Russia’s resources.

The Pacific Northwest is the place of the great getaway, a region described by Alan
Furst as “a mystical zone of indifference, a place so remote, so utterly far away from
everything that even your private demons will get lost trying to find you. All the
refugees out here have at least one thing in common: in their secret hearts they’re
people who don’t want to be found.” But getting away from it all is becoming more
difficult in western Washington and Oregon, northern California, and even Alaska
as more people discover the natural beauty and amenities of the region. What has
sometimes been termed the most livable part of America is experiencing rapid
population and economic growth, to the point where arguments over development
have become a major political issue.

Such scenes stand in real contrast to more distant times, when the expansion of Russia
ran into unusually tough resistance in this youngest of frontier regions as well as
competition from other powers, suffering serious setbacks as a consequence. The initial
Russian conquest was slowed even by the landscape of the Far East. The rivers that
conveniently bore Russian explorers across Siberia stop short of the Pacific, which is
separated from the interior by an uninterrupted chain of rugged mountains running
all the way from Chukotka to China. It was only along the inhospitable coast of the
Okhotsk Sea that Russians easily dispersed weak native tribes and established their
original Pacific foothold in 1649.
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Farther north, the extreme remoteness of the Chukotka and Kamchatka peninsulas
long hampered Russian control by their extreme remoteness. The Chukchis of
Chukotka were eventually left to their own devices and enjoyed the distinction of being
the Empire’s only officially “not fully pacified” people down to the 20th century. Fierce
resistance of native Koryaks and Itelmens delayed Russian control of Kamchatka until

The Cascade Mountains serve as very effective borders of the region to the east.
Blocking the Pacific rains from entering the estranged eastern portion of the states,
they set off a chain reaction of differentiation that begins with climate and vegetation,
runs into separate economies and population densities, and ends in deepset cultural
differences. Eastern Washington and Oregon are absolute parts of the vast Land Ocean
- in terms of how they make a living, in the appearance of the landscape, and by their
very political spirit. The Cascades not only are a barrier to moisture, but they also
inhibit east-west transportation and trade. While the ports of the Pacific Gateway
provide a linkage to Asia, the back door connection to the rest of the United States is
via highways that must chug up mountain passes or railroads that tunnel through some
of the longest stretches in America. Easier connections are north and south to Alaska
and California. Los Angeles is only 1000 miles from Seattle and Portland, but Chicago
is 2000 miles away; New York City, 3000. By air transportation, Anchorage is about
half the distance from Seattle as is the U.S. East coast. On the other hand, the ports of
the Pacific Edge are favorably suited for trade with the “tigers” of Asia: Japan, South
6

Face to the East
Aged stones and such face to the east,
Where rains are mixed with clay and the drain steep,
Overflowing rivers and rice fields,
Where roads cannot bear up - so heavy is the earth.
Even the stones and such always face to the east,
Where waves pouring heavy as leaden slumber
Rush over the buoy, spread across the breakwater
onto the land
Split around the eyelid, fall down the face and die
away...
And through the V-form of the cranes' flight,
The gunpowder mist melts over Sakhalin.
~Yury Kabankov, "Litsom na vostoke", from S.
Balabin and L. Knyazev, editors, Tikhookeanskiy prioboy (Pacific Waves) collection, 1984,
Dal'nevostochnoye knizhnoe publishers, pp. 136137. Vladivostok.
[translation by K. Braden]

7

the reign of Peter the Great, when it became the base for exploring and claiming the
American coast, most notably Alaska. The cruel climate of Alaska and the Far East
prohibited cultivation and large-scale Russian settlement, though, increasing the lure of
the far warmer and inviting lands along the Amur river. But in the attempt to expand
south from the sea of Okhotsk Russians clashed with a matched rival - the Manchu
Chinese Empire. In 1689, Russia retreated from the Amur, fixing the boundary with
China along the Stanovoi range. Only in 1858 was then-weakened China forced to
cede the almost unpopulated lands along the Amur and Ussuri rivers, which serve
as the Russo-Chinese boundary to our day. Since the Government was anxious to
consolidate the hold over the new provinces, thousands of settlers were encouraged to
come and farm the fertile land. Still, in the Far East the Empire clearly overextended
itself. Colonists could arrive overland, but commodities had to reach the Far East by
traversing half the globe in the ocean journey from Petersburg to Vladivostok. The
region had to import a major share of its food supplies. Alaska was provisioned by
and therefore firmly tied to the United States, while the mainland Far East was largely
supplied with food (and manual labor) from neighboring Chinese Manchuria. Alaska
was sold to the United States in 1867. The logical Russian attempt to expand into
Manchuria clashed with similar designs by Japan, and this territory was lost as well in
the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05).
Russia’s bastion on the Pacific was hard won and is therefore gingerly guarded. Large
portions of the region continue to be claimed by China or Japan (which attacked
Russia in 1918-22 and in 1937) and the Far East long remained a fortress rather than a
gateway to its neighbors. Vladivostok literally means “The Ruler of the East.” Military
concerns reigned supreme over economic development goals, especially due to the
strategic importance of the Far East: the Arctic aside, this is Russia’s only outlet to the
open ocean. The huge naval bases in Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok are second only to
one in Murmansk. The military presence is highly visible, as sailors reportedly make up

Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. The great circle route on the globe shows that Seattle is
the closest port to Tokyo in the coterminous United States.
The states of the region are relatively new: Oregon joined the union in 1859,
Washington in 1889, and Alaska only in 1959. We include a small portion of
northern California in our region, so it is the grandfather with statehood in 1850.
But human habitation here dates back thousands of years. Members of the Native
American tribes of the Pacific Northwest probably witnessed the devastating eruption
of Mount Mazama that formed Crater Lake in Oregon or even the Great Spokane
flood of 15,000 years ago, believed by some to be one of the largest floods ever to
occur on the planet. The culture of Native Americans along the Pacific coast has been
among the most highly developed on the continent. Despite years of decimation
and impovershment thanks to the arrival of the Anglo population, tribal groups
are still evident in the economy and culture of the region. The Coast Salish and
Oregon Penutin tribes have connections to the Native Americans who extend up the
coast through British Columbia and Southeast Alaska. Within Alaska itself, Native
Americans have made important economic inroads in terms of land claims, particularly
since the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.

'Once by the Pacific'
The shattered water made a misty din.
Great waves looked over others coming in,
And thought of doing something to the shore
That water never did to land before.
The clouds were low and hairy in the skies,
Like locks blown forward in the gleam of eyes.
You could not tell, and yet it looked as if
The shore was lucky in being backed by cliff,
The cliff in being backed by continent;
It looked as if a night of dark intent
Was coming, and not only a night, an age.
Someone had better be prepared for rage.
There would be more than ocean-water broken
Before God's last 'Put out the Light' was
spoken.
-- Robert Frost

Early exploration and settlements by Europeans in this region extend back to the
16th century when Spain and England sent exploratory parties. The 1778 voyage of
James Cook from England, 1788 exploration of Robert Gray from Boston, and the
famous 1805-1806 Lewis and Clark expedition all marked the start of larger scale
white movement into the Pacific Northwest. Meanwhile, Russian influence had been
extending into the region since the late 1700s, when the first Russian settlement was
founded at Old Kodiak in Alaska. Russian fur traders, working with the native Aleut
people and borrowing their skills in trapping sea otters, made their way down to
California in search of food supplies for the Alaskan settlements. By the time Russia
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10 percent of the population of Vladivostok and 40 percent in Nakhodka and
Petropavlovsk. Separated from Russia by the huge expanse of the Land Ocean, the
Pacific Edge is still something of a militarized “overseas” dependency.
Throughout the Soviet period the Pacific Edge was persistently the fastest-growing
region of the country, with a population expanding more than fivefold. Since the
1960s, migration has been driven not so much by the earlier romantic appeal of the
last frontier as by the magnetic pull of high wages. Among the increasingly non-idealist
generations of young Soviets, the region acquired the reputation of a “Promised Land,”
where special wage incentives sometimes double what is paid for equivalent work
in European Russia. The region drew those who were ready to tolerate temporary
deprivations for the sake of a good future life. Forfeiting their previous skills and
prestigious professions, these people came to clean fish, to work as cooks on fishing
trawlers, and to serve as cargo handlers in harbors or as general manual labor in
expeditions. Their sole goal was to save enough money to start a decent life back home.
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But this image of a “Promised Land” proved to be misleading. Nowhere else in Russia
was there so acute a housing crisis. In the smaller settlements in particular, many still
live in makeshift shanties popularly known as “Shanghais.” The high proportion of
well-paid young people in the population makes especially intolerable the shortage
of kindergarten facilities, movie theaters, or good consumer goods in stores. High
wages also prove rather ephemeral due to a correspondingly high cost of living. For
many, the savings are just enough for an extended vacation and spending spree “back
west,” and then they are forced back to try again. The influx of new waves of youths
is counterbalanced by the out-migration of older people, mostly disillusioned former
enthusiasts no longer able to tolerate the unsettled and raw life in the region. Due
to this turnover of people, in recent decades the population grew only at the average
national rate. Numerous temporary residents, mostly women, are recruited to work in
fish processing plants during the season, from June to October, and leave afterwards.

sold the United States its claims in Alaska for eight million dollars in 1867, Russian
cultural presence was firmly on the landscape in places like Sitka and as far south as
San Francisco. “Oregon Country” was claimed by Russia, Spain, France, England,
and the United States, but by 1818 England and the United States were left to be the
real game players in the region, spurred on by the fur trade. Astoria, named for John
Jacob Astor of the American Fur Company, was established near the mouth of the
Columbia River. By the latter half of the 1800s, there was an uneasy joint occupancy
of the region by the British and Americans, as well as a strong migration of pioneer
agricultural settlers into the Willamette Valley. The Oregon Trail and Oregon Country
became a major focal point of the great American westward flow of white people.
Portland, Seattle, and Tacoma were established settlements by the 1850s. Compromise
in 1846 had determined that the U.S.- Canadian border should extend along the 49th
parallel, thus cutting off British Columbia from inclusion in our region, although by
climate, economy, and recent influx of Asians it may logically be considered part of the
“Pacific Edge.” The international boundary also isolated a small piece of Washington
State, Point Roberts, which can be entered by land only through Canada, and left
undetermined the boundary around the San Juan islands, which became part of the
United States much later when the German Emperor arbitrated the land dispute
between British and American islanders in 1872.
With the advent of railroad connections to tie the young region with the rest of the
country, the friction of distance began to erode. From the 1880s to 1910 for example,
Washington Territory witnessed a 1400 percent growth in its population, a forewarning
of philosophical battles over growth that would be repeated later in the century. The
feeling of separatism from the rest of the United States has been strong in the Pacific
Edge, and when Ernest Callenbach published a novel in 1975 hypothesizing the
secession of Oregon, Washington, and Northern California, it rang true to many
people who wanted to keep their environmentalist values and utopian imagery of the
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The threads of migrational moves continue to tie the young and immature Pacific
frontier to European Russia. The residents are likely to have more friends and relatives
in Moscow than within ten miles from home, and experience the region only as a
remote and isolated outlier of European Russia.
The “island” sense of psychological isolation is strengthened by the lack of cohesiveness
within the region. The more firmly settled Amur Lands are reliably linked to European
Russia by the TransSiberian railway and have developed as Pacific outcrop of Russia’s
main settlement zone and diversified economy, lying beyond the emptiness of the
Land Ocean. The populations of both Vladivostok and Khabarovsk have reached the
one-million mark. In contrast, the northern part of the region is dominated by small,
scattered, and isolated settlements linked only by air. All basic necessities for Chukotka,
Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Kurile islands, and Magadan, as well as all regional exports,
pass through the seaports of Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Vostochnyi, and Soviet Harbor/
Vanino, where the TransSiberian terminates. The whole of the region clings closely to
the Pacific, which binds together its parts and also accounts for the region’s importance
to Russia.

region intact. The name “Ecotopia” became popular, fed by the anti-growth sentiment
that was perhaps most strong in Oregon. But the battle seems to be lost. “There
are just too darned many people here now” is a complaint one hears frequently in
Portland and Seattle. Traffic jams regularly choke interstates that were once “overbuilt;”
formerly pristine hiking trails fill like crowded streets on summer weekends; huge
new urban corridors are springing up around Portland and on the eastern side of Lake
Washington; and in the heart of Ecotopia, pollution is an ongoing problem. The final
blow to the hideout region came with change in its geographic situation. The Pacific
Northwest has become a victim both of its own quality-of-life mythology and the postindustrial economic shift that has freed up the American population to locate in areas
once considered too remote. And when the variable of Pacific Rim boom economies in
Asia are added in to the equation, it is clear that events outside the Northwest are still
determining the fate of this utopia.

Shut off from the rest of the country by the Land Ocean, the region has long enjoyed
a semi-autonomous island existence. Between 1920 and 1922 it was the nominally
independent Far Eastern republic, created as a Russian buffer to thwart Japanese
expansion. Afterwards, the nearly autonomous Far Eastern Territory preserved its own
economic planning system as late as 1937. Even today, local residents acutely feel that
they are islanders, usually referring to the European regions of Russia as the mainland,
or the continent. Whether for Russia or Pacific investors, the region seems to still
function as an island dependency in an economic sense.
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THEME 1: CHASING A RIM OF GROWTH

THEME 1: CHASING A RIM OF GROWTH

As befits a dependency, the economy of the Far East focuses on the extraction of
resources for outside markets, and, as befits an island, it is strongly linked to the sea.
The principal treasure of the Far East has been fish. The region accounts for 40 percent
of the national catch, and the fishing industry is its leading economic sector - in
Kamchatka and Sakhalin fishing accounts for a staggering 55 to 75 percent of the value
of industrial output. Yet most of the catch is limited to coastal waters, rather than the
nearby open ocean, and the fish reserves are severely overtaxed, not least by Japanese
poaching.

The story of jobs in the Pacific Edge of America is a journey from lumber mills to
Nintendo games, and along the way, people could always find work building airplanes
or missiles. Trees, soil, fish, and minerals formed the first base for employment in
western Washington and Oregon, and raw materials still very much dominate the
Alaskan economy.

Another prime resource for exploitation has been timber, but many of the best
species and easily accessible stands are tapped out. What remains is either larch (not a
prime commercial species) or forests on mountain slopes. A wood products industry
commensurate with the resource size has not been established, thus limiting the
economic value of the wood cut. Trade with Japan, which originally purchased much of
the raw log exports from the Far East, has become more limited as the most desirable
species are exhausted. Much wood is harvested in a reckless manner, and foreign
investors from South Korea and the United States have met opposition to logging from
Native Siberian groups and environmental organizations.

13

The gift of ancient volcanoes (non-ferrous metals, especially tin) is another source of
wealth, but the extent of mining is not at all comparable to the huge operations in the
Land Ocean. Although the region has long been known to possess coal and oil, local
production accounts for only one fifth of regional needs. Both coal and oil are mostly
found in the north of Sakhalin island, with major new oil and natural gas fields located
offshore in the Sea of Okhotsk, clad in ice for most of the year and frequently stormy.
Thus far Russia has failed to develop these offshore fields without western technology.
Overall, the share of the region in Russia’s industrial output and exports is well lower

About 25 percent of the nation’s lumber comes from the Pacific region. While hemlock,
spruce, and cedar are important species, perhaps the one tree that symbolizes the timber
industry in the Northwest more than any other is the Douglas fir, a coniferous species
that is not really a fir at all but can grow to 325 feet tall, with diameters up to seventeen
feet. Douglas fir provides about fifty percent of the annual harvest in the Northwest,
thriving in the climate to become a favored species for regrowth in the tree plantations
that supply much of the mill and export logs for the region.
The timber industry may be the founding heart activity of the Pacific Edge. For over
one hundred years, the forests of western Washington, Oregon, and northern California
provided an apparently unending supply of huge-diameter, original growth, and
second-growth trees. But in the 1990s, it looks as if the party is over, and many people
in towns that depend on the trees are feeling the impending loss of their employment
base. The controversy over logging the remaining original forest is representative of
the changing identity of the region, in what has come to be billed as the fight between
logger and environmentalist. The trees of the Northwest also point to the importance
of trade with Japan and other countries of the fast-growing Pacific Rim. About forty
percent of logs cut in Washington, for example, have been exported yearly to markets
in Japan. While many regions of the United States complain about jobs lost to Asia,
the Northwest has benefitted as Japan, Taiwan, China, and South Korea absolutely
dominate the turnover in trade through Seattle, Portland, and other port cities.
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than its proportion of population. Local production of consumer goods is able to meet
only 30 percent of the region’s needs and half of its food is imported. The geopolitical
importance of the outpost region has led the Russian government to subsidize up to
a third of regional spending. Since the Soviet economic system tended to underprice
major imports into the area, such as fuels, foodstuffs, and especially labor, the huge
expenses of creating a workplace, building housing for volatile migrants, and paying
higher wages necessary to attract a workforce were mostly borne by other regions. As
Russia’s switch to a market economy stopped the flow of subsidies, most businesses
could not afford to pay higher wages themselves, and residents who came here for
big money started leaving in droves. The current crisis underscores not only that
investment in this region is proving risky due to organized crime and a chaotic
economy, but also that the Far East was a money-losing dependency of Russia, not a
profitable resource colony.
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These hard times are especially ironic since the region was viewed earlier by the Soviet
government as a gateway, a hinge linking their economy to the dynamic Pacific Rim.
To facilitate Russia’s entry into the “Pacific Age,” projects such as BAM (Baikal
Amur Mainline railroad) were undertaken in the 1970s to create a new Siberian land
bridge linking the Pacific and Europe. During the world oil crisis of the same period,
prospects looked bright for the development of the Far East as a resource frontier for
capital-rich but resource-poor Pacific Rim economies. A number of resource projects
were conceived jointly with Japan, including timber harvesting and processing as
well as oil and liquified natural gas production in Sakhalin for the Japanese market.
Most big hopes of the period were dashed with the onset of post-oil-crisis resourcesaving technologies that dramatically devalued primary materials and reduced the
attractiveness of investment in resource projects. Also, in comparison with Canada or
Australia, the Soviet Far East simply is not the most attractive of resource frontiers in
the Pacific Rim. The ebullient perception of the Far East as a potential Klondike,

Colored strips of imported Asian cars cover Seattle’s waterfront piers; banks and trading
companies that specialize in Asia bring money into the Northwest economy. Small
wonder that when the Seattle baseball franchise fell under ownership by Nintendo, the
main complaints about Japanese purchase of an American institution like baseball were
heard largely from outside the region.
Hard feelings have evolved over the years, however, regarding fishing disputes between
Asian countries and Northwest companies in the Pacific. Many of the original salmon
runs are threatened or gone, and much of the focus of the fishing sector has moved on
to Alaskan waters. Similar to problems in managing forest resources, arguments abound
over who has the right to take salmon; from questions over guarantees made by treaty
to the Native Americans (for whom the salmon is as important part of traditional
culture and spirituality), to international conflicts with Japanese fishing interests.
When voices are added to the fray from commercial and sports fishers, from users of
hydropower produced by the Columbia, and from farmers depending on irrigation
waters in the eastern portions of the states, the salmon hardly have a chance. The fish
with the romantic names like sockeye and chinook, who hold so firmly to their home
beacon, have proved no match for human competition.
Manufacturing has always played a smaller role in the region’s economy. Distance from
major market centers has tended to limit industry only to that related to resources,
such as lumber mills or canneries, or to specialized production not directly tied
to transportation. But in Washington State manufacturing bears the name of one
company: Boeing, which has dominated local industrial employment more intensely
than any other comparable example for manufacturing in U.S. cities. By 1970, as a
result of a downturn in demand for airplanes, Boeing laid off 65,000 workers within
two years, putting a dent in the city’s economic base that was to affect urban planning
in Seattle for many years ahead. The city swore it would never again be so addicted to
16

widespread among Russians, is but a misleading exaggeration. In this region, the
potential and the actual always seem to be at odds.
The Pacific Edge of Russia is still a young frontier in the early rude stage of
development. Its population of 5.5 million, clinging to the international line is
completely overshadowed by its neighbors: about 120 million in Japan, 60 million in
Korea and 90 million in the Manchurian provinces of China. Nowadays, with always
remote Russia in disarray and the economy liberalizing, these realities of geography
prompt the Pacific Edge to trade the old idea of a hinge between Russia and Pacific
Rim for one-way integration into the latter. Following the example of the economicallyaggressive “Tigers of Asia” (such as Hong Kong and South Korea) the Far East became
home to Russia’s first free economic zone in Nakhodka, and the whole of Sakhalin
Island enjoys a special status of “economic homerule.” The region is Russia’s leader in
the development of transborder barter trade, especially along the Chinese boundary.
Special economic zones are being created on the Chinese side of the international line
to take advantage of commerce with Russia, the largest of them being across the Amur
River from Blagoveshensk. The two banks of the city are now linked for the first time
by power and telephone lines and a railway crossing. The United Nations is financing
a project that plans to bring together the comparative advantages of Russian natural
resources, Chinese labor, and technology from Japan and South Korea to undertake
manufacturing for export. China and North Korea are regarded as potential sources
of labor for the chronically underpeopled region, especially for achieving food selfsufficiency, and the first groups of Asian farmers are already tilling land in the Maritime
territory.

one company, and began a program to diversify its work force. Today, Boeing is still the
main game in town in terms of the manufacturing work force in the region. Compared
to Seattle, Portland has always been more diverse in its manufacturing employment,
relying on wood products, transportation equipment, and machinery companies.
Geographers and economists studying the urban economies of the Pacific Edge had
subscribed to traditional theories that held to the notion that manufacturing would
provide a major export base for a region’s economy. Despite the downturn in timber,
fishing, and some manufacturing, the region gained jobs in services and there was a
boom in downtown office construction. Where were the jobs coming from? Reports
suggest that transportation and trade, communications, finance, and business services
are bringing money into the region. What has come to be known as the “Post Industrial
Economy” nationally is already apparent in the Pacific Northwest, with markets in
other western states, in Europe, and particularly in Asia. By the end of the 1980s, Asia
was providing 43 percent of imports into the United States and buying 31 percent
of American exports, and the ports and businesses of America’s Pacific Edge were big
beneficiaries of this growth spurt. Added to these connections was the location of “high
tech” activities in the Seattle and Portland metropolitan areas, particularly computer
software firms such as Microsoft, recreational firms like Nintendo, and biotechnology
and genetic engineering companies.

Yet even as the region’s hopes to join the Pacific club are revived, it can be admitted
only as a semi-colonial resource appendage. Choosing new masters will hardly bring
rapid prosperity. Thus far, Pacific integration is most visible in the terms of
17
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automobiles and videocassette recorders for sale in Far Eastern cities. In most cases the
worthless cars are traded for precious natural resources in shady deals by mushrooming
local businesses that operate in the gray zone between law and crime. The region is
gripped by the “grab and go” spirit of unbridled speculation. As a result, crime has
skyrocketed, particularly street robberies and burglaries, and it is not uncommon for
foreign business investors to hire armed guards to protect equipment deliveries. Some
regard the system of pay-offs as a necessary expense, and perhaps a more serious damper
on investment is the uncertainty of the business climate along the Pacific Edge.
THEME 2: LIVING ON A RING OF FIRE
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In its attempt to become a prosperous gateway, the region may well lose its most
valuable asset, that of being the remote refuge of nearly pristine nature. Foreign wood
products companies have already invaded the forests of the region, with North Korean
operations in Amur Oblast already accused by Russian environmentalists of severe
overcutting, and U.S. companies interested in tapping into the remaining tracts of
trees. Wild animal populations are experiencing increased pressures as well: having
discovered the high value of bear bile on the Japanese market, poachers killed 2000
bears in Kamchatka just in the summer of 1992, frequently not even bothering to take
the animals’ hides. Considering that the entire bear population of Kamchatka barely
exceeds 10,000, the consequences can be dramatic. This case is typical: the rootless
population that has gathered in the region in search of fast money is ruthless in pursuit
of a new Klondike, and is quite willing to sell to the highest bidder not just their
labor but also the region’s unique natural wealth. For all its immense area, the region
has little room to reconcile its Gateway and Getaway functions. Hortensia, a typical
domestic plant in European Russia, circles tree trunks up to the tops. In the wild forests
of Sikhote-Alin, you can still hear the growling of the Ussuri tiger under the larches.
Kamchatka boasts fur seal breeding grounds on Kommodore Islands and bird rookeries
along the coast.

THEME 2: LIVING ON A RING OF FIRE
The Pacific Northwest may be at the “edge” of the continental United States, but
geologically it is at the center of action. Volcanoes, mountains, and earthquakes
all provide evidence of the region’s belonging to the Pacific Ring of Fire, a rim of
seismically active zones around the Pacific Ocean Basin. The Pacific Edge is one of the
few places in America where someone can actually see geologic processes happening.
The result has been a place of both incredible natural beauty and deadly attraction.
This environment of fire and ice can be traced back to the Pacific Ocean plates, riding
on a crust of magma. Off the coasts of Washington and Oregon lies an oceanic trench,
swallowing up seafloor crust at a rate of 2 to 3 inches per year. As the North American
continent drifts westward, the Pacific Plate slips into this trench. There was a time
when you could own Pacific beachfront property in Spokane - if you were around a few
hundred million years ago.
The microcontinent that formed the North Cascades sailed across the Pacific fifty
million years ago, bringing with it the volcanoes that were to form the classic peaks.
Along a line parallel to the ocean trench a series of fire breathers grew out of the
mountains - the stratovolcanoes of the Cascades, formed by alternating layers of lava
and debris thrown violently out of the mouth to create giant cones on the landscape.
One of the most striking of these may have been Mount Mazama in Oregon, 9,000
to 11,000 feet high. About seven thousand years ago, Mazama blew its stack in an
eruption so huge it resulted in a caldera- a collapsed cone. As water seeped in, it
became one of the most beautiful sights in the northwest - Crater Lake. The most
recent example of the dangers of life among the volcanoes has been the May 18,
1980 eruption of Mount St Helens in southern Washington. The blowout took the
lives of thousands of animals and more than 30 human beings, in an explosion that
released the equivalent energy of 21,000 Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs. People in the
Northwest watched the whole event on their televisions.
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The desire to preserve these unique environments led to the creation in the Pacific
Edge of some of Russia’s largest nature reserves. The 934,000-hectare (>2 million
acres) Kronotskiy reserve on Kamchatka protects native sable which had been
overhunted. The reserve contains sixteen spectacular snow-covered volcanoes such as
Krasheninnikov and Kronotskaya Sopka. The warmth of the underlying strata heats
up the waters of some lakes in the reserve to the point where they do not freeze even
in the harsh winter, and plant life as well as animals flourish around these natural hot
tubs. But perhaps the most famous feature of the reserve is the Valley of the Geysers,
not even “discovered” by scientists until 1941. While the whole valley churns and
steams with hot springs and twenty-two major geysers, the most famous are “Velikan”
(the Giant), which explodes water every five hours, and “Fontan” (the Fountain), which
sends out a jet of water five stories high.
Any misstep can destroy the fragile environmental balance, and indeed the region
provides examples of both Russian early environmental protection and thoughtless
“frontiersmen” exploiting the “unlimited bounty” of nature. In Kamchatka, marshes
have been drained to increase agricultural areas, which, along with lumber operations,
pronounces a death sentence on the salmon nursery grounds - the main treasure of
the area. The All Terrain Vehicles and caterpillars used by geologists and the military
leave scars on the landscape that take five or six years to heal. The destroyed vegetation
undercuts the foodbase of small rodents who are in turn the main food of the sable and
fox populations. It has been reported that in Kamchatka alone there are about 12,000
of these so-called “geologists’ paths.”
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But nature here can turn the tables and be threatening as well to human inhabitants
of the Far East. Just as the sea forms the identity of the Far East, its landscape
is dominated by the mountains. There are about thirty active volcanoes just on
Kamchatka, and the Kuriles are simply a chain of partially submerged volcanoes. The
great volcanoes, such as Avachinskiy, Karymskiy, Shiveluch, and Klyuchevskoi (which

The mountains of the Northwest are a prime influence on the region’s vegetation
and climate. Washington State has one of the few mid-latitude rainforests in the
world due to the odd juxtaposition of westerly winds off the Pacific and the Olympic
Mountain range. As the rains from the Pacific slam into the mountains, precipitation
may reach more than 200 inches of rain per year, creating moist conditions conducive
to the growth of huge cedar and hemlock trees. The coast range of Oregon is not as
high as the Olympics, and thus, Portland’s climate is slightly hotter and drier than
Seattle’s. The lack of major mountains and a relatively gentle coastline have resulted in
a region more welcoming to visitors. If you compare the Pacific coast of Washington
on a map with that of Oregon, you might wonder why all the development seems to
have clustered along the Oregon coast. Indeed, Saturday night in Seaside, Oregon, is
probably as raucous with teenagers as any city in the Northwest, and many towns along
the coast have drawn a livelihood from tourism.
But the state of Alaska has no rival in North America when it comes to real mountains.
From the Brooks Range in the north to the 20,000 foot high St. Elias Mountains rising
straight out of the sea in the south, Alaska is a marvel of fire and ice. Volcanoes such as
Mt. Iliama are quite active, and Alaska has witnessed some of the strongest earthquakes
in the United States in modern times, such as the March 27, 1964, earthquake of more
than 8 on the Richter scale, centered near Valdez.
The value of nature has been recognized by the abundance of federal and state land
preserves of various types in the region. In Washington and Oregon there are four
national parks (Mt. Rainier, Crater Lake, Olympic, and North Cascades), while Alaska
has eight, including Denali, Wrangell-St. Elias, and Gates of the Arctic, the three
largest in the national park system in terms of acreage. The national Wilderness Act of
1984 reserved even more land in the Pacific Northwest, and created a distinct category
because only areas “unaffected by human use” can be included. People are regarded as
rare visitors in these areas. Environmentalists complain that too little land has been
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rival the perfect beauty of Fujiyama’s cone), are objects of unconscious worship by the
Far Easterners, who speak of them as if they are living beings. The violent explosion
of volcano Bezimyannyi (“Nameless”) in 1956 blew off the volcano’s top in a manner
resembling the later famous Mt. St. Helens event. Tsunami waves and tropical
typhoons with their devastating effects are not infrequent visitors to the region as well.
The Russian expression “Life on Volcano” is not just metaphorical along the Pacific
Edge, and the allusion to the European Russia as the “firm earth” is not merely a
reflection of local “islander” mentality, but also a comparison to their own ground,
which indeed frequently trembles. People live here endangered by all four great
elements of nature - earth, water, air, and fire - and equally insecure in their alternating
roles as defenders of Russia’s outpost or inhabitants of a new colony thrown wide
open. The region is as young and rudely chiseled as its ferocious volcanoes, and just as
unsteady on its feet.
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preserved under this policy; others feel that too much land is being locked up that
could otherwise be used successfully on a multiuse basis. Also in the 1980s, the
Columbia Gorge was added to the nation’s list of wild and scenic rivers. Development
versus preservation is a constant battle on this beautiful section of the Columbia.
The Oregon side alone already enjoyed 27 state parks, and the stretch of river from
Hoodsport to the Dalles is considered one of the premiere windsurfing paradises in
North America.
People on the Pacific Edge seem to take full advantage of life on a ring of fire, and the
beauty of the natural environment may be dooming the area to a continued battle over
growth. The region’s service as front door to the Pacific is booming, and as most of the
local economy remains strong and the region’s national image so positive, new people
keep drifting in - for jobs, for the excitement of living in young states, for a chance to
sip espresso on the waterfront after work and climb the Cascade peaks on weekends.
It is not the cobwebbed corner of America any longer. Perhaps there has never been a
place which has had such mixed feelings about its own success.
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CONCLUSION
Kathleen Braden

“There are at the present time two great nations in the world which seem to tend toward
the same end, although they started from different points: I allude to the Russians and
Americans...their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of
them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.”
-Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
We began this book by claiming it was an experiment in Geography to
understand two large states by comparing their component regions. We
therefore had to decide what to include and compare, and what places
to exclude. Our Russian and American team of geographers found little
trouble in seeing elements of New York on Moscow’s streets, picturing
Siberia’s open space and the great American West as mirror images, and
finding pieces of Vermont just northeast of St. Petersburg. But when we sat
back at our meetings, closed our eyes, and imagined California, we saw,
well...California.

1

THE PLACES WE LEFT OUT
The places excluded from our new geography help explain why the eleven regions we
did include form such strong parallels. They also remind us about the organic nature of
boundaries and the fact that people will find ways to adjust to and overcome political
borders, living instead within the true lines that define everyday life and culture.
California
The authors could find no legitimate Russian counterpart to California, although the
suggestion was made that had Russia held onto Manchuria, it may have evolved into an
apt parallel. We borrowed only a small portion of southern California for the Mexistan
region, so what makes California largely un-pairable? With its size, economic strength,
and agricultural richness, the state could stand on its own as an independent country.
Twelve percent of the people in the United States live in California, and despite recent
economic troubles, California puts out a remarkably large share of American farming
and industrial products. Yet perhaps what Makes California so unique is the fact that
it best represents the United States of the future. The mixture of people who have
converged in California give a demographic preview of the United States of the 21st
century, when less Americans than ever before will be of white European ancestry, and
people of color or of Hispanic origins will form a significant share of the American
profile. This state already receives the major portion of new immigrants coming from
Asia and Latin America. In the twentieth century, American culture is being exported
all over the world, and most of that culture has been born in California. Los Angeles,
with almost 15 million people in its greater urban area, is reaching out beyond the
United States and becoming a leading city of the new Pacific Rim world region. In
short, California suggested no Russian counterpart to us because it is a phenomenon as
much as a place, and has no parallels anywhere in the world.
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The Baltic States, Western Ukraine, Moldova
The fluidity of culture and borders was apparent when the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics split up, new political units formed, and fifteen independent countries
emerged. Yet the outward wave of Slavic society and influence did not quickly recede,
and greater “Rossiya” is still alive along the border republics which we have included
in the book, such as Belorus and Kazakhstan. On the other hand, when the authors
designed the book’s scheme of regions, we excluded the Baltic Republics of Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia from the start. In part this choice represented the recentness and
controversy surrounding their incorporation into the USSR in 1940, but the decision
to exclude them had as much to do with their cultural and historic differences from
Russia. Lithuania itself for many centuries formed its own empire at the western edge
of Russia; Estonian culture has more in common with that of Finland; and Latvia is a
place of ancient Baltic traditions. With independence, the three republics have looked
more toward economic integration with Europe, although Estonia retains a large and
restless Russian population.
Western Ukraine bears little resemblance to the South of our book that includes
eastern Ukraine, let alone to Russian territory. The religion here is Catholic, and the
historic orientation toward the Central Europe of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that
once incorporated its lands. Moldova likewise was taken into the USSR relatively late
(1940) although as “Bessarabia”, its ancient name, it had been acquired by the tsars in
the nineteenth century. Romanian culture dominates here, despite the presence of a
significant Russian population with periodic suggestions of secession of the eastern edge
from the Moldovan state.
Caucasus
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It was not hard to give up immediately trying to find an American counterpart for
territory in the Caucasus republics (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). With the exception

of the narrow coastal strip of Georgia we include in the Tropical South, the Caucasus
are another peripheral zone separate to itself, despite years of inclusion within the
USSR. We also excluded the Caucasian internal republics of Russia just across the
mountains, such as Chechenya and Ingushetia. The people in all these areas live in
what may be one of the most complex cultural regions of the world, where linguistic,
historic, and religious differences all clash. Warfare has been a major feature of this zone
of collision, with periodic fighting between Chechens and Russians, Chechens and
Ingush, Abkhazians and Georgians, and Azeris and Armenians over control of territory.
Central Asia
In the lands south of Kazakhstan, a new consciousness is emerging for the people of
Uzbekistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan who increasingly see themselves
in terms of their own native heritage or as part of a greater Islamic or reborn Turkic
world. Therefore, these places seem un-pairable with any counterpart in the United
States, and indeed, seemed inevitably to be detaching from the USSR even at the start
of our project. Tajikstan, with its Persian cultural heritage, has been engaged in fierce
civil warfare, and Russia has not yet totally abandoned its influence on the region. The
imprint of the communist era is still felt here in terms of the political background of
some of its political leadership, the economic structure, and potential commercial ties
back to Moscow. Yet culturally, the Russian realm is receding, and even the Cyrillic
alphabet may soon be an historic artifact on the landscape.
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All these regions did not fit into our book plan not only because they were essentially
unpairable with a counterpart, but also because they did not fit into the heart identity
of a new geography of Russia and America. They are places out of synch with time as
well as territory. Just as California may represent the identity of America in the future,
the former USSR republics we excluded were part of the past: a state held together ever
so tentatively by a notion of a union “soviet” or a tsarist empire. Whether the borders

of that unit pulse outward again in the future has been less a question here than the
core identity of what is and will stay as “Russia.”
THE LAST PLACE
But there is one region left to explain on our Russian and American maps, and it is
perhaps unique, even to a greater degree than California. The region where the borders
of the two countries actually meet along the Bering Sea is an elephant’s graveyard of
boundaries. Here, the lines of longitude which define east and west on the planet begin
a frantic convergence toward the poles. Only here did a geologic bridge once unite the
two huge landmasses; and in this region geography shows its best irony as the Aleutian
island chain goes so far west that Attu Island spills over the 180th meridian and gives
Alaska the odd distinction of being both the easternmost and westernmost state in the
United States. Even time itself gets converted by an odd boundary in this place as the
international dateline turns Russia’s Monday into America’s Sunday.
In this region of strange geographies, Russia and the United States almost touch,
with only three miles separating Big and Little Diomede Islands. There are no mirror
regions here, only a territory in the Bering Sea where all that has both divided and
unified Russia and America has been played out. In 1942, the two World War 2 allies
exchanged lend-lease planes across the Alaska-Aiberian route, and by the end of the
war, Soviet pilots had flown almost 8,000 U.S. airplanes to Russia; yet, merely a few
years later in 1948, the line between the two countries became a wall, and the Cold
War closed the touchpoint, isolating native communities who had always lived along
these borders.

5

The bonds in this region between America and Asia went back even longer than the
lifetime of the local people; in fact, 15,000 years ago, ice formed a link here and people
from Asia traveled that landbridge which was one-thousand miles wide and claimed a

new world. The people who live here today from the Chuckchi of Siberia to the Inuit of
Alaska to the decimated Yukaghirs of the Russian Far East, recently saw a reforming of
the ancient linkage - this time by air as Alaska Airlines in 1988 reestablished the route
that was severed by the Cold War. Yupiks from Nome flew to Provideniya in Russia to
reclaim their connections with the people of Siberia.
Americans may be unaware of how many times Russia reached out across that frozen
sea. The Russian explorer Simon Dezhnev was the first white man to traverse the water
between the two continents. Vitrus Bering, for whom the Bering Strait was named,
traveled in the name of the Russian empire, and Alexei Chirikov explored the region in
1741, followed then by a litany of Russian, British, and American seagoers. Russian fur
traders and priests left behind a heritage of onion-domed churches along the Alaskan
coast. When Count Nikolai Rezanov determined that his fur traders in Alaska were
starving, he tried to extend his empire’s food search all the way to California where
Fort Ross was established in 1812 (with far more native Alaskans in residence than
Russians). Even today, services at St. Michael’s in Sitka, Alaska are given in Russian,
English, and Tlingit.
Some of the earliest joint ventures between Russia and America were fishing activities
that plied the waters of the Bering Sea, and commercial airline flights as well as tourists
now fly the arc that unites the two countries. Non-human inhabitants also persist in
overcoming the international border. Every year, 25,000 snow geese from Wrangel
Island leave their breeding grounds and fly to distant Washington State for winter
break. Cooperative Russian and American scientific work in the Bering Sea and Arctic
area focus on polar bear, sea lion, whales, and walruses. An international park has been
proposed between western Alaska and eastern Chukhota to unite Russian and American
efforts to protect the special cultural and wildlife heritage of the Bering Sea bridge.
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Our portrait of Russia and America then may end at this last place where two
continents touch and lines defining entire hemispheres and even time itself are drawn
in confidence not by nature, but by human convention. But the sureness with which
past borders on the globe have been rendered is giving way to puzzlement, and the
geography of tomorrow may seem more and more beyond the understanding of most
people. With a North American Free Trade Agreement that breaks down boundaries
between the neighbors of the western hemisphere and threatened civil wars of secession
to trouble Russia, the permanence of borders may increasingly be a comfortable
illusion. Perhaps the best way to make sense of a world map that seems to be a moving
target is to understand the real regions that people create through their common lives
together. At best, the rest may be just lines on a piece of paper.
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